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2Abstract
My research is based on twenty months' fieldwork carried out in Qamishly in 
Syrian Jazirah. The purpose of my study is to examine the lives of women in this 
community. Why women? The relations among women in this community are close 
and confidences easily shared; not so, for me, among men. The network path for 
external communication in this society is contained almost exclusively within the male 
world. I wished therefore to examine the society from the inside, using the eyes of 
women, to determine attitudes to ethnic, sectarian and class issues. For me, as a 
Japanese, a particular area of interest was the extent to which women's concepts of 
social duty and obligation led to their individuality being subordinated. In this society, 
the burden of duty and obligation falls most heavily on women.
The inhabitants of Jazirah fall into three main groups: local Arabs (Shawaya), 
Kurds and Christians which are further subdivided into tribes (Arabs and Kurds) or 
sects (Christians). In my study, I focus on the local Arab tribal confederation known 
as the Tai. The mechanism by which individuals identify themselves with their 
grouping, whether religious, tribal or class lies at the root of the whole network of 
obligations and restrictions on the behaviour of female members of society.
Not only do women take care not to fall victim to rumour, speculation or gossip, 
which in Jazirah is elevated almost to an art form. From the point of view of individual 
reputation, a woman will also be under pressure from her male kin. The standing and 
reputation of men in society are also vulnerable to any apparent failure to keep the 
family women under control. Jazirah women struggle with the dual obligations of 
ensuring their own and their family's honour and position in society in the context of a
rigid social code at the same time as expressing themselves as individual, 
personalities and as women. Some succeed.
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7Preface
I went to Syria in January 1989 for preliminary research, planning to carry out 
extended field research in the Jazirah region from April 1989. There was little 
information available on Syrian Jazirah (Khalaf, 1981; Rabo, 1986). Scholars whom I 
contacted had noted the suspicion felt toward social research carried out by a foreigner, 
because of the political sensitivity attached to studying Jazirah. Fortunately, I was able 
to secure a position as a research scholar at the Institute for the History of Arab Science 
in the University of Aleppo, which enabled me to carry out research on the women of 
Jazirah. I conducted field research during twenty months beginning April 1989, 
including supplementary research in April 1991, intended for a review of ethnic 
relations in the area in the aftermath of the Gulf War. I spent the first two months in 
Aleppo, the second largest city in Syria, obtaining government permission for my stay 
in Syria, and studying Arabic.
I moved to Qamishly, which was the biggest town in the Jazirah region, in June 
1989. I began research by asking friends to introduce me to their friends both in the 
town and the villages nearby. I planned to conduct research both in Qamishly and a 
nearby village. Qamishly was the regional economic and social centre, where the town 
inhabitants and villagers living nearby mix with each other through economic, 
educational and private activities. Through the exchange of everyday stories, gossip 
and rumour, the Qamishly women's views on rural-urban relations and the 
characteristics attributed to different ethnic or religious groups became apparent. Upon 
hearing these conversations at the beginning of research, I set out to investigate the
8women's views on ethnic or sectarian relations in Qamishly society, and of their own 
identity within it
Through my immersion in village life, I tried to investigate how regional 
economic developments based on agriculture and natural resources, coupled with the 
unstable social situation derived from ethnic or sectarian conflicts, affected their 
everyday lives and gender relations. After visiting several villages, I chose a village, 
which I shall in this thesis call Dubana, located about ten kilometres from Qamishly. 
The local inhabitants of Jazirah categorised themselves into three main groups: local 
Arabs (Shawaya), Kurds and Christians. Dubana was composed of local Arabs; local 
Arabs, along with Kurds were in the majority in this region; most of the villagers were 
members of the Tai tribal confederation whose paramount sheikh also lived in Dubana. 
I made my choice for the following reasons: the village was located near Qamishly, and 
the villagers had contact with different ethnic or religious groups in the town through 
their everyday economic and social activities; it contained only twenty-one households, 
excluding seasonal agricultural labourers. This village size made it possible for me to 
have close contacts with the villagers.
I lived with a family in Qamishly and commuted between Qamishly and Dubana 
every day. I stayed overnight in the village once or twice a week, and on other days I 
worked in the village, and in the evenings visited women in Qamishly with whom I had 
become acquainted through my friends and their families. Through conversations with 
the women both in the town and the village, I gradually recognised that gender norms 
became boundary markers that segregated society into differentiated ethnic or religious 
groups. Among Dubana villagers, their egalitarian and independent attitude toward the 
Tai paramount sheikh was evident in the duplication of ritual symbols in sheikh 
sponsored Islamic feasts, in private mourning ceremonies and also in the sheikh's 
acceptance of an obligation to protect the honour of the village women.
In the course of my field research, I needed to explore conceptual and social 
processes which held gender relations and collective identities together. My concern 
was to identify the words and actions used by women to indicate their acceptance and
9conformity to the behavioural standards, that shaped their normal lives. By focusing 
upon topics that were repeated often and circulated widely in society, in this thesis, I 
highlight dominant forms of social code and obligations, which the women repeatedly 
mentioned as forces constraining their activities, and which created the dilemma for 
them between adherence to socially acceptable collective standards and fulfilling their 
personal wishes.
I took notes on or taped my interviews and conversations, when the topic was 
not directly related to personal matters or political attitudes. If personal secrets, or 
political opinions on ethnic relations or relations with their tribal sheikhs were 
expressed, I listened, only occasionally asking questions; later I would write down 
these conversations as accurately and as promptly as possible.
Certain difficulties I encountered during my field research have constrained the 
scope of my thesis. Firstly, I was hampered by the political sensitivity attached to the 
study of ethnic groups in Syria. Studying plural ethnic or religious communities made 
my relations with interview subjects more complicated, because of a tendency to 
suspect that I might have affiliations with other ethnic or religious groups. Secondly, 
the nature of the subject made it difficult for me to use formal procedures like structured 
interviews. Thirdly, my position as a single woman prevented me from investigating 
many aspects of both men's and women's activities outside the home.
Arabic words used in the text will be transliterated according to the system in the 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Adjustments to Qamishly dialect and 
Shawaya dialect will be made in accordance with local pronunciation. I chose fictitious 
names for Muslims referred to in this thesis from Muslim Names (al-Ja'fari, 1977). As 
for Christians, I chose pseudonyms from names which were popular among the 
Qamishly Christians.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: THE SETTING OF MY
RESEARCH
In January 1989,1 visited Qamishly, the biggest local town in the Jazirah region 
of the Syrian Arab Republic in order to look into the possibilities of carrying out field 
research on methods used by women to construct culturally acceptable norms of social 
behaviour. Fortunately, during this preliminary stage of my research, I made the 
acquaintance of several local families through Japanese businessmen working in 
Qamishly. Their mediation helped me to establish confidential relationships with local 
families and their friends later on in the course of my main field research. In June 1989 
I began my stay in Qamishly.
During my time in Qamishly, I was often included in private conversations 
amongst local women through my network of friends. This participation gave me first­
hand knowledge of the prevailing cultural concept that social contact between men and 
women, other than with one's kin or affines, was taboo, since it implied relations of a 
sexual nature. I was to find out that this concept and its implications, constitute the 
Jazirah women's most important concerns in everyday life. This concept of gender 
segregation is transposed into interpretations of women's everyday behaviour. These 
interpretations in turn lead to gossip, which may well damage a woman's social 
reputation. Although this perception is an inescapable motif in their everyday life, 
women's activities do not strictly abide by this abstract ideal of gender segregation. 
For example, many educated Qamishly women work as school teachers, alongside 
male head-teachers who are usually unrelated men (gharaib). The idea of gender 
segregation is therefore clearly not strictly adhered to in all work places. Similarly,
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young single village women work as seasonal agricultural labourers also alongside 
unrelated men from different regions, while middle-aged village women regularly sell 
their dairy products in the Qamishly market in the company of non-kin men. When 
visiting kin and friends, women have many possibilities of meeting unrelated men. In 
such contexts, however, speaking to men is not regarded as shameful ( 'aib) conduct, or 
a violation of gender segregation.
During the first stage of my field research, I was perplexed by the variable 
interpretations of behaviour applied by women in different situations. For example, 
upon seeing friends of their husbands and brothers in the street, women would try and 
avoid them because it would be shameful for them to be seen speaking to these men on 
their own. However, when these women met these same men in the company of their 
husbands or brothers, they did not hesitate to openly socialise with them. Women 
interpret meanings of these meetings with unrelated men by referring to their 
conformity to socially acceptable behavioural standards. Through experience they come 
to understand how the norms of gender segregation are to be applied to particular 
situations, and which particular conditions are required to justify the socialising of men 
and women. I shall therefore first describe social norms that prohibit women from 
speaking to and meeting unrelated men. Then, I shall examine the social reality that 
accepts women working together or enjoying conversations with these men, on 
condition that they do not breach the norms of gender segregation.
In writing this thesis, I have used observations and insights I gained through my 
own encounters with these women, who shared their lives with me, in order to arrive at 
an understanding of their behaviour and their way of evaluating their own and other 
women's behaviour. My aim in this thesis is to describe the processes by which 
women create a collective identity. This collective identity means that women a) 
recognise their own behaviour as one which is conducted according to social norms, 
and b) affirm it as socially appropriate behaviour through the evaluation of their 
behaviour by others. This collective identity does not however seem to me to demand
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rigid compliance, but rather is subject to pragmatic interpretation, aimed at covering up 
tensions and conflict within the community.
Given these premises, I want to answer three questions about women: a) how do 
Jazirah women acquire some freedom of behaviour while conforming to norms of 
gender segregation and social behavioural standards?; b) how do women code their 
words and actions to indicate their acceptance of and conformity to the socially 
acceptable behavioural standards and values that have been shaped both in local history 
and the contemporary political and economic situation?; c) how do women make 
personal and private decisions, given the restriction that they are obliged to adhere to 
socially acceptable behavioural standards and must seek the positive approbation of 
others? In replying to these questions, I shall describe the everyday conversations and 
actions in which they present themselves as socially acceptable women. This applies to 
both the Qamishly city women, and women from the nearby village of Dubana.
1.1 Research Problems
During my field research, one of the most serious problems I regularly faced was 
that my interview subjects expected me to behave in accordance with their notions of 
what was acceptable behaviour for a young single woman, although they respected my 
position as a researcher seeking information. Most of them came to respect my 
intentions and even to take pride in telling me about their customs. One of my 
acquaintances, a Dubana villager, whose village I had chosen for carrying out my main 
research, agreed to accommodate me and to assist me in my contacts with the 
administrative authorities. In return, I had to conform to what he considered to be 
acceptable behaviour for a single woman. Dubana villagers were quite strict in 
enforcing cultural norms and in applying them to me.
As a student of anthropology, concerned to comprehend another culture and its 
order, it was imperative for me to adapt to the local culture, to learn the local modes of 
behaviour, to master culturally appropriate ways of speaking and behaving and 
particularly the social restrictions on their behaviour. In turn, the villagers related to me
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by placing me into their socially prescribed categories. Dubana villagers regarded me as 
their guest, friend, a researcher and a young woman. To outsiders, they introduced me 
as kanna. Kanna, derived from the verb of kanna, generally means daughter-in-law. 
Kinna, which is the word derived from the same root as kanna, means shelter or cover. 
When a person asks more influential people, kin or otherwise, to protect him/her from 
social conflict with others, and those people accept, they should then shelter him/her. 
In their understanding, I was a young woman coming into the village families from the 
outside, like a woman married into her husband's family, who needed their protection 
from outsiders. In time, their initial hospitality and graciousness as hosts, or hostesses 
and guardians gave way to a much closer relationship.
Dubana villagers, especially male villagers, regard unrelated men (gharaib) as 
potential enemies and a sexual threat to their female kin, particularly to the virginity of 
single women, and thus to their honour (sharaf). Women, as a consequence, must be 
protected by their male kin, and their movements outside the village restricted. Because 
of my relationship with them as kanna, a woman protected by the villagers, they held 
themselves responsible for protecting me. They would insist therefore that I was not to 
drop in on friends, or go anywhere on my own while commuting between Dubana and 
Qamishly, where I had rented a room. Whenever I went back from the village to 
Qamishly, either one of the village men would accompany me to my house, or they 
would choose a taxi-driver, be it a relative or friend, to take me. That I would submit 
myself to their protection was taken for granted by these villagers.
My conformity to their cultural norms of behaviour, concerns, and ways, did 
however pose restrictions on my freedom to move outside the village. In addition, 
while my anthropological and safety concerns obliged me to sustain this socially guided 
relationship of dependency and protection, clearly the more I agreed to abide by their 
notions of a single woman in Jazirah society, the fewer opportunities I got to move 
freely outside the village and speak to men who are seen as outsiders by the villagers. 
Consequently, these restrictions make it difficult for me to look into their lives as an 
outsider and observer.
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Just like other village women inside the village, I was able to speak to village 
men without any restrictions. The men were happy to allow me to join in their 
conversations, or to answer my questions. Soon after starting my research, I noticed 
that I needed to know more about their relationships with the people outside the village, 
in order to fully understand their conversations. It was necessary for me to gain 
information about their kin, affines and friends, if I were to understand the ways of 
maintaining relationships between them and the talk about their activities and 
behaviour.
On one occasion the son of a religious sheikh was getting married. I was asked 
by several of both the male and female villagers to join them in attending the wedding 
reception. I accepted gladly, as this was one of the rare occasions on which the 
villagers allowed me entry into their social network outside the village. On the day of 
the wedding, many village girls helped in cooking the meal for the guests, while the 
young men arranged the site for the reception. On ceremonial occasions the work is 
usually shared by close kin and neighbours. I asked many Dubana villagers about their 
relationship with the sheikh. Their answers were almost all the same: the sheikh 
belonged to the Tai tribal confederation, to which most of the Dubana villagers 
belonged, but was not their kin; they respected the sheikh because of his religious 
knowledge and ability. Given the non-kin nature of the relationship, I could not 
understand why the villagers offered their help to the sheikh's family.
One month after the wedding, an old couple in Dubana asked me to join them on 
a visit to the sheikh's household. Observing the behaviour of the couple towards the 
members of the sheikh's household, I realised that their relationship was similar to that 
between other commoner villagers in Dubana and the Tai paramount tribal sheikh. 
Even though the couple were visitors, the husband gave one of the sheikh's sons a lift, 
while the wife helped with the cooking and looked after the sheikh's grandchildren. 
These services indicated relations between inferiors and superiors; guests are never 
treated in this manner in relationships between equals. Although Dubana villagers, 
including this couple, insisted that the relationship between them and the sheikh was
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not that of unequals, and that it was customary to help close neighbours and friends, 
their behaviour clearly indicated difference in social status between them. Even this 
indication of status difference, the villagers using the cultural notion of mutual help to 
express their equality, interested me. Later on, as my field work progressed, I realised 
that this notion of mutual help was used as an important device by the commoner tribal 
members to deny status difference between themselves and the sheikh. They replaced 
the meaning of their behaviour by indicating the status difference as social exchange 
between equal individuals.
On this occasion, one of the sheikh’s daughters gave me a bottle of perfume as a 
present. In Jazirah society, the exchange of gifts is a means of initiating a new 
personal relationship. In terms of my research, it seemed to me that constituting close 
relations with the sheikh's household members might provide me with opportunities to 
understand their relationship with the Dubana villagers. Ten days after this first visit, I 
made a return visit to the daughter on my own, with a wedding present for her as she 
was going to marry a man in Saudi Arabia. However, my sudden visit obviously 
embarrassed the daughter and the other female members of the sheikh's household, and 
I was not welcomed as a guest on this occasion. The Dubana villagers had warned me 
not to visit people on my own, even acquaintances. Even though I explained to them 
the purpose of my visit, they were unable to understand my behaviour. I, for my part, 
was disappointed by the cold response of the sheikh's household to my visit, and even 
more by the villagers' response. In re-examining the situation, I understood that I had 
been allowed to attend the wedding reception as one of the village single women, i.e. in 
the company of responsible male kin, and was thus only allowed to visit the sheikh's 
household in accordance with the same norms as other single women in Dubana.
The villagers had judged my behaviour by applying to it cultural norms which 
they applied to their own female relatives. Although I recognised this as their way of 
preserving their identity, it left me with no choice but to adhere to the behavioural 
norms for single women. It was vital that I show my respect for them and their 
customs, in order to gain the trust and friendship of the villagers. This well-defined
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position of single women guided me in carrying out my obligations and responsibilities 
to, and dependence on, my host villagers, especially in the context of my activities 
outside the village. This experience also clearly demonstrated to me that a woman's 
behaviour was interpreted in the context of whether or not it fulfilled their social 
obligations.
The focus of my study became clearer through my participation in the complex 
relationships which developed between the villagers and me. Their aim was to control 
my behaviour outside the village and to fulfil their obligations to their kanna. Even 
though their hospitality and kindness were genuine, I often found it difficult to accept 
the social constraints upon my behaviour and the disregard for my own feelings. My 
own first-hand experience of the social obligations imposed for the sake of maintaining 
good relationships, brought me face to face with the question of how the village women 
- whose activities were more restricted than mine - handled everyday interactions 
without deviating from these social obligations, while at the same time limiting the 
effect of these social constraints and being able to express themselves as individuals.
In order to solve this problem I spent a large portion of my time building close 
relationships with the village women. I helped with their domestic chores and 
agricultural labour in the fields and joined them on their visits to Qamishly where they 
went to sell their dairy products. When they were free, I also spent time with 
individual women alone. I tried to get close to them, in order to encourage the women 
to confide in me and to discuss their perception of the dominant social values and 
obligations. They sometimes told me about their dilemma of acquiring social esteem as 
modest and obedient women and yet achieving their own wishes which may be 
inconsistent to these standards. In this process of getting to know these women and the 
way in which they identified their activities as socially acceptable, I came to the gradual 
realisation that women were constantly striving to maintain their social position by 
indicating their acceptance of and conformity to the social values and obligations. They 
also tried to accomplish their own wishes in socially acceptable ways, without 
damaging their social reputation.
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Conversations among close friends contained expressions of how their self­
esteem is affected by the social evaluation of their behaviour by others. There are two 
conventional expressions used for the anxiety that self-esteem may be lost by others 
(nas) labelling their behaviour as inconsistent to socially acceptable behavioural 
standards: 'how do others (na$ understand my behaviour?1; or 'if I do not do such and 
such, others may think that I do not know the way of this world (dunya)'. Women are 
therefore anxious about the possibility of their behaviour being judged as contravening 
the moral code by other people (na$ with whom they share a common cultural 
background. Dunya, in this context, refers to the social ideas of obligations and 
responsibilities to others necessary for maintaining one's social position and good 
reputation, and the social reality in which one's behaviour is subject to pragmatic 
interpretations by others who apply these ideas in different ways. A woman should 
learn the order, or dunya through her life experience. A woman interprets her 
behaviour from the point of whether or not it conforms to these ideas. However, a 
woman is often afraid that others who interpret behaviour in different ways in different 
contexts, can label her as dat, a person who has base characteristics, or does not know 
dunya
In this sphere, individual women strive to portray themselves as conforming to 
the general ideals of how women must be: modest, self-controlled, always denying 
their sexual desire and obedient to the social order. Although women seek conformity 
to prevailing social values, it is not always derived from their own inner wishes to be 
moral or good. Eickelman speaks of propriety: "the locus of propriety is not so much 
the inner moral consciousness of a person as his [her] public comportment with respect 
to those with whom he [she] has regular face-to-face relations" (1976: 138). Among 
Jazirah women, modesty and the obedience to the social order in the public sphere are 
essential in order to receive social approval. Social approval, however, is required not 
only for the fulfilment of their obligations to others, but also for self-respect and pride 
in conforming to the acceptable moral standard.
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Fear of losing one's self-esteem, derived from anxiety that women may be 
judged by others as ignorant of dunya, increases when they are caught in a dilemma 
between acting morally and accomplishing their wishes. Women often seek the 
sympathy and help of their close friends who will understand their dilemma and help 
them restore their self-confidence by criticising others' judgement of her behaviour. 
The acknowledgement of their behaviour by their friends sets them at ease, because 
women's inner anxiety is never separated from others' evaluation imposed on their 
behaviour. Their confidence to themselves is constituted in, and through, social 
relations in which their behaviour can be acknowledged.
I shall investigate personal conversations and narratives which contain 
judgements as to whether or not behaviour conducted by women fulfils social 
obligations and their roles. The tales related by these women are not simply 
descriptions of personal experiences. The theoretical concern underlying the analysis of 
women's personal activities, is that they are always interpreted with reference to social 
obligations which women must fulfil in order to establish their social position in 
relation to others. When women talk about their personal experiences, using evocative 
words such as obligation ( ijbai), responsibility (maswnliya), and this world (dunya), 
they are in effect linking their experiences to prevailing norms of social duty. When 
women talk about their own behaviour and that of other women, they interpret it with 
reference to their relations to others, categorised such as father-daughter or brother- 
sister relations, and relations between patrilateral parallel cousins, neighbours and 
friends, all of which accompany specific obligations between them.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
Through my participation in the life of Dubana villagers, the subject matter of my 
research gradually becomes clear. My investigation of women's personal experiences 
will focus on the social obligations which must be fulfilled between individuals
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involved in certain relations, which thereby determine women's actions and so lead to 
their individuality being subordinated.
As a Japanese, my experience makes it easy for me to understand the concept that 
identity might be shaped by constructing social relations based on fulfilling obligations 
to others. Japanese identity is constructed by social relations between self and others in 
this world (seken) which includes norms of responsibilities and obligations to others, 
and the social reality which emerges from their interactions based on these norms. 
Iijima (1989: 55-6) discusses meanings of Japanese 'hito ':  it means generally people 
in the world {seken), and also the social order which organises human relations; it 
indicates others and also means self. This understanding of relations between this 
world, self and others is that Japanese 'hito' exists in the world of relations between the 
self and others. Japanese self is defined in the world of relationship to others. Mori 
(1976: 26-7) mentions the lack of individuality amongst the Japanese people, where 
individual experience cannot be distinguished from others' experience. According to 
him, moral values, for example honesty and innocence, which are the most important 
ideals for Japanese, are understood by the Japanese in relation to others, and without 
the existence of these others, honesty and innocence do not have meaning for them 
(Mori, 1976: 66-7). Mori (ibid.: 81) further discusses Japanese cognition of the self: 
they are not autonomous individuals in the Western sense, and their self consciousness 
has been developed by fulfilling roles and responsibilities to 'you', the 'other', for 
example, husband/wife, children, company staff and so on; one cannot decide his/her 
own behaviour without considering how 'you' interpret it. He/she is expected to react 
to 'you' in the same way as 'you' expect him/her to react to 'you'. The boundary 
between 'I', the first person and 'you', the second person, becomes ambiguous in 
Japanese social relations.
I, as a Japanese, empirically understand the social relations which emerge in 
negotiation with others and dunya in Jazirah society, in terms of what I have 
experienced in finding myself in my responsibility to 'you' and seken. To observe 
these proprieties is to respect relations between 'you' and 'me'. Common aspects
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between my Japanese self and that of people in Jazirah are that in both cases the 'self is 
restricted by social relations, especially obligations to others and the world, including 
the order and people who constitute it
The difference between the 'Japanese self' and the 'self in Jazirah is that in 
Jazirah individual experience is differentiated from that of others, and individual 
autonomy is an ideal which is sought Lack of individuality in Jazirah society is largely 
a result of social restrictions, to which individuals think they must adhere. Their 'self 
is achieved through the identification of oneself by fulfilling social obligations to 
others. During my field research, one question often arose: although women overtly 
express themselves and claim their right to do so, why do they lack individuality and 
always fear the loss of self-esteem?
People in Jazirah had little knowledge about Japan; other than the manufacturers 
of Japanese audio systems and cars sold to the Syrian market, and what they had heard 
of the A-bombed city of Hiroshima. They knew little however, about Japanese 
custom, religion and personality. My religious affiliation was one of their most 
important concerns. Thanks to my Japanese origin, I could tell them that I was 
Buddhist, even though I was not religious. My religious affiliation helped me to keep 
myself out of the regional framework of opposition between Muslims and Christians. 
Some of Dubana villagers, who were Muslims, said to me, “if you were Christian, we 
would not have accepted you”. Neither Muslim villagers or Qamishly Christians were 
able to attribute to me any base dispositions which they attributed to their religious 
rivals when asserting their own superiority.
People in Jazirah tried to understand me as a Japanese and gave me stereotyped 
questions. They always asked me about Japanese attitudes to the fulfilling of 
obligations to kin, and the constraints on women's activities. Typical questions were: 
a) “we visit our relatives regularly. It is our obligation (ijbai). In the West they ignore 
the value of these relations. How about in Japan?”; b) “women in Europe have little 
concern for family ties. They live apart from their parents when they grow up. 
Unmarried women go out alone. How do Japanese women behave?”
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They only refer to norms which are the most important for them in constituting 
social relations and achieving honour (sharai). They judged the behaviour of Japanese 
and Westerners from the point of their own social standards. On the basis of my 
answers, they concluded that the Japanese were better than Westerners. They found 
that the Japanese were more confined by social relations through responsibilities and 
obligations to others, than Westerners. Their understanding of the Japanese, including 
me, relayed to me the most important factors for them in shaping their identity.
My Japanese experience of constituting relations between the self and others, and 
their understanding of me as a Japanese, brought an important perspective to bear on 
my study. White (1992: 39) argues that the weight of individual-centred analysis has 
created a significant theoretical problem, aggravated by the persistent dualism in 
Western thinking on the self and society: private/public, inner/outer, emotion/reason, 
and individual/society. These contrasts are inevitably reflected in anthropological 
discussion on the person and self. Since Mauss (1985) elaborated cultural conceptions 
of social actors as the evolving unity of human beings’ self awareness, and the idea of 
person as a social concept compounded by judicial rights and moral responsibilities, 
according to Kirkpatrick and White (1985:10), many anthropological analyses leave the 
person and self as opposed, and postulate Western notions of person in the 
evolutionary sense, without paying attention to Mauss's different definitions of the self 
and person in different cultures and at different historical periods.
The self in Jazirah society is acquired in two contradictory ways: enhancement of 
the concept of obligations which ensure their own and their family's honour and 
positions in society, and enhancement of an individualism which leads to competition 
between individuals. The latter is encouraged by gossip about the shameful character 
and behaviour of others in order to enhance the image of oneself. An individual feels 
that his/her behaviour is always evaluated by others, who thereby judge the conformity 
of their behaviour to the accepted standards, and his/her behaviour must therefore be 
recognised by them. Through this mutuality, one confirms an inherent social link 
between his/her self and others, and so acquires self-respect. An individual can
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therefore only measure him/herself by an evaluation of his/her vice and virtue by 
others. Awareness of his/her own behaviour as evaluated by others results in the 
tendency to state more scrupulously his/her attachment to the behavioural standards. 
At the same time, an individual must make his/her own decisions on the basis of 
enhancing his/her own virtue and good characteristics in comparison to others. In this 
sense, an individual constitutes a figure of autonomous self only in opposition to 
others. Moral values, for example, honour, generosity and hospitality which are the 
most important ideals for Jazirah people, underline the autonomy and independence of 
individuals vis-'a-vis others. These personal virtues are not achieved by a moral 
consciousness but are rather reflected in the obligations undertaken in their relationship 
with others.
Whilst the Western notion of the self is characterised by psychological 
consciousness, focusing primarily on the reflective self-awareness of the subject 
(White, 1992: 30-1), the self as the basic category of inner consciousness is developed 
as a being possessing ideology and moral value, that is, a person. For example, 
Dumont (1985: 94) develops his discussion based on such Western notions of the 
person-self opposition and suggests an ideological dichotomy between individualistic 
Western ideology and holistic Indian ideology in which society as a whole is the focus 
of value. Dumont postulates the Western notion of individualism to understand the 
Indian individual. Anthropological discussions of how the individual and society are 
interconnected have been deployed by maintaining the distinction between the 
individual and person (e.g.: Fortes, 1973).
Yet, theoretical assumptions, framed in dichotomous terms such as 
individual/collective, self/the world, hinder us in our examination of culturally 
constructed individuals which are created in everyday interactions between self and 
others. In Jazirah society, an individual makes his/her own decisions in his/her own 
interests which reveal a sense of personal autonomy as well as in an intense concern for 
conformity of his/her behaviour to social standards. Through these contradictory ways 
of self-presentation, self and personal values are created.
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This way of assessing behaviour by natives should be explored. In this thesis, 
understanding behaviour in its relation to the notions of gender segregation poses one 
of the most important concerns. Gender segregation is found more or less everywhere 
in the Middle East; it affects decisions over one's behaviour and its interpretation as 
regards one's social position. As Kirkpatrick and White noted, "even if contextual 
bases of affect are universally recognised, we doubt if these are the sole means for 
constructing persons' status in any culture" (1985: 6). We should direct ethnography 
toward indigenous understandings and practices. This attitude makes it possible for us 
to investigate actions and emotional experiences which provide their own way of 
understanding the social norms. Even though gender segregation and the protection of 
female sexual virtue and the underlying the concepts of honour and shame, may appear 
in similar ways in different societies, we cannot depend on uniform interpretations. 
Ethnography should explicate the behavioural significance in terms of "a set of 
problems of social relationship or existential meaning that cultural systems often appear 
to present in emotional terms" (Lutz and White, 1986: 427).
Abu-Lughod and Lutz do not agree with the analytical approach taken by most 
studies about emotions dependent on psychological processes that predicate people's 
experiences and behaviour upon universal psychological processes (1990: 2). From 
early culture and personality studies about the individual, emotion and behaviour are 
often subsumed under the concept of personality (e.g.: Benedict, 1967; Mead, 1963). 
The concept of personality is traditionally an explanatory concept that responds to 
cross-cultural analysis and theories about social behaviour (cf. Spiro: 1984). (!) 
Caughey (1980: 175) suggests, that the problem of personality analyses within Western 
tradition is compounded in cross-cultural analyses: it is apparent that much of the 
analysis of cultural differences in relation to personality simply relies upon the 
perspective of equating the local label with an English gloss. "This tendency is linked 
to the assumption • • • that a single universal mode of personality appraisal underlies 
different ethnopsychologies" (Caughey, ibid.: 175). The concept of personality found
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in the Western tradition of research refers to individual behaviour and experience within 
the assumption that individuals are the focus of organisation in behaviour. Arguments 
for the behavioural validity of different cultures, which depend on this assumption, 
apply this Western notion of autonomous individual to the interpretation of behaviour in 
other cultures. In Jazirah, behavioural validity is based on one's relationship to others 
and dunya, from which the individuals acquires self-esteem. The Western notion of the 
autonomous individual seems not to be appropriate to analysing the experience and 
behaviour of people in Jazirah.
Recent interpretive approaches to emotions attempt to seek connections between 
social ideas and personal consciousness which lead people to particular behaviour 
constituting social relations (e.g.: Abu-Lughod, 1986; Abu-Lughod and Lutz, 1990; 
Rosald, 1984; White, 1991). This new trend rests on the view that the meaning of 
emotional words in non- Western societies should not be simply analysed on the basis 
of Western theories of emotion, and that English terms must not be employed as 
universal labels for describing motivational feelings without regard for indigenous 
perceptions of moral and social reality. This attention to the interpretation of emotions, 
with which indigenous concepts and practices are associated, presents an ethnography 
in contradiction to ethnographic models of emotion as defined in Western thought. For 
example, Errington and Gewertz's study of the Chambri in Papua New Guinea (1987) 
suggests:
"One of the main reasons, in our view, that Mead failed properly to 
understand the Chambri as persons - and thus misunderstood the 
relationship between Chambri men and women and the interests and 
strategies of each - is that she viewed them in terms of a culturally alien and 
Western model. Following this model, she saw them as subjectivities 
. which had developed as a result of emotionally formative experiences; she 
did not see them as repositories of social relationships" (ibid.: 40).
Errington and Gewertz re-examine Mead's field-notes about a perplexing dispute over a
disgruntled wife (ibid.: 71-75). They argue that Mead understood the anger of the male
participants in the dispute from the viewpoint of adultery. Errington and Gewertz argue
that Mead's focus is too narrow, and that they need to look at the Chambri view of the
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relationship between husband and wife, in order to understand the dispute as part of the 
continuing political struggle between big men.
Even though emotion is universal, it should be seen as exerting its own force in 
social relations and in directing practical actions. The social use of emotion enables the 
investigation of social reality which itself is constituted by referring to socially available 
ideas for defining relationships.
When I first began to work in Qamishly and Dub ana, I anticipated the 
significance of the use of the communal 'we'. This usage does not only indicate the 
existence of a boundary between co-members and excludes others, but also forms 
words and actions which indicate the actors' social position in relation to others. One 
of the most effective means for analysing the communal selfhood in those relations, is 
to investigate narratives of self-presentation in which individual words and actions are 
interpreted from the point of whether or not they fulfil the social obligations which the 
woman is expected to carry out in her relation to the community. Emotion about gender 
segregation and female sexual virtue expressed in narratives helps us find the key to 
understanding the social reality that women are in a dilemma over accepting the 
obligation of adhering to these ideas and the dissatisfaction of accepting social 
constraints which force them to conform to these ideas.
In Jazirah society, extra-marital relationships are strictly forbidden. This 
prohibition is strongly supported by notions of family honour (sharai). If an extra­
marital relationship is discovered by the woman's kin or any one else, her male kin are 
obliged to kill or punish both her and her lover in order to regain lost honour, caused 
by their loss of control over their female kin's sexual acts. Affairs are understood as 
disgracing the women's family honour. Two primary dimensions of indigenous 
conceptualisation emerge from the symbolic meanings of prohibited love: a) men's 
responsibility (maswuliya) to their female kin to prevent them from sexual offence by 
unrelated men, along with their right (haq) of control over their women's activities; b) 
shame ( 'aib), brought on to women's family by their contacts with unrelated men, and 
the dishonour ( ’az) caused by women's involvement in illicit sexual affairs, which
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damage the honour (sharaf) of their male kin and family. These stereotyped 
understandings constitute conceptualised modes used to stop individuals from engaging 
in extra-marital affairs.
Both men and women say that 'we' should fulfil 'our' duties (wajibat) by 
accepting arranged marriages negotiated and decided between the bride and bride­
groom's families. In terms of their spouses, men have more opportunities to choose 
their women candidates, and to ask for marriage to specific members of their family or 
friends. Women are more restricted in expressing their preferences. Although they can 
voice their opinion against a particular marriage arrangement to their family, they are 
not allowed to ask for marriage to any particular man; this is considered shameful 
( aib).
For both men and women it is not possible to realise marriage with persons who 
are from different ethnic, or sectarian groups and classes. Jazirah society is composed 
of mainly three ethnic or sectarian groups: Christian, Shawaya(2) and Kurd. As a 
principle, each group is endogamous, but commonality of religion sometimes makes it 
possible to arrange inter-group marriage, in cases where the economic and social status 
between the two families is similar. Marriages are thus sometimes arranged between 
the Shawaya and Kurds, or between local and foreign Christians who emigrated abroad 
and seek spouses from their home land through relatives and friends.
Young men and women sometimes tell their close friends about their dream of 
communicating with a person about whom they fantasise, but with whom they have no 
existing relationship. They describe their romance as the ardour of love but with 
respect for an individual (hubb or 'ishq). This fantasy of love is understood by both 
men and women as the most beautiful expression of feeling and is not restricted by 
social obligations. This tie between a man and woman is different from the ties 
between family members who love (hubb) each other. Love within a family is realised 
on the basis of mutual care and responsibility for protecting the family honour. In order 
to maintain a positive social reputation they are obliged to fulfil certain duties. A 
woman must keep her sexual virtue and the men in her family must protect it for the
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sake of their family honour. Fulfilment of these mutual duties is undertaken as part of 
the love and mutual care between family members. Hence, a woman is not allowed to 
pursue romance.
Another obstacle to seeking romance is the norm of preferential marriage 
between close kin. Both men and women understand that marriage between patrilateral 
parallel cousins in a classificatory sense should be arranged, and that a male cousin has 
primary right over his female cousin for marriage. This is not only in theory, it is 
often carried out. In this respect, both men and women from all the ethnic or sectarian 
groups feel that: “'our freedom of choice in selecting spouses is restricted, because of 
marriage regulations”.
The public-private space configuration also prevents a woman from 
communicating her feeling of love towards a man about whom she fantasies. Women's 
behaviour in the context of activities outside the home, that is, in the public arena, 
becomes the object of commentary which evaluates their actions and reformulates their 
meaning in terms of whether or not they violate norms of gender segregation. Illicit 
relationships signal the rejection of the mutual dependence between female and male kin 
in the context of family honour. Even if a woman does not engage in an actual affair 
and only has feelings of love for a man, any suggestive behaviour on her part leaves 
others free to interpret her actions as a violation of the norms. The public-private space 
configuration between men and women thereby becomes the procedural device used to 
confine women's actions.
This schema, confining romance between men and women, "is [a] cognitive 
structure through which interpretations about the world are made" (D'Andrade, 1992: 
52). This schema determines the interpretation of one's behaviour both by oneself and 
others' peers, even though only certain elements of this schema may be used at any one 
time in a particular context. In reality, these interpretations can be constructed by taking 
into consideration various political, economic and historical elements. Social reality 
therefore does not always reflect the total representation of this social schema $)■
29
Examples of the women's cognition of love and gender segregation, as 
expressed in narratives and conversations, reveal their cultural understandings, and the 
social situations in which emotional experience and thought are created. As a concept, 
love is an ideal in which the individual's autonomy, which is the most important value, 
is respected. Women use romance to find ideal relationships between themselves and 
others, in which their autonomy and independence are not restricted for the sake of 
protecting their family honour. However, in reality, various social responsibilities and 
obligations for protecting family honour and keeping a good reputation, actually 
prevent women from seeking romance. Moreover, since a woman's behaviour 
associated with seeking romance is interpreted by others as a evidence of a personal 
desire (raghba) for sexual attraction, a woman is afraid to be labelled as such a woman 
and risk losing her social position; she may be divorced by her husband for the sake of 
protecting his honour; if she is still single, she may not have opportunity of a marriage 
proposal.
Despite the social constraints imposed on women, romance becomes a topic of 
conversations between close friends and the means of expressing their resistance to the 
collective view which prevents freedom of choice in selecting partners. The stories of 
romance contain two contradictory notions, that is, restrictions on the male-female 
relationship, and individual autonomy. The following is an example of women's 
emotional reaction to love and of their understanding of prohibited relationships.
Muhja, a single Shawaya woman and a friend of mine, was preparing for lunch 
with her grandfather's widow, with whom she was intimate. The widow said with a 
smile, as if she was talking to herself; “Muhja will marry a man in Saudi Arabia”. I 
was surprised because I had not heard anything about her marriage from Muhja, her 
family or neighbours. I asked Muhja later in private whether or not she would be 
marrying in the near future. She told me that a man who was going to return from 
Saudi Arabia was to visit her family and ask her father for her hand in marriage. A few
months later in another conversation I was to find out the truth about her love.
Muhja: “when I was in elementary school, my classes were in the morning.
When 1 was leaving school, the man who is now in Saudi Arabia would
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come to teach in the afternoon classes. I therefore saw him everyday. 
When I first met him, he was still a university student. He is handsome and 
I find him very attractive. When I met him a month ago, he told me that he 
was going to go to Saudi Arabia for a while. He has not come back yet.” 
Noriko: “will he visit your family for greetings after coming back?”
Muhja: “no, it is impossible, because he is not our relative, nor a friend of 
my father. The only way for me to talk to him is in Qamishly, in the street, 
where I must pretend to have met him spontaneously. Noriko, we will go 
shopping together after he comes back.”
The expression by Muhja of her love cannot be separated from social obligations 
and constraints. Muhja and her grandfather's widow respected their family honour and 
were aware of preferential marriage between close kin. These notions prevented Muhja 
from realising her love to the unrelated man in the form of marriage. Muhja recognised 
that her patrilateral parallel cousin wanted to marry her, and refusing this marriage 
would be difficult, if her family agreed with the marriage. However, in their 
conversation, the two women temporarily removed themselves from these constraints 
and enjoyed relative freedom by talking about Muhja's love. Muhja dreamed of 
marrying the man whom she loved, and of meeting with him, even though she knew it 
might be difficult because of gender segregation. Her expression of love was affected 
by the social restrictions imposed by marriage regulations and gender segregation to 
which she adheres, in order to preserve status and carry out respective roles. Her 
personal talk therefore must not be examined by separating it from the social 
representations of prohibited relationships and family honour. Women's emotional 
expression of love is not congruent to the behaviour which respects family honour and 
marriage regulations. It would therefore be shameful for her to demonstrate her love for 
the man about whom she fantasised, such as by meeting with him, for fear of being 
gossiped about as a woman who has a strong sexual appetite and who is destroying her 
family honour. Women are caught in a dilemma between these social constraints, and 
the tension caused by these constraints. Their recognition of political forces that 
constrain and direct their actions, expressed as obligations and responsibilities in their 
social roles, is contrasted to their private views about love, in which they idealise being
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liberated from these social constraints. Talking about love would release them from 
these social constraints and signal resistance to institutions and political forces which 
prevent them from exercising their autonomy in selecting a spouse.
In this thesis, I shall look particularly for ways in which power relations 
determine what women can, cannot, or must do, by taking into consideration their roles 
and status. In order to analyse social forces imposed on women and their response to 
it, I shall examine events which depict this dilemma between the fulfilment of social 
obligations and the desire to resist
One of the most influential works on power relations was written by Foucault 
(1972), who shows that power relations are held within discourses. Foucault defines 
'discourse' as a) a practice that systematically forms the objects of which the subject 
speak (ibid.: 49): b) a discourse is made up of a limited number of statements for 
which a group of conditions for existence can be defined (ibid.: 117); and further, a 
group of relations between statements which make up a discourse belong to a single 
system of formation, that is, 'discursive formation'. Discursive formation governs the 
division of statements, the degree to which they depend upon one another, the way in 
which they interlock or exclude one another, the transformation that they undergo, and 
the play of their location (ibid.: 33-4, 107). Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990: 9-10) 
mention that Foucault's contribution to discourse analysis is to suggest a concern with 
texts, talk and all sorts of other social practices, as productive of experience and 
constitutive of the social realities, which are not only informed by social ideas and 
values, but also serve as idioms for communicating performance in a field of social 
activity. Foucault (1972: 98, 102-3, 105-6, 115, 119) uses the concept of discourse to 
express his rejection of the distinction between social ideas and social practices, and to 
postulate that social actors not only operate representative meanings of social ideas for 
an object, but also elaborate them through discursive formation.
Foucault's analysis of power relations provides ways of thinking about power 
which are framed in the context of experiences that involve the whole person and are 
shaped by social interaction. "Systems of power bring forth different types of
32
knowledge which, in turn, produce effects in bodies of social agents that serve to 
reinforce the original power formation" (McNay, 1992: 148). Foucault's formulation of 
the power/knowledge nexus is that "power and knowledge directly imply one another; 
• • • there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations" (1979: 27).
Foucault emphasises heavily a primacy of fundamental rules that define the 
discursive space in which the speaking subject exists (see Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 
52). As a result, he defines that the processes through which hegemonic social 
relations are maintained, exemplify images of the physical inscription of power upon 
the subject. This tendency is apparent in Foucault's historical studies (1978:138), 
where the disciplinary method is seen as producing "subjected and practised bodies, 
'docile bodies'" (McNay, 1992: 40), in which "the body presents no material resistance 
to the operation of power" (McNay, ibid.: 40). Foucault enables us to grasp how social 
ideas, as cultural products, are reproduced in individuals in the form of embodied 
experiences.
In his theoretical discourse, since individuals assess their own behaviour in 
relation to social discourse, the discourse is incorporated into behaviour of the self. 
'Discourse' in recent anthropological writings, has become one of the most popular 
terms, often used in a much wider sense than that used by Foucault. The ambiguities 
of the concept of discourse, as Foucault himself noted (1972: 80), allow a wider usage, 
which cuts across current research on social schemata, emotions and relations between 
social knowledge and power as exerted in social life. The discourse approach, as social 
theory, directs ethnographies toward "social practices as productive of experience and 
constitutive of the realities in which we live and the truths with which we work" (Abu- 
Lughod and Lutz, 1990: 9-10). This approach also concerns "relations among 
cognitive, communicative, and socio-institutional forces rather than discrete “concepts” 
or “symbols”" (White, 1992: 38-9). The discourse-oriented approach offers a more 
complex view of contested, multiple and shifting relations between practices and
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cultural knowledge. This approach also considers social activities and emotional 
narratives in which cultural values and concepts exert their force in social relations, and 
which, as constituting social reality, use these values and concepts for understanding, 
reformulating and transforming meanings of one's social activities. I shall use the term 
'discourse' to refer to complex statements and their justified pattern of common usage 
repeated by numerous people in Jazirah in everyday life. Women in Jazirah apply these 
patterns of complex statements for communicating and justifying the meanings of their 
behaviour, and as devices which indicate their behaviour adherent to institutionalised 
social obligations.
1.3 Writing Method
Experiences during my field research, interactions with Dubana villagers and 
Qamishly inhabitants, as well as the politics involved, recast my whole involvement 
with this subject, as mentioned earlier in this Introduction. My participation was 
shaped by particular dialogues between myself and my Qamishly friends and Dubana 
villagers, and influenced by the dynamics of our relationships. In time, participation as 
an observer became socially limited, while as an audience and a fellow actor, my 
involvement in their activities increased.
From the theoretical stand-point, the problematic relationship between 
participation and observation in ethnography has produced concern over the 
methodologies appropriate to the study of everyday experiences. Recent studies of 
interactions turn the study of social identity into discursive processes, in which actors 
give meanings to their actions with reference to conceptual and institutional forces, 
where social reality constructed through their activities is not merely represented by the 
social institutions and rules. One direction of this individual-centred study is to study 
processes in which socially constructed and validated cultural meanings are internalised 
in individuals (e.g.: Kondo, 1990). My approach to the study of social identity focuses 
on the analysis of interpersonal relationships. The relationship between cognitive
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processes, through which social behaviour and narratives are understood and social 
activities through which these processes are constituted, contains both the 
internalisation and extemalisation of cultural meanings which create social interactions.
I have therefore chosen to examine a number of communicative ways, such as 
casual talk, private conversation, and narratives of historical stories. In their talks they 
give meanings to their words and actions with reference to conceptual and institutional 
forces and sometimes resist these collective forces which constrain their behaviour. 
Jazirah women try to establish their social position through their behaviour, to which 
they give a meaning by conforming to socially acceptable collective behavioural 
standards. While they constitute their identity in this way, they oppose the social 
constraints which force them to behave according to these behavioural standards. Being 
in a dilemma between these social constraints and the desire to resist, how do Jazirah 
women free themselves from the dilemma?
One example can be found amongst village women working in the agricultural 
fields of their tribal sheikh. Considering the historical hierarchical relationship between 
the tribal sheikh and the commoner tribal members as slavery working for the sheikh, 
these women occupy a subordinate position to the sheikh. However, the historical 
narrative of how their economic and political relationship with the sheikh has changed 
since they acquired independent income from various sources, expresses their self- 
awareness in defining themselves as equal to the sheikh. Alliance between tribal 
members and acceptance of the sheikh's political influence, in the form of respecting 
his honour, make it possible for these commoner tribal members to oblige the sheikh to 
accept the role of a guarantor for protecting these women from outsiders. Thus these 
women insist that they work in his fields, not because of being obliged to work as slave 
labourers, but because of his guarantee to protect them from sexual assault by outsiders 
during the work. Fidelity of the sheikh to his tribal members in conducting his role as a 
guarantor and his political influence that no one trespasses his authority over his 
labourers, lead them to an alliance with the sheikh based on the norms of tribal 
solidarity. Women's reputation and their family honour are not damaged by working
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outside the home, because of the sheikh's guarantee. This egalitarian discourse makes 
the women free from a slavery position to the sheikh and also brings them an 
opportunity to have income. This discourse however, obliges them to be dependent on 
male guarantees to protect their social reputation about sexual virtue.
Throughout this thesis, I attempt to examine dialogues and events as they
occurred amongst people I knew, and to describe the collective understanding of social
obligations, the desire to resist it and the ways of resolving the dilemma between the
two. These social and cognitive processes are important because they give meaning to
the words and actions that shaped their everyday lives.
* * *
Throughout this thesis, I use Christian, Shawaya and Kurd as categories 
defining my units of study (4). Various markers differentiating these ethnic or sectarian 
groups will be discussed in Chapter 2 and 3. Here, I shall explain the reason why I use 
these ethnic, or sectarian differences as markers to define my unit of study according to 
local expressions.
It is common understanding between these three groups that men from different 
ethnic or sectarian groups, who are defined as unrelated men, or outsiders, ghaiaib, are 
potential threats to the sexual honour of women other than from their own group. 
Indigenous experiences articulate these groups which are affected by values of family 
honour derived from the need to protect female sexual virtue. Women take pride in not 
placing themselves as threats to their family honour. Men pride themselves on imposing 
confinement on the movement and activities of women in their family and having the 
authority to restrict their women's activities outside the home. These self-estimations 
require acknowledgement of these claims by the society (cf. Wikan, 1982: 141). What 
women are most afraid of is gossip which can ruin their reputation and that of the men 
in their family, and which can also undermine self-esteem. If others (nas) in society 
gossip about a woman who is regarded as having, or intending to have sexual liaison, 
her male kin lose honour, because they failed to control women's behaviour in their 
family.
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By considering how both men and women fear being gossiped about, I realise 
that social constraints imposed on women's activities are related to creating boundaries 
between ethnic or sectarian groups and protecting family honour. Norms of solidarity 
between insiders of the group against offences to female sexual virtue and to their 
family honour by other groups create group distinction. These social values 
demarcating ethnic or sectarian groups, shared in common between these three groups, 
are put to use in order to constitute their identities vis-^-vis outsiders. Since protection 
of female sexual virtue and revenge against violation enhance group solidarity and the 
consciousness of group affiliation against offenders, women's actions, such as 
speaking to and meeting unrelated outsiders, are identified with sexual acts against the 
group interest. Social restrictions imposed on women's activities are created in order to 
identify themselves as members of the group and also to create boundaries between 
Shawaya, Kurds and Christians.
In chapter 2 ,1 begin by broadly outlining the political, economic, and historical 
situation in Jazirah, then go on to outline the population composition of Qamishly, and 
finally analyse the various dimensions of constituting social boundaries between the 
Shawaya, Kurds and Christians, between town and country and between big landlords 
and poor peasants.
Chapter 3 focuses on the most prominent dimension of the conflict between 
Kurds and Christians in Qamishly history; and on the assault on women from other 
social categories as representative of group hostility. This dimension provides me with 
the possibility of introducing the recurring theme of sexual assault on female outsiders 
which creates conflict between the Shawaya, Kurds and Christians. Although assault 
on female sexual virtue and stories of prohibited relationship between a man and 
woman from different groups are depicted as group conflicts, actual matters related to 
female sexual virtue are regarded as family matters, on which no one must intervene out 
of respect for the family's autonomy. No one has direct awareness of how others 
evaluate one's behaviour. Women therefore need to censor their behaviour themselves 
in order to make sure they are not jeopardising their good reputation.
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In chapter 4 ,1 shall examine the women's inner conflict in achieving individual 
wishes. Activities outside the home offer great possibilities for women of being 
suspected of involvement in illicit relationships which threaten male authority over 
them. Since women need to present themselves as chaste and obedient, women confine 
themselves to being involved in activities permitted by their male guardians, out of fear 
of the social evaluations imposed on their behaviour. This confinement creates the 
dilemma for women between adherence to socially acceptable behaviour and 
determining their own activities. Women seek liberation from the social restrictions in 
the idea of love between a man and a woman, which is based on mutual respect for 
personal values, rather than social status and obligations. However, in seeking 
romance, they risk being evaluated by others as someone who possesses a strong 
sexual appetite, if their liaison is discovered. Women strive to resolve the gap between 
acquiring social acknowledgement for their behaviour, and liberating themselves from 
the social constraints.
Chapter 5 juxtaposes different accounts of the relations between the Tai tribal 
sheikh and his commoner tribal members. Commoner tribal members seek equal status 
to the sheikhs on the basis of tribal structure on the one hand, while on the other hand, 
they are still tied to practices enforcing their subordinate position to the sheikh. In this 
ambivalent situation, commoner tribal members seek discourses to resolve status 
differences between themselves and the sheikh by consenting to his political authority 
on the basis of honour. I shall discuss discourses of ceremonial exchanges between the 
commoners and the sheikh, and women's agricultural labour for the sheikh. In both 
discourses the gender roles bear importance in asserting the commoners' equality with 
the sheikh. These discursive formations allow them to transform their subordinate 
position to the sheikh. However, their assertion of equality entwines them and their 
activities more closely in the constraints which force them to adhere to their roles.
Chapter 6 examines the interpretation of women's activities outside the home. 
The contribution of village women's income from animal rearing and dairy production 
to the household economy does not only provide a cash income to the households, but
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also constitutes an ideological basis for the assertion of their independence from the 
tribal sheikh. Local response to village women's economic activities, admits the need 
for these activities to be acknowledged by men, because contact with unrelated men is 
inevitable in these activities. The women's own definition of their participation in 
these activities is linked with their role as processing subsistence for the household, and 
with the cognition that their activities are authorised by male elders in their households. 
This male authority provides women within their self-esteem, on the basis that their 
contact with unrelated men in the course of their activities does not involve sexual acts.
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CHAPTER 2. CONSTRUCTION OF CULTURAL 
DISTINCTIVENESS AND MAINTENANCE OF GROUP
BOUNDARIES
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I shall describe group identities constituted in contemporary 
economic and political situations, and in local history. People in Jazirah define their 
respective identities in terms of religion and ethnicity: Christian, Shawaya and Kurd. 
The way in which they attribute distinctive group features to each other, signifies the 
classification of groups. The relationships between groups whose members consider 
themselves culturally distinctive from members of other groups, have developed 
through mutual contacts. Yet, before starting the discussion on group identification, I 
shall first describe the native definition of Shawaya, as given by themselves and as 
attributed to them by members of other groups. Describing the delimited category of 
Shawaya is not only useful for explaining the meaning of the name, but also provides 
an insight into the native's recognition of distinctions between their own group and 
others, in other words between 'us' and 'them'.
The Shawaya describe themselves as people originally from the steppes, tending 
sheep and camels. They say that the word 'Shawaya' derives from shawa, to roast or 
grill meat, which connotes their previous life-style as nomads. They also guess that the 
word 'Shawaya' is a name of an Arab tribe or a&hira, even though they know no such 
tribe exists in this region. They identify themselves as rural people and distinguish 
between themselves and city dwellers. Although migration of the rural population into 
cities, such as Qamishly and Hassaka, has accelerated recently, rural immigrants do 
not abandon their own rural and nomad origin and even think that they may go back to 
their natal villages if the opportunity arises.
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The Shawaya no longer identify themselves as nomads, although they still 
depend on rural economic resources: they are engaged in animal rearing and agriculture. 
With the region's economic development, many Shawaya men have gained 
employment in cities or towns. As government employees, workers in the private 
sector or self-employed, their income constitutes their households' main income. 
Despite this economic shift, they still identify themselves as rural peasants, fallahun 
(single; fallah). The Shawaya define the boundary between their own group and others 
in terms of their nomadic tribal Arab origin and occupation. They grow particularly 
self-conscious of these group identities as their contact with city dwellers increases.
As Muslims, they also differentiate themselves from the Christians. As for 
language, the Arabic dialect spoken by the Shawaya is different from that spoken by 
Qamishly city dwellers, in terms both of pronunciation and vocabulary. For example, 
the word for village, qarya in Qamishly dialect, which is the same as standard Arabic, 
becomes jyarya in Shawaya dialect; and dog, kalb becomes chalb. The interrogative 
'what' is eishu in Qamishly, but sinu in Shawaya dialect. The Shawaya, whose mother 
tongue is Arabic, also distinguish themselves from the Kurds whose mother tongue is 
Kurdish.
Although the Shawaya insist emphatically on their group identity, they rarely use 
the term Shawaya to refer to themselves. Instead, they refer to themselves as Arabs, 
even though they are not the only Arab inhabitants in this region (the Christians also 
identify themselves as Arabs). Identifying themselves as Shawaya implies their 
acceptance of the negative stereotypes of Shawaya as portrayed by others. The 
Shawaya are often regarded by others as backward, ignorant and dirty. These others 
use the name 'Shawaya' in order to indicate inferiority. However, these stereotypes do 
not always reflect the real Shawaya identity. Among the Shawaya, there are educated 
engineers and even female teachers. Furthermore, the Shawaya women always pay 
attention to hygiene and sanitation. The stereotypical dispositions attributed to them 
therefore do not by any means reflect the way the Shawaya live. Instead, they provide
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other groups with simple criteria for group classification in their relations with the 
Shawaya.
The locals' own classification of the Shawaya highlight several important points 
in the discussion of group identity. The difference of the Shawaya from others is 
taken for granted by both the Shawaya themselves and others, even though each of 
them use different criteria. Since these criteria emerge through mutual contacts between 
them, they must maintain the notion of each other as being socially and culturally 
different from one another. This differentiation is essential in these relationships. 
However, the criteria used in defining the Shawaya clearly bear a little relation to the 
reality. Moreover, the shared social and cultural traits frequently cross group 
boundaries and people do not always share all these traits with others in their own 
group.
For example, although the Shawaya define themselves as peasants, many of 
them are no longer intensively engaged in cultivation. Many Shawaya men let out their 
leasehold agricultural land, assigned to them by the Syrian government, to people who 
look after their crops and they themselves only work in the fields during the periods of 
sowing and harvesting. Some of them do not work in the field at all and just contract 
out to share-croppers. Neither do many Shawaya women in Dubana work in the fields 
held by their fathers and husbands and only young women work as seasonal 
agricultural labourers in the fields owned by big landlords. This type of engagement in 
agricultural cultivation is little different from that of city dwellers, who also possess the 
right to hold land on lease. Shawaya households who immigrated to the town scarcely 
work in cultivation and their household heads earn income from other jobs in the town. 
Thus, although they do not fulfil the criteria of peasants, they still identify themselves 
as such. Their access to economic resources reveals the contradiction between their 
own definition of Shawaya, as Arab peasants, and their life-style. But distinctions 
between rural and urban, as well as between peasant and non-peasant, are of great 
importance for the Shawaya themselves in order to define the self in relation to others. 
Why is this so?
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The stereotyped images created in inter-group contacts are caused by a variety of 
factors: a) historical evolution of their peasant identity, b) inclusion of the Shawaya into 
a capitalist system of production and exchange, and c) increased economic and personal 
contact with other populations in the town. Through these processes the Shawaya have 
grown self-conscious of their group identity due to their extensive contacts with other 
groups. As a result of these interactions, the Shawaya constitute their own stereotypes, 
while other groups attribute to the Shawaya different stereotypes from those that the 
Shawaya use in order to identify themselves. These stereotypes are widespread in 
society, with a rough power equilibrium existing between the Shawaya and other 
groups. Below, I shall analyse the processes by which the Shawaya's identity was 
created in relation to urban populations, mainly the Christians, who distinguish 
themselves from the Shawaya in constructing their group identity.
The peasant identity is also created within intra-Shawaya relationships between 
the tribal sheikhs and common tribal members. Commoner Shawaya tribal members, 
along with the Kurds, have been incorporated into a capitalist agricultural production 
system since the 1930s, as tenants of big landlords, i.e. their tribal sheikhs. Regional 
industrial development and the Syrian land reform of 1963 have given these common 
tribal members opportunities to become economically independent of their tribal sheikhs 
who had previously monopolised agricultural land. They refer to this change not only 
as a change in economic relations between the sheikhs and themselves, but also as 
reflecting change in political relations, away from superior-inferior to between equals. 
They explain the old relationship between themselves and the sheikhs as resembling 
much more one of slaves owned by the sheikhs. They insist that their economic 
independence from the sheikhs has now transformed this relationship into an egalitarian 
complementary relationship, in which they support each other as equals (Eriksen, 1993; 
27-8). It is therefore important to analyse narratives expressing the process of this 
shift, through which these commoner villagers insist on their identity as peasants 
independent of their tribal sheikhs.
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Processes of dichotomisation and boundary maintenance between ethnic or 
sectarian groups are not analysed only from a subjective position, in which agents 
themselves ascribe ethnic memberships. Barth suggests that ethnic membership must 
be acknowledged by agents themselves in order to be socially effective (1969: 15). 
Although Barth focuses on the need for investigating the social enactment of ethnicity 
through flexible and negotiable boundary-making processes, he does not discuss the 
social processes of creating collective conceptions which operate in order to make 
distinctions between groups. Instead, he defines ethnic ascription as categorical 
ascription which classifies "a person in terms of his basic, most general identity, 
presumptively determined by his origin and background" (1969:13).
In Jazirah, group distinctions are acknowledged by agents themselves and 
expressed in processes in which they create criteria for distinguishing groups. These 
distinctions are shaped in local political and economic situations as well as local history 
and are not determined by ascriptive group characters. For example, the Shawaya 
belief that they were originally nomads, but now define themselves as peasants, even 
though agriculture has diminished in economic importance. It has become gradually 
more difficult for them to differentiate themselves from others in terms of occupation 
and source of income, since many of these peasants have become wage earners in 
towns and on industrial sites, and worked as shopkeepers and taxi drivers, in all areas 
of economic activity in which city dwellers are also engaged. Their identity cannot 
therefore be discussed only from the point of subjective ascription and their origin, but 
must also be examined from the point of objective social and political functions, which 
serve to underline their social position in their relationships with other groups. Group 
distinctions should be analysed from both aspects: that of the agents' subjective 
awareness and strategy, and of the structural constraints which are imposed upon 
agents within interactions (Okamura, 1981: 453,456).
In the following sections I shall discuss group relations in which group members 
demonstrate group distinctiveness vis-^-vis others, and through which they try to 
distinguish cultural or natural traits between groups in order to define their own
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position within the group. I shall also discuss these demonstrations of identity and 
group boundary in relation to regional economic and political developments and 
historical changes. The economic and political situation in Jazirah imposes various 
social constraints on individuals; these are expressed in the form of group relations and 
distinctions.
2.2 Regional Development and Peasant Identity
Jazirah means 'Island' in Arabic. It is the area lying between the Tigris and the 
Euphrates rivers. It covers a fertile area in north-eastern Syria and large parts of 
today's Iraq, previously known as Mesopotamia. The Jazirah in Syria is composed of 
three administrative provinces: Raqqa, Deyr-ez-Zur, and Hassaka. My field research 
was conducted in Qamishly, and the rural Shawaya village nearby, which for the 
purpose of this thesis I call Dubana, in the Hassaka province. I shall therefore limit my 
descriptions to this area.
Qamishly is a relatively new city, in the sense that it has a very short history. It 
was planned and established when the French mandatory power came to the region in 
1922, in order to accommodate Kurdish and Christian refugees from Turkish Anatolia, 
who had fled following Turkish independence and Western interference in Turkey 
during the 1910s and 1930s. Before the French invasion, Qamishly was a so-called no 
man's land, home to scattered settlements of Kurds. The French planned the city along 
a grid pattern. The town used to be roughly divided into two parts by the Jag-Jag river, 
which formed the boundary between the Christian and Kurdish districts (Velud, 1986: 
91-3). By 1925, the oldest Kurdish district, Qdur-bek, was already established.
Most Christians, although by no means all, are city-dwellers. Hence, Qamishly 
is an area of relatively high Christian population density, even though in Syria as a 
whole, according to Lewis (1987: 13-4), Christians constitute less than eight percent of 
the population. The majority of the Christian inhabitants of Qamishly are Syrian 
Orthodox, Syrian Catholic and Syrian Protestant, all of whom identify themselves as
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Suriyan (Syrian Christians). Arabic is their first language, but many families tend to 
speak their own language Syriac at home and attempt to find places in schools and 
churches for their children's Syriac language education. There are Assyrians, i.e. 
Nestorians (Ashurl), and Assyrian Catholics, that is, Chaldeans (hildanj), who fled 
into this region after clashes with the Iraqi army in 1933. According to Nisan (1991: 
164-5), "the Iraqi accused the Assyrians of rebellion; the Assyrians accused the Iraqis 
(Arabs and Kurds) of cold-blooded murder" (1991:164). Suriyan, Ashuri and 
Kuldani have a conviction that the shared language means that they all originally had 
very close relations. These Christians sometimes do inter-marry. Acceptance of this 
marriage is explained by their shared Syriac origin. There are also Armenian Orthodox 
and Armenian Catholic Christians, but the proportions have decreased, especially due 
to emigration to Armenia in the former Soviet Union in 1948 and 1965. They speak 
Armenian at home. The Syriac and Armenian Christians differentiate each other and do 
not inter-marry. The sectarian differences are not created in on the grounds of 
distinctive religious doctrines amongst these sects, but are created by behavioural 
patterns, such as marriage, language and attending churches of their own sects.
Most present inhabitants of Qamishly and the surrounding countryside used to 
live in what is now south-eastern Turkey. The border between south-eastern Turkey 
and the adjoining area, which is now part of northern Syrian, was only established in 
the peace settlement ending the first World War in 1922 (Yapp, 1987: 318-21). Both 
regions used to be the territory of the Ottoman Empire and the inhabitants moved back 
and forth between these two regions. Local family histories relate how many Kurdish 
peasants had already moved from south-eastern Anatolia into Jazirah during the 
Ottoman period and settled there. Shawaya tribes or tribal confederations, such as the 
Tai and Shammar, who were sheep rearers, occupied both south-eastern Anatolia and 
northern Jazirah, and seasonally migrated within this region.
The Danish writer Carsten Niebuhr who visited Nuseibin in 1766 wrote of his 
meeting with the Tai tribal sheikh (1992: 709). Blunt also mentions the Tai as living in 
a camp composed of one thousand tents, in the late nineteenth century:
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"Tai [is] a pure Bedouin tribe, formerly very powerful in upper 
Mesopotamia, and allied to the Tai of Central Arabia. They own camels 
and mares, and carry the lance: but are peaceful and rich. They have 
numerous flocks of sheep. The present Sheykh, Abd er Rahaman, is 
considered of very noble family" (1879: 189).
The Tai were based in Nuseibin, which is now on the Turkish side, and occupied
south-eastern Anatolia, Nuseibin, Mardin and Diyarbakr to the north, and Mount Sinjar
to the south, as their tribal territory. The Tai believe that they are originally from the
Arabian Peninsula, but they cannot trace their links to the Arab tribes of that area.
Qamishly and the surrounding countryside were sparsely cultivated by Kurds. 
According to Lewis (1987: 160), Jazirah became an area important for agricultural 
production during the second World War when wheat prices rapidly increased. My 
interview subjects mentioned that the price increased eightfold between 1935 and 1939. 
Then, the second agricultural revolution introduced cotton cultivation into this area and 
its production increased during the Korean War of 1948 to 1952. During that time, 
"the USA imposed export controls • ■ •. Between 1948 and 1952 production of cotton 
in Syria increased eightfold and acreage under cotton almost tenfold" (Lewis, 1987: 
161).
The subsequent rush to get as much land as possible and to bolster claims to it by 
occupation and cultivation was caused by the chaotic situation in this region: "this was 
an area where clear title to land was a rarity" (Lewis, ibid.: 161). The enormous 
possibilities of cotton production as an agricultural money-maker were recognised by 
tribal sheikhs, who aspired to take maximum advantage of the prevailing agricultural 
boom by treating much of the tribal land as if it were their own. The sheikh of the Tai 
tribal confederation, who was the present sheikh's grandfather, kept his eye on the 
economic advantages of agricultural production. At the beginning of the 1950s, he 
abandoned his village in the tribal heartland, where water supply was less than that 
required to sustain dry-land farming, and moved to land where the Jag-Jag river 
provided plenty of water for his fields. There he constructed a new village, Dubana. 
The sheikh controlled huge amounts of tribal territory under cultivation. His tribesmen
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say that they could not obtain rights to land in their tribal territory and so became 
landless tenants and domestic labourers, that is, slave followers, 'abid (single: Kabd) of 
the sheikh.
In 1963, the Syrian land reform redistributed a large area of land from a handful 
of rich tribal sheikhs in Jazirah to state farms. Considerable numbers of tenants and 
city dwellers were helped by the new laws, enabling them to rent land owned by the 
state at cheap rates. According to my interview subjects, the average size of a peasant 
land-holding was between 140 and 200 dwanum (single:dmorn), which is almost 
equivalent to thirty-five acres and fifty acresO). Peasants calculate the size of land by 
sacks of wheat required for sowing. For example, they say that one sack of wheat is 
needed for sowing ten duwmum (one sack of wheat is between one hundred and one 
hundred-twenty kilograms).
Land reform therefore reduced the size of large land-holdings and gave landless 
peasants the means to free themselves from economic control by the tribal sheikhs. 
Nevertheless, the fragmentation of land led to reduced efficiency and, as a result, the 
economic gap between big landlords and small lease-holding peasants was not closed. 
First of all, small lease-holding peasants can only depend on rain-fed wheat and barley 
cultivation. They usually cannot afford to rent government agricultural plant and invest 
in irrigation, or to use manure in order to increase productivity. The harvest is also 
easily influenced by precipitation levels. For example, low rain-fall during the first two 
months in 1990 affected rain-fed barley cultivation. Peasants complained of a harvest 
which was only two or threefold the amount sown. Some of them harvested only the 
same amount of crop as they had sown. Secondly, farms owned by big landlords, or 
the state, occupy well-watered land, giving high returns, whereas land redistributed to 
small peasants often lacks the water supply required to gain enough productivity 
through rain-based cultivation.
Thirdly, plots which are owned by big landlords and are state-managed, use crop 
rotation which improves their productivity. For example, the plots belonging to the 
sheikh of the Tai tribal confederation surrounding Dubana, were run on a rotation of
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grain, cotton and summer vegetables (such as tomatoes, aubergines, okra, cucumbers, 
marrow, watermelons and sesame). Plots where wheat was cultivated in June the 
previous year are left until sesame is planted in the spring. After the harvest of sesame 
in September, wheat is planted at the end of autumn. Another plot, which had lain 
fallow last season, is planted with wheat from October to June, and then next April will 
be a cotton field. This crop rotation is believed by peasants to increase productivity and 
to restore the organic composition of the soils. The use of vegetables and cotton in 
rotation with grain cultivation also enables farmers to leave plots uncultivated from one 
season to the next.
Yet crop rotation needs irrigation and therefore small lease-holders, without 
water pumping facilities, cannot have access to this effective system of cultivation. 
Only wealthier landowners are able to afford the cost of capital intensive vegetable and 
cotton production. Vegetable prices are free from state regulation. Their cultivation 
could therefore yield higher profits than wheat and barley, whose prices are low and 
fixed by the state and do not keep pace with the rate of inflation. Hence, despite the 
benefits of the land reform, many small plot holders cannot make a living by agriculture 
alone.
These poor peasants must have several sources of income in order to make a 
living. Development of the oil and gas industries, which are the most important natural 
resources in north-eastern Jazirah, provide some employment opportunities. The road 
network carries these workers to the sites of oil and gas industries (Rumeilan, 
Swediyah and Malklya). These job opportunities have brought rural migration 
to Qamishly, which has acquired locational advantages. Roads and railways connect 
oil and gas installations in north-eastern Jazirah and the agricultural villages to 
Qamishly and Syria's other major urban centres and ports (Hassaka, Aleppo, Hama, 
Horns, Damascus, Ladqiya and Tamis). Qamishly is the regional commercial, trade 
and transportation centre and thus provides the local population with job opportunities 
in these industries. These regional factors have caused a population increase in urban 
centres which is also paralleled with higher birth rates. During the twenty years
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Figure 1. Mineral resources, industry, and transportation in the Syrian 
Arab Republic (From G. Meyer, 1987: 47. The blue line is a main road under construction in 
1991, traced by the author from Syria Road Map for Tourists, 1985.)
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between 1960 and 1980, the population in Qamishly doubled from 43,198 to 92,990 
(Mardini, 1986: 97). Syrian population growth is one of the fastest in the world. 
Perthes (1992: 42) estimates it at more than 3.9 present per annum for the late 1980s. 
Furthermore, about 60 percent of the country's 12.5 million people are under 20 
(Hedges, International Herald Tribune 18 December 1991). But even given the high 
birth rate of the area, rural migration to Qamishly is an important factor for its 
population growth.
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Increases in the urban population provide another source of income for rural 
peasants and households of immigrant rural workers in the cities. The increasing 
demand for meat and dairy products provides them with the opportunity to sell their 
products in the Qamishly market. They keep a few milking cows, or a small flock of 
sheep and make some cash from the sale of these products.
Investment in animals for milk production is costly for these peasants. The cost 
of a sheep is between £S 1,000 and £S1,200 and that of a milk cow is more than ten 
times that.(2) Even with this highly costly investment, there are three main determinants 
of the profitability of milk production for these small livestock-owners. Firstly, these 
livestock provide milk for the owners' household consumption as well as for sale. The 
saie of milk products is free from state interference and therefore profitable. Secondly, 
animal rearing for milk production is one of the few economic activities in which 
peasant women can be involved, i.e. feeding, watering, milking, making dairy 
products and selling them in the market. Although these economic activities 
surrounding milk production require male intervention in their commercial aspects, 
mainly in dealing with unrelated men, or ghrsib, women's labour in this area is vital in 
generating cash income for peasant households (see Chapter 6). Thirdly, possession of 
livestock is a means of claiming economic independence from tribal sheikhs, as well as 
indicative of their right to cultivate lease-hold agricultural land.
As slave followers, abid, of the sheikhs, the peasants used to work on the 
sheikhs' land and take care of their flock. The change in their economic status has 
encouraged them to construct a new discourse in which their economic independence 
from the sheikh has also liberated them from bondage as "abid. The villagers therefore 
deny vigorously that they are 'abid any longer. The following narrative describes how 
the villagers in Dub ana perceive the change in the relationship between themselves and 
the sheikh, after their acquisition of the right to cultivate land endowed by the State. A 
married woman, Malika, forty-three years old, in conversation with a young male 
villager, Khalid.
Khalid: We could borrow seeds and funding from the State for a motor to 
pump up underground water for irrigation.
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Malika: What is [the status of ] your father?
Khalid: Malik(malikis an owner who has the right to the freehold of his 
land and cultivation. The right of possessing the land is categorised as 
mulk, which is out of State control). A malik, not a person having a right 
of intifaa {intifaa means making use of the land and monopolising profit 
from the land and its cultivation. A person having the right of intifa'a 
owns the right to cultivate the land and get profit from it, but ownership of 
the land is vested in the State).
Malika: You are stupid. What was [the status of] your father originally? 
Khalid: My father was malik
Malika: Malik! Was his right to own his land granted by the State?
Khalid: Do you have the freehold to your land? Or, do you possess the 
right of intifaa ?
Malika: With honour ('a/a "ayn). But my son, I spent more than ten hard 
years as "abd. We did not possess the right of intifa'a. Now the land which 
we cultivate belongs to the State. Produce from it is ours. We sell the 
produce to the State. Our right is granted by the State. What about yours? 
Khalid: My father's right is registered with the State.
Malika: A former tenant of the sheikh (fallalt) cannot have freehold land. 
As categories of land use, there is tenant, and there is intifa'a. O, my 
father! We lived in a village belonging to a sheikh who was the father of 
Hajjiya Maysun (a wife of the father of the present Tai paramount sheikh). 
When my father moved into the village, he was lent a piece of land. The 
land did not belong to the State, but to the sheikh, the father of Hajjiya. He 
lent his land to the "abid who cultivated it. At the time of the Syrian land 
reform, the government paid sheikhs compensation for their land. Was 
your father a tenant of a sheikh? What did he say about his status?
Khalid: My father was not a fallab.
Malika: For example, Khalid, your house; your father is the owner, malik 
of the house (it is absolute freehold). Supposing that the land were 
distributed for cultivation by the State, the right of cultivating the land 
belongs to each cultivator. If he had money, he could cover the cost of 
cultivation and harvest. If he did not have enough money, he would ask a 
rich man for financial support. After the harvest, he shares the crops with 
his supporter at a ratio of one to one. This is the right of intifa'a. If a man 
does not have any right to land which he cultivates and which belongs to a 
sheikh, he is a tenant (fallab) of the sheikh. Khalid, I have not heard such 
an interpretation of malik like yours. No one any longer says, "I am an
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"abd of a sheikh". 'Abd served a sheikh. :Abid prepared dishes, cleaned 
the sheikh's house and washed the dishes. For example, a woman like me 
went to the women of the sheikh's household and washed their clothes. 
This is 'abd. Now, who is doing such work?
Khalid: No one.
Malika: A few, but willingly. If I want to visit the sheikh and serve his 
household members, I can. Older villagers, like your father, used to be 
'abd of our sheikh. When the sheikh ordered an 'abd to kill someone, the 
'abd had to carry it out No one could refuse him. There was no one who 
was not "abd of sheikhs. Fifty or sixty women, like me, who were poor, 
worked in the sheikh's field during the harvest season. He gave us a little 
wage with which we could only eat and sleep. A malik, like our sheikh, 
exploited his tenants.
Malika's view represents the common villagers' recognition of the shifting 
relationship between themselves and their tribal sheikhs from the perspective of 
historical change. Commoner villagers, like Malika, recognise that distinctions 
between themselves and the sheikhs emerged in the course of the commercialisation of 
agricultural cultivation and the monopolisation of tribal land by the sheikhs. They think 
through this process, occupational specialisation between the landowners and peasants 
was developed(3). Tenants of the sheikhs were compelled to be dependent on the 
sheikhs economically and consequently became politically slave-followers, "abid, of 
the sheikhs. For these peasants, "abid indicate both landless tenants of the sheikh, and 
people ranked as his slave-followers. Dubana villagers told me that before the land 
reform, all the male villagers were slave followers ( "abid), who fulfilled different roles 
in serving the sheikh: serving coffee for the sheikh's guests, looking after the sheikh's 
children, acting as attendants of the sheikh, domestic servants, or shepherds, and so 
on. Female villagers served sheikhly women as domestic labourers, washing and 
cooking. By dividing the villagers into these categories, they describe the salient 
distinctions between themselves and the sheikh, at the time when they had no other 
livelihood except for dependency on the sheikh.
The commoner villagers insist that this hierarchical distinction between sheikh
and 'abid has now therefore diminished, since the acquisition of the right of intifa"a .
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Even after the acquisition of this right, they are still peasants (fallahun) who do not own 
the land which they are cultivating, but are no longer just tenant peasants ( fallahun) of 
the sheikhs.
Together, the villagers describe their past politically as slaves and economically 
as underpaid peasants. By virtue of the land reform and regional industrial 
development, they are now able to describe the past hierarchical relationship between 
themselves and the sheikhs as the result of a historical configuration, in which they 
lacked access to economic means except for reliance on the sheikh. Nowadays most of 
these villagers generate their income independently from the sheikh: as peasants, they 
own the right of intifa'a. Moreover, male villagers have jobs as wage labourers, 
commercial traders, or are self-employed. They also earn income from livestock 
rearing and dairy production. Even though some male villagers work as the sheikh's 
private drivers or tractor drivers in the sheikh's field and young village women work as 
seasonal agricultural labourers in the sheikhs' fields, they regard this work as based on 
economic contracts. No one identifies themselves as slaves any more, even though 
they often still work for the sheikh; they say that they offer their labour willingly. Their 
egalitarian attitude is a consequence of the change in economic circumstances and their 
reaction to these circumstances. Under these circumstances, the villagers define 
economic changes in their life as liberation from the hierarchical order, and share 
collectivity as ex-'abid.
This common ground of their past and present circumstances identifies 
themselves as peasants (fallahun) having the right of intifada. Their peasant identity 
however, is not only created in historical processes within intra-Shawaya relationships, 
i.e. relationship between the Shawaya tribal sheikh and commoner tribal members, but 
is also created in interactions with Qamishly city dwellers. In the following section, I 
shall discuss the identity of Qamishly Christians, who apply stereotyped criteria to 
themselves vis-'a-vis the Shawaya. These stereotyped criteria of the Shawaya clearly 
do not reflect who the Shawaya actually are. The Shawaya in return object, and 
construct their own criteria in order to identify themselves.
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2.3 Constituting Cultural Differences
Inter-group contact and conflict between Christians, Kurds and Shawaya in 
Jazirah have existed since Christian and Kurdish refugees from Anatolia came to 
Jazirah. Before their immigration, the north-eastern Jazirah used to be occupied by 
Shawaya tribes, local Kurds and minority Christian villagers. The appearance of 
refugees, especially large numbers of Kurdish refugees following Sheikh Said's 
rebellion in Anatolia in 1926 (Olson, 1989: 120, 125-6; Joseph, 1983: 105-6), 
increased conflict with the Shawaya, mainly because of the rapid population growth in 
the region. Kurdish refugees followed local Kurds and took up farming. The Shawaya 
were also encouraged to take up farming by developments in commercial agricultural 
production. According to Khoury (1987: 526), conflicts consequently arose over 
access to grazing and farming lands, especially in competition for water, and were not 
easily resolved.
Group distinctions between Christians, Kurds and Shawaya were accelerated by 
political instability in Jazirah. The majority of Qamishly inhabitants were Christians 
who had fled from Anatolia. They were engaged in commerce, or worked as urban 
professionals -  as medical doctors, pharmacists, artisans and soldiers in the French 
army. They were a regional minority and wished to protect their rights and retain 
autonomy under the French Mandate power. Even now, Qamishly Christians hold the 
French administration in high regard. This is not only because the French promoted 
urban development in Qamishly and helped their resettlement there, but also because the 
French advocated political rights for the Christian minority.
The Kurds also supported autonomous movements in opposition to nationalists, 
mainly led by the Shawaya, who were in turn supported by the government in 
Damascus. These movements were not simply political, but were also used by the 
urban Christians and local Kurdish and Shawaya tribal sheikhs in order to secure their 
own respective interests. The most remarkable incident reflecting this, which most 
Qamishly inhabitants remember, happened in 1937.
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Serious tension had existed between the allied separatists of Kurds and 
Christians and nationalists, led by the Shammar tribal sheikh (Shammar is one of the 
Shawaya tribes) (Hourani, 1946: 215). According to Khoury (1987: 531), when the 
Shammar tribal sheikh attacked the Christian opposition in Qamishly and Hassaka, the 
Christian quarter in 'Amuda, which was located to the north of Qamishly and populated 
by a significant number of Christians, was pillaged by a Kurdish tribe allied with the 
Shammar; the Kurds massacred the 'Amuda Christians, until the French military 
intervened in the conflict on the side of the Christians.
People in Qamishly recall this historical event as 'the massacre', and interpret 
contemporary relations between the Kurds, Shawaya and Christians with direct 
reference to it. The Christians refer to the incident at 'Amuda as an evidence of 
Kurdish betrayal: “the Kurds pretend to take your side, but then stab you from behind” 
(see Chapter 3). In turn, the political movements of the 1930s seem to have left the 
Shawaya with the perception that the Christians support Western powers, because the 
French took sides with the autonomists against the nationalists. For example, during 
the Gulf War, the Shawaya resented the local Christians, because the Shawaya 
regarded the Christians as supporters of the Allied operation in Iraq and so increased 
their antagonism towards them, since the Shawaya regarded the whole operation as 
Western interference in the Arab world.
Another historical factor that has fuelled group classification is the nature of 
agricultural commercial relations between Qamishly city dwellers, mainly the 
Christians, and rural inhabitants, which existed before the Syrian land reform in 1963. 
Christian farming entrepreneurs rented land from the tribal sheikhs, large landowners, 
and invested in machinery, seed and irrigation. Warriner (1957: 90) mentioned that 
these farming entrepreneurs, who had no inherited wealth, and did not belong to the 
established land-owning class, accumulated capital in this way. This was a risky 
business because irrigation farming was only done on a small scale, while dry farming 
depended on unstable rainfall. According to my interview subjects, the failure of the 
harvest which occurred for several years in the 1950s, drove many of these farming
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entrepreneurs to bankruptcy. This Christian enterprise created occupational 
differences between the city dwellers, as an entrepreneurial urban class, and rural 
inhabitants, as either big landowners or landless peasants.
In the course of Jazirah history, the Christians, Kurds and Shawaya seem to 
have developed a strong consciousness of their group distinctions as a result of these 
contacts and conflicts. As Qamishly Christians and Kurds often say, “until twenty 
years ago, the Shawaya only came to Qamishly when they wanted medical treatment. 
Now they come here for work and to attend school. For these purposes, large 
numbers of Shawaya come here everyday. Many of them have immigrated to 
Qamishly”. These statements testify to the increased contact between city dwellers and 
people of rural origin, who have acquired opportunities to earn income through work 
in Qamishly.
In Qamishly, no quarter (hard) is ethnically, or religiously unmixed. One of the 
oldest districts, called Wasta, used to be inhabited mainly by Christians and Jews. 
With the development of Qamishly into an urban and commercial centre, this residential 
quarter became a market area. The inhabitants have pulled down their old houses and 
rebuilt flats both for residential and commercial use. These flats are occupied by 
different kinds of people. For example, a building owned by a Christian family houses 
shops run by Kurds; or a Shawaya family may move into a flat in the Jewish area. In 
the outskirts of the city, multi-storey residential buildings have been constructed for 
school teachers, employees of the electric power station and the agricultural sector and 
more are under construction. These flats are often let by the owners to people of 
different occupations, usually new couples and rural immigrants. These areas house a 
mixture of Christian, Kurd and Shawaya inhabitants.
There are also relatively new quarters which have sprung up on the outskirts, 
occupied mainly by rural immigrants. These are characterised by horizontally 
structured mud-brick, or concrete houses, with the people retaining as feu* as possible 
their rural lifestyles: raising livestock in the courtyards, furnishing their rooms with 
long, narrow rugs and cushions on the floor. These districts have more of a rural than
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an urban character. One of them, hara Tai (the Tai quarter), was established in 1962, 
just before the Syrian land reform in 1963. Since I carried out my research in Dubana, 
a Tai village, I had many opportunities to visit the villagers' kin and friends in this 
district. The residents used to be sabH of the Tai tribal sheikhs and immigrated here in 
order to seek economic opportunities. Some men work as employees in either the 
public or private sector, while others are engaged in self-employed commercial work, 
running small shops which sell vegetables, or miscellaneous goods, or in garages, or 
some work as taxi or tractor drivers. These jobs all used to be regarded as jobs held 
by urban dwellers, but rural immigrants gradually come to outnumber urban dwellers in 
these occupations. Consequently, occupation, income and residential differences have 
been blurred between the city dwellers and people from rural origin. This has led to 
social unrest amongst the minority Christians.
The Christians of Qamishly were the town's first urban professionals, 
commercial traders, entrepreneurs and artisans. The Christians, as well as urban 
Kurds, still occupy the most prestigious jobs, such as medical doctors, pharmacists and 
engineers. Most of the shops in Qamishly market and in shopping centres located in 
the city centre are still run by the Christians and Kurds. Occupation and access to 
economic resources constitute important criteria for the Christians to distinguish 
between urban and rural, or professional and peasant
Urban professions, however, are no longer monopolised by urban dwellers. 
Increased access to higher education has made it possible for rural peasants to become 
qualified engineers and school teachers. Rural immigrant women work as school 
teachers, one of the most respectable occupations for intelligent city women, even 
though the number of female school teachers from rural origin is still small. School is 
the most desirable place for women to work because gender separation is observed to 
some degree. Women teachers work only among their female colleagues; of the 
teaching staff, only the head-teachers are men.
Christian city dwellers have gradually seen their valued distinction as urban 
professionals undermined. They therefore fear the intrusion of rural people, especially
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the Shawaya, whose presence amongst them during these twenty years has disrupted 
the traditional balance of urban-rural relations. They speak of distinguishing 
themselves from the Shawaya by nature and culture, emphasising their own prestigious 
position in society. They have developed standardised ways of understanding and 
attitudes vis-h-vis the Shawaya, and have oriented themselves socially to the 
standardised attitudes of their own group. The Christians hold particular notions about 
the vices and virtues of the Shawaya and these notions are articulated in everyday 
conversations. They predictably determine the behaviour of the Shawaya, which are 
interpreted in the light of ethnic dispositions, or group stereotypes with which they 
identify and differentiate the Shawaya.
One stereotype held by the Christians relates to education. Child education is one 
of the most important issues for the Christians, especially for mothers, and is regarded 
as a factor defining their own and their children's place in society. The traditional 
occupational dichotomy between urban and rural has created the preconception that 
urban Christians constitute the urban intelligent middle class, whereas the Shawaya are 
less educated peasants.
Moreover, the government policy of investing in the public sector in order to 
increase production, has encouraged and increased the employment of engineers as 
local experts, by offering better salaries at the beginning of 1980s (Perthes, 1992: 45). 
This policy has encouraged child education among the city dwellers in Qamishly, as a 
means of enhancing their economic and social positions. Many Christian parents (even 
rich Muslim parents) try to send their children to private Christian schools and to hire 
private tutors in order to provide them good education. These city dwellers believe that 
having a few children and spending large amounts of money on their education are 
distinctive features of an advanced (<mutaqaddim) way of life. Many young couple in 
their twenties and thirties insist that to have three or four children, is sufficient^4). They 
contrast their attitude to child education and family planning to that of rural peasants, 
who have as many children as they possibly can. The urban Christians regard this
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attitude as backward (mutaakhir) and derived from the parents' inability to understand 
the importance of educating children.
These stereotypical attitudes relating to education and the number of children, 
serve to justify the urban dwellers' superiority to the rural peasants. They function by 
justifying the inferiority of the rural peasants, especially the Shawaya, by emphasising 
their lack of knowledge regarding birth control, the deterioration of women's health due 
to continuous child bearing, as well as the rearing of many children without concern for 
their education.
Although the Shawaya do indeed have many children (many village women bear 
a dozen babies), these stereotypical images held by the Christians have little to do with 
the reality of the Shawaya's life. Children, especially daughters, are active members of 
the labour force in village households. Village women need the help of their daughters 
to carry out domestic chores and animal care. If a village woman does not bear 
daughters, her domestic chores increase with every new addition to the household, 
without additional help. Sons are able to help with animal rearing, but they are not 
allowed to engage in dairy production and domestic chores, because of the gender 
division of labour. Consequently, women with few daughters find themselves in the 
position of the woman in the following example. There was a woman in Dubana, 
whose fourth child was her first daughter. She was forty-two by the time her daughter 
was only thirteen. There was no other female labour force in the household. The 
daughter did the washing and cleaning and did not attend elementary school. However, 
she was not old enough to bring fodder, or cotton stalks used for fire wood, from 
distant fields, nor to cook meals by herself. The mother subsequently bore a heavier 
work load than other village women who were almost at the same stage of life as her, 
but had more grown-up daughters.
Having sons acts as future insurance for parents, for their old age. Indeed, one 
of the married sons in a family is obliged to live with his parents and to take care of 
them. For daughters, having brothers is also important as insurance. When a woman is 
divorced or widowed, she can come back to her natal family and ask for the support of
60
her father and brothers. When sons marry and constitute independent households, 
brotherhood is regarded as the closest relationship outside one's own household. 
Brothers are also obliged to help each other, especially on big occasions, such as 
weddings, funerals, and in sickness, when great financial expenditure and the 
cooperation of agnatic kin are required. This mutual support between brothers is a 
prerequisite for carrying out one's social obligation (ijbdi) towards one's distant kin, 
neighbours and friends.
As for education, the Shawaya recognise the importance of educating their sons 
and regard it as one of the motivations behind their immigration to Qamishly. It is 
however true that they have little concern for women's education. For example, in 
Dub ana all the men between the ages of elementary school and into their fifties are 
literate, whereas for women over thirteen, only two teenage girls were literate. Men 
need to seek multiple opportunities to acquire income in the towns. Women are 
regarded as responsible for domestic, agricultural work and livestock rearing, so that 
learning these chores during their maidenhood takes first priority. Moreover, notions 
of gender segregation also hinder women's attendance at school. For example, in 
schools, as well as during journeys to and from school in the city, girls are regarded as 
being exposed to the eyes of unrelated men. However, since the Syrian government 
has increased the number of elementary schools in villages, it has become easier for 
village girls to receive elementary education in their own villages, without having to 
worry about contact with unrelated men. Since the establishment of an elementary 
school in Dubana in 1986, most of the girls were able to attend school.
Given this wide gap between the misconceptions of the urban Christians and the 
reality of the Shawaya villagers' attitudes toward children and education, what can be 
the cause of this stereotyping by the Christians? When I started my field research in 
1989, belief in higher education as providing a good job and a better life no longer 
reflected the actual situation in the job market. At the macro-level of the Syrian 
economy, according to Perthes (1992: 43-4), actual government investment in the 
public sector has declined because of rapid inflation at the end of 1980s. Inflation and
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the reduction in actual expenditure on investment are important reasons why the public 
sector has held back from employing workers and engineers. Consequently, a number 
of local professionals are facing difficulties in finding employment. I met many 
university graduate engineers in these circumstances. They certainly have skills, but 
no work.
The Christians are apprehensive about the advent of an economic crisis, because 
of their fear of losing status as urban professionals. Difficult job prospects, inflation 
and salaries lagging far behind inflation^5), have therefore created serious social unrest 
among the Christians. In the summer of 1989, although all Syrian citizens were issued 
coupons by the Syrian government as a means of controlling inflation and subsidising 
basic foods - sugar, rice, tea, and olive oil - it was still difficult to obtain these goods 
in government establishments. Consequently, the shortage of goods led to inflation in 
the prices of daily foods and to a flourishing black market. Since this was the time of 
year when every household purchased large amounts of foodstuffs to preserve food for 
the winter, concern grew amongst the Christians(6).
Inflation and the lack of employment opportunities resulted in the Christians' fear 
that their standard of life as the urban professional class in Qamishly would be lost. 
They felt unable to keep up with the social exchanges necessary between kin, 
neighbours and friends. They generally spend large amounts of money on gifts to 
relatives and friends on important ceremonial occasions. Although these exchanges are 
a financial burden for them, they nevertheless cannot escape them, as they are regarded 
as their obligation (ijbat). If they fail to participate in this exchange, it means that they 
wish to end relations with their network of people close to them. They will 
consequently be isolated and lose their position in society. Therefore, it is necessary 
for them to participate in these reciprocal exchanges, even though they are financially 
burdensome.
I shall give one example of how many Christians participate in social exchanges 
beyond their financial ability. My neighbour at Qamishly, Salwa, a nursery school 
teacher, who was a Syrian Orthodox living with her mother and sister, earned £S2,500
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per month. Her neighbour, who was a medical doctor, announced his wedding and 
sent an invitation to Salwa's family. Salwa was obliged to buy a wedding gift, which 
was customarily presented to the bride. Salwa did not buy the present until her other 
neighbours, who were also invited to the wedding reception, had bought theirs. She 
consulted these neighbours on their presents and their cost. Her neighbours had 
bought gold rings, which are usual wedding gifts to one’s close neighbours: one 
neighbour had spent £S 1,200; the other £S970. Salwa thus decided to buy a gold ring 
for £S950.
Just three days after the wedding, Salwa was also invited to a party celebrating a 
baptism held by another neighbour, whose family were big landowners. She bought a 
gold cross for £S450 as her present to the baptised boy. Ten days after the baptism, 
Salwa was invited to a friend's new house. The friend was a wife of a Bavath party 
officer and was therefore rich. After her visit, Salwa felt that she was obliged to buy a 
gift as a housewarming gesture for her friend. Salwa said to me, “most of the furniture 
in my friend's new house was probably presents from friends. Usually officers receive 
large amounts of gifts on such occasions. I cannot buy her anything cheap”. Since her 
expenditure on gifts in that month had already amounted to sixty percent of her salary, 
she could not afford to buy another gift. She was thus forced to ask her close friend to 
lend her £S 1,000, with which to buy a present for the officer's wife.
This example shows how ordinary city inhabitants are financially burdened by 
having to keep up with their social network and relationships. Salwa tried to keep up 
with her rich neighbours and friends, whose financial situation was better than hers. 
Even on occasions when she is engaged in exchanges with people of similar economic 
means, the cost of goods for social exchange is the same as on the occasions when she 
participates in exchanges with richer friends. Many city dwellers admit these social 
exchanges are financially burdensome, but cannot abandon them if they wish to keep 
their status as equals in their networks.
When the gap between their actual financial means and claimed class status is 
revealed, they are forced to escape from society. They then believe that their prospects
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would be better elsewhere. Many Qamishly Christians have therefore emigrated abroad 
to seek their fortune. A middle-aged Syrian Protestant man, who was a watch-maker 
and was trying to emigrate to Sweden, told me, “I like Qamishly, but feel that it is 
difficult to live here. I have a shop, but cannot earn enough. Social expenditure for 
parties and gifts exceeds my financial ability. All my brothers and sisters have 
emigrated abroad. I received an invitation from my friend in Germany. Therefore, I 
am planning to go to Germany first, then to Sweden to work, where I have many 
friends”.
The financial situation of rural peasants resembles that of ordinary urban 
Christians, but without the burden of social expenditure. While they are also obliged to 
participate in social exchanges: mutual visits and exchange of gifts, these are on a 
different financial scale. I observed social exchanges among Dubana villagers, their 
kin, affines and friends, including people who had immigrated to the city, on various 
occasions. At the birth of a child, a boy's circumcision or a wedding, close 
neighbouring women present nvgvl, which is a dish composed of rice and clarified 
butter, to the mother, or the bride during the seven days after the event. When a child 
is bom, the uncles, sisters, patrilateral parallel cousins and krif(a guardian of 
circumcision of the father, or the mother's brother) give a present of money, sweets, or 
baby clothes. The cost of this usually does not exceed £S100. At a circumcision, the 
boy's ktif, who is usually the boy's father's friend, presents the boy with a white outfit 
which he wears after his circumcision. During the seven days after a wedding, the 
bride and her bridegroom receive their kin, neighbours and friends who bring presents 
to the bride. The gift items are usually sweets, money, perfume, night-dress for the 
bride, shoes and so on. The cost of these does not exceed £S200.
At a funeral, which usually continues for seven days, groups of the kin of the 
deceased and his/her neighbours' kin take turns in preparing the meals for the 
gatherings and so share the cost. Among many households the preparation and 
expense of the meals - mainly on meat - are shared. Because of their co-operation, the 
sharing of expenses and work, only a little burden falls on each household. In the
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social networks amongst the Shawaya, the importance of these social exchanges is to 
support one another {musa'ada in a baad). Their contribution to kin and neighbours 
is aimed at the successful observation of ceremonies, or resolving serious crises 
according to culturally defined ways. This support is reciprocal. One family who are 
helped by their kin and neighbours will return the same financial and labour support to 
their kin and neighbours on occasions when the latter need it. The monetary value of 
exchange items does not take priority, nor is this related to their class consciousness. 
The Shawaya consider mutual support as an important cultural trait of their own.
The Christians have therefore seen that their status as urban middle class is 
gradually undermined. They fear that they might not be able to maintain their standard 
of life in Qamishly. Moreover, rural immigrants have come to outnumber urban 
Christians in urban occupations. This crisis requires other criteria to distinguish the 
Christians from rural immigrants, especially the Shawaya, who are the relative 
newcomers in Qamishly. The Christians determine the criteria for differentiating 
between their own life-style and discipline, and those of the Shawaya's. These criteria 
give individual Christians a means of confirming their superiority as modernised, 
advanced (mutaqaddim) and intelligent people, in comparison with the Shawaya.
One of these criteria is housing. In the centre of Qamishly, many Christian 
families have pulled down old-style mud-brick houses and built modem blocks of flats 
in their place. Their main purpose is to let or sell parts of the buildings for both 
residential and commercial use. Although the Christians used to emulate Western 
styles of decor and furniture in the old houses, they have since become even more 
westernised in their choice of architecture and furniture in their new flats. They have 
well-furnished guest rooms and bedrooms in a Western style, as well as two types of 
toilet: one Arab, which is installed in an independent room, the other in the Western 
style, which is installed in the bathroom. For the Christians, the decor of their homes 
to some degree represents their advanced way of life in comparison to the style of rural 
houses, which the Christians regard as backward {mutakhallif).
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Village houses, inhabited by both the Shawaya and the Kurds, are one-story 
houses made of mud-brick or concrete. The sitting room or guest room is usually 
furnished with long narrow rugs, and cushions on the floor and along the walls. The 
earthen floor of the bedrooms is covered with plastic mats. The wall of one of the 
bedrooms is generally hidden behind bedding, mattresses and cushions for all the 
members of the household, piled up as high as possible on a wooden bed, a particular 
style of village furniture. Most of the village houses do not have toilets. Even in newly 
built houses, they do not install a toilet. Although village households use oil heaters as 
their main heating facility, they also use heaters fuelled by dried sheep droppings and 
clods made of cow dung mixed with clay and straw.
The structure of Kurdish and Shawaya urban houses, as well as the Christian 
urban houses, are divided into two types: horizontally structured old houses and 
modem flats. Although the structure of their houses is similar to that of the Christians, 
the urban Kurds and Shawaya are not particularly interested in the decor of their 
houses. Some houses have the sitting rooms or guest rooms which are furnished in the 
rural style and others have furnished guest rooms in a Western style. The urban 
Kurds and Shawaya, even though they are rich, do not generally spend a large amount 
of money on the decor and furniture in their houses and have no interest in modernising 
old equipment in the bathroom and toilet For the urban Kurds and Shawaya, the decor 
of their houses does not reflect their financial status or level of modernisation.
The difference between urban and rural houses is acknowledged by both urban 
Christians and rural Shawaya. The Shawaya insist that they want to keep the traditional 
style of rural Arab housing as a means of identifying themselves as people of Arab 
nomad origin. The urban Christians regard the Shawaya's life-style as a sign of their 
inability to adopt a civilised way of life. The Christians declare their allegiance to the 
modernised way of life as representation of their cultural ability to adapt to advanced 
ways of thinking.
Another criterion used by the Christians to contrast themselves with the Shawaya 
is sanitation. Christian women believe that improvements in sanitary conditions
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correspond to one's degree of culture and civilisation. This idea is reflected in the way
they carry out domestic chores. They clean the floor of their houses several times a
day; they are over scrupulous about the matter, even though it is very difficult to
prevent dust coming into the rooms from the desert. They keep their kitchens
meticulously clean and scour all the pots and pans until all the surfaces shine. The
creases on all washed clothes and bed linen are carefully ironed out. These Christian
women contrast their own standard of cleanliness with that of the Shawaya, to the
latter's disadvantage:
“The Shawaya blow their noses without using tissue paper and then wipe 
their hands on their clothes or rugs. They cook food and process milk with 
their hands, without washing them first. They cannot understand the 
meaning of keeping things clean. ”
These statements are often used by the Christians in order to stress their own 
relative advantage. However, during my time with the Shawaya villagers, I did not 
find the Shawaya ignorant of sanitation. The Shawaya women also sweep the floor of 
their houses several times a day, clean their kitchens and utensils, and wash their 
clothes regularly. Yet, the villagers live in houses with earth floors and often carry out 
their work, even domestic chores, outside the house. Their clothes and feet often 
become muddy. They may therefore be seen as dirty by outsiders.
Christian women often say: “look at Shawaya children! They wear dirty clothes 
and walk around with bare feet. Shawaya mothers do not understand what happens if 
germs enter through wounds on their feet.” They often warn their children: “don't 
walk with bare feet like the Shawaya!”. These mothers force their children to follow 
their own standards - putting shoes on and wearing neat clothes - whereby they 
demonstrate their advanced understanding of sanitation.
The Shawaya in turn have different notions of child development. Small 
Shawaya children, whom their mothers do not treat as babies, look dirtier than urban 
Christian children. Shawaya mothers train their children to think for themselves. Their 
attitude to child discipline is that mothers must help their children develop their own 
moral ability. If children are not able to comb their hair and dress neatly and forget to
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put on shoes, their mothers advise them what to do. If children do not listen, their 
mothers do not force them to do so and leave them until they can judge for themselves 
what they should do. Adult Shawaya say: “children do not know how to present 
themselves. They often fly into a rage, cry and resist their seniors. This happens 
because they lack knowledge. Gradually they learn what they should do”. The 
Shawaya think that children learn to dress appropriately during the course of their life 
among adults, by watching the ways of the adults, and their behaviour.
The Shawaya regard their housing and life-style as their own. They do not think 
that these are less advanced than those of the urban Christians. Rather, they regard the 
Christians' Western oriented attitude as further proof of the Christians' political support 
for the West rather than for the Arabs. This is a Shawaya criterion, imposed on the 
Christians in order to distinguish them from Arabs. The Christians however, identify 
themselves as Arabs (7), and interpret this discrimination with reference to the historical 
circumstances surrounding the Sykes-Picot Agreement, in which the Western powers 
divided the Arabs in order to defend their own interests in the Middle East (this view is 
common among historians, see Mutaguchi, 1987:189-91, 203-207; Yapp, 1987:279- 
280). The Christians know that the Shawaya discriminate against them as non-Arabs, 
and so feel threatened politically. During the Gulf War the Christians feared attacks by 
the Shawaya The Christians maintain that “the Westerners divided us Arabs, through 
political manipulation and created antagonism between us”. Although the Christians 
share the political fate of the Arabs in the broader political context, the Shawaya's 
perception of the Christians' political stand does not correspond with the Christians' 
actual attitude. The Shawaya's perception is reinforced by the Christians' Western 
oriented life-style and demonstration of their superiority to the Shawaya.
In Jazirah, occupational choices, access to economic resources, financial status 
and educational opportunities are becoming equally available to the urban and rural 
populations. The Shawaya have acquired opportunities for better jobs and various 
means of generating income. Yet even though agriculture is of secondary importance 
economically, they still identify themselves as peasants, fallahun. They view
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themselves as liberated peasants, according to their historical interpretation of their 
release from the status of 'a b i d They deliberately highlight this identity in their 
contacts with city dwellers. They regard their access to urban occupations as one of the 
means for acquiring income, but deny that their intention is to assimilate urban middle 
class life, by maintaining their rural life-style, norms of mutual assistance between kin 
or neighbours, their own discipline for child education and Arab versus Western 
distinctions.
From the other perspective, the Christian urban dwellers object to the Shawaya 
and boast of their distinctiveness and superiority to the Shawaya. The Christians 
experience the economic difficulties, the financial burden of keeping social networks, 
alongside inflation, unemployment, and the general crisis of status brought about by the 
entry of rural populations into urban occupational niches. These circumstances threaten 
their way of life. Their means of reducing their stress and anxiety is to delineate 
distinctions between themselves and the Shawaya, the relative newcomers in Qamishly. 
The Christians have thus developed their identity as the urban professional class and 
demonstrate their superiority through a cultural dichotomy between themselves and the 
Shawaya: their cultural advancement (mutaqaddim) versus the Shawaya's 
backwardness (mutaakhir), or intelligent versus ignorant, clean versus dirty. The 
Shawaya are aware of what the Christians think of them, and so feel increased 
antagonism towards the Christians. Since the Christians use the name Shawaya 
pejoratively, the Shawaya identify themselves as Arab peasants. This is a means by 
which they not only insist on a distinction between their life-styles, as adherent to the 
cultural traits of Arab peasants and those of Western-oriented urban Christians, but also 
regard the Christians politically as Western supporters against Arabs.
Ethnic and sectarian identities can then emerge from this categorisation processes 
in which each individual interprets the behaviour of another in terms of stereotyped 
ethnic perceptions and relationships, so that the interpretation is accepted by all as 
sufficient explanation (Mitchell, 1974: 25). However, these narrow stereotyped views 
of ethnicity and sectarianism, which actors place on their actions, must be analysed in
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relation to social constraints enjoined upon actors within a social situation, as the 
consequence of historical, economic and political structures of group relations. In the 
next chapter, I shall analyse another stereotyped view held by the natives with regard to 
sexual actions and its relation to social constraints which affect social relations between 
ethnic or sectarian groups. As an analytical explanation of the relationship between 
sexual actions and ethnicity, this approach will help understand the locals' way of 
linking gender segregation to group differentiation.
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CHAPTER 3. SOCIAL BOUNDARIES AND WOMEN’S
SEXUAL VIRTUE
3,1 Introduction
In Qamishly, the Gulf War ignited local conflict between Kurds and 
Christians.G) My Christian neighbours, both men and women, sat around exchanging 
information about the movements of the Iraqi Kurds. A rumour was spread amongst 
the Christians, that many Iraqi Kurds had crossed the border along the Tigris river into 
Syria. My neighbours talked of alleged incidents involving cruelty by Kurds towards 
Syriac Christians: Iraqi Kurdish men were said to have raped two unmarried sisters 
from a village near the Tigris river; another Christian girl had lost an arm, broken her 
jaw and lost her eyesight in an explosion, supposedly carried out by Iraqi Kurds who 
placed the bomb in a hand cream container which the girl had picked up in the Tigris 
river. Rumours of Kurds attacking Christians were rife amongst Qamishly Christians, 
but were never confirmed. Several fights between Qamishly Kurds and Christians 
were also reported by Christian men. My Suriyan neighbour told his neighbours about 
an incident involving his brother's son, a deaf and dumb boy, who was told by a 
Kurdish man, “it is because of the Christians that the Kurds are sacrificed.” He had 
then poked the boy, who could not reply to him; soon the people watching surrounded 
them, the quarrel developed into a fight between fifty Kurds and twenty-five 
Christians. In other instances, teenage Christian boys, who had heard of conflicts 
between Kurds and Christians discussed by their families and neighbours and who had 
internalised this resentment, began claiming that they had been attacked by Kurdish 
boys armed with knifes or broken pieces of bottle for no other reason than being 
Christians.
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Many Qamishly Kurds tried not to get involved in such conflicts. I asked several 
of my close Kurdish friends, their husbands and brothers, whether or not any of their 
kin had gone to Iraq during the Gulf crisis in order to defend the Kurdish population 
and land, or whether their kin living in Iraq had fled into Syria. I asked them 
separately, on different occasions, but all of them replied in the same way: they did not 
know any Syrian Kurds who had moved to Iraq; at least among their kin in Syria there 
was no one who had crossed the border between Syria and Iraq. I told my Kurdish 
friends that Christian mothers were afraid of their boys getting involved in fights with 
Kurdish boys. My Kurdish friends told me that they had never heard of such a danger 
in Qamishly. Denial of such Kurdish-Christian problems by the Kurds thus prevented 
them from getting involved in open conflict.
Qamishly Christians, however, had their own interpretation of the position of the 
Kurds in the Gulf War. They highlighted the clear connection between the Kurds’ fate 
and the allies' campaign in Kuwait. The Christians believed the Kurds saw themselves 
as having been betrayed by the United States to become victims of the Iraqi 
government’s genocide. The Christians thus feared recrimination from Qamishly 
Kurds, believing that the Kurds regarded them as Western supporters. Hence even 
though many Qamishly Kurds maintained neutral political positions, the Christians 
were highly suspicious of them.
These interpretations of contemporary events create hostility and conflict between 
the Kurds and Christians. The Christians' understanding of the Kurdish acts relates 
back to local historical Christian-Kurdish conflicts. For the Christians, collective 
memories of the genocide of their ancestors and the sexual assault on their female kin in 
Turkish Anatolia in the 1910s and the 1920s by the Kurds, are recalled and retold over 
time in order to constitute a meaningful history of relations between Qamishly 
Christians and Kurds. How have the events of this genocide obtained social 
significance and been applied to the interpretation of contemporary events, such that 
they have been told repeatedly through time? To respond to this question it is necessary 
to comprehend the following point. The history, which remains very much alive,
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speaks to the hearts and minds of those who participate in its reconstruction. It is 
different from the history which historians describe, because here meanings of 
historical events are recreated and applied to current events, in accordance with the 
participants’ concerns and interests. Davis (1989) suggests how contemporary Libyan 
tribesmen produce decisions and actions that are intended to be a replication of their 
history of fighting the Italians. He cites this relationship between current actions and a 
rural history as produced by the tribesmen, in terms of a touchstone for determining 
current actions:
"people give meaning to events, and then decide on current actions partly 
in the light of their knowledge of the past, thus creating events that in turn 
are given meanings [• • •] The history of the common men' is the history 
produced and consumed in daily life by common men - i t  has a 
determining role in shaping experience and events" (Davis, 1989; 104).
The history, as retold by these participants is constructed in such a way as to 
facilitate an understanding of relations between different social groups and their cultural 
dispositions, and in order to interpret contemporary events. These historical narratives 
therefore create not only an emotional reaction to historical events, but have also have a 
contemporary socio-political significance. These tire relayed in ordinary conversation 
and draw similar understandings between historical and contemporary experiences. In 
Jazirah, the social meaning behind the genocide of the Christian population and the 
dispositions attributed to the Kurds through the interpretation of these events, are both 
widely shared not only among Christians, but also among the Shawaya in Qamishly 
society. The Kurds also predict Christian and Shawaya reactions by considering the 
contemporary situation in the light of historical events. In this chapter I aim to portray 
Christian-Kurd relations in the light of local history. I shall then consider prohibited 
sexual relationships between Christians and Kurds, or between Christians and 
Shawaya, which are significant in the creation of group boundaries in both historical 
and contemporary narratives. My purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate how local 
history and the differentiation between Christians, Kurds and Shawaya, prepare 
Qamishly people for constructing discourse on the constraints imposed over the
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activities of women. I shall examine these processes of creating group boundaries in 
terms of the spatial and relational confinement imposed on women, as well as the social 
codes which are adopted to interpret women's activities.
3.2 Historical Experiences and Contemporary Christian-Kurd 
Relationships
Qamishly and the surrounding countryside were sparsely cultivated and largely 
unpopulated before the arrival of European powers early this century. Among the 
present inhabitants, the Syriac Christians (Suriyan), Armenians and Kurds living in 
Qamishly and the surrounding countryside, previously lived in south-eastern Turkish 
Anatolia. Stories told by older generations of Christians remind the younger 
generations of their migration. Abu-Ghasan, an eighty-four year old Suriyan Christian 
living in Qamishly, told of the tragedy of his family in Anatolia, and of his emigration 
to Qamishly.
“When I was six, my father and father's brothers were killed by the Kurds. 
We lived in a village called Warabash, near Diyarbakr. My grandfather, 
who was a religious man and had visited Jerusalem, used to read from the 
Bible for his neighbours. Men who were intelligent and religious were rare 
in those days. The Kurds were cruel, but my grandfather was not put off 
by their atrocities. He said, “if the Kurds slaughter us, we will go to the 
place of God.” My grandmother used to tell him that although my 
grandfather read the holy Bible regularly, he did not know whether God 
would help her find out the whereabouts of my father and his brothers after 
they disappeared. After my grandfather died, my grandmother found out 
that my father and his brothers had been murdered by the Kurds. Soon 
after, she died of sorrow.
The Kurds are cruel to Christian women. One of my neighbours, a 
woman with two children, was threatened by a Kurdish man who told her, 
“if you do not do as I say, I will kill your children one by one.” The 
Kurds also raped Christian women, even pregnant ones. They cut their 
swollen bellies and killed the foetuses. My wife later told me that she put 
excrement on her face in order to protect herself from sexual offence. After 
the massacre, we lost all our animals and property. My mother, my
74
younger brother and I moved into Diyarbakr. My brother caught cholera 
and died there.
When I was fourteen years old, in 1920, we knew that the French 
mandatory power was coming to Syria. I came into Qamishly with my 
mother and my older brother. When we moved into Qamishly, the French 
force had not arrived there yet. Even the present city centre was no more 
than agricultural fields. After arriving, the French constructed Qamishly; 
the population increased later on with refugees from Turkey.”
Abu-Ghasan's narrative is of significance to the history of Qamishly Christians. 
Such stories of the massacre of fellow villagers and kin present a scenario that 
structures and motivates Christian hostility towards the Kurds. Before the start of 
European intervention in Turkey in the 1910s, many Suriyan Christians now living in 
Qamishly used to co-exist alongside the Kurds in south-eastern Anatolia, in towns such 
as Nuseibin, Mardin, Madyat, Diyarbakr, and the surrounding villages. These 
treacherous acts were conducted by their Kurdish neighbours. The Chaldeans 
(Kuldani), and Assyrians (A&hurl), who lived nearer the present Iraqi border, were in 
a similar situation to the Suriyan. According to Joseph (1983: 96-8), the Christian 
evacuation and massacre of 1915-1918 was carried out by the Ottoman government, 
which issued the evacuation order of the Armenian population. There were a great 
number of Armenians (Armani) living in this region at the time. This evacuation policy 
applied to all Christians, regardless of sect. The Kurds took the side of the Turks and 
fought the Christians under the guise of religious conflict. Abu-Ghasan became a 
victim of these deportations.
About the time of Abu-Ghasan's emigration to Qamishly, Anatolian Christians 
were still subjected to acts of Turkish retaliation. The Armenian movement claimed that 
their independence was put down by Turkish nationalist forces in 1922. The Kurds 
acted in collusion with Turkish armed forces. All the Christians, not only the 
Armenians, became the helpless victims of these forces and sacrifices to the course of 
events. In 1922, the Turks permitted all Christians to leave Turkey (Joseph, 1983: 
101). Many of these Christians fled to Qamishly.
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Those who emigrated from Turkey were not just the Christians, but also some 
Kurds. As a result of the Kurdish revolts of the mid-1920s and the 1930s, "about 
twenty thousand Kurds came and settled in northern Jazirah in Syria[,] along the 
Turkish-Syrian frontier" (Joseph, 1983: 105-6).(2) The population composition of 
Qamishly became similar to that of their previous residence in Anatolia, even though, 
according to my interview subjects, some Kurdish peasants had already moved from 
south-eastern Anatolia into Qamishly during the Ottoman period.
Like Abu-Ghasan, many Christians who experienced deportation referred to 
Kurdish cruelty. Although the Christians and Kurds co-existed in the same 
community and shared certain cultural characteristics, such as Kurdish and Syriac 
languages, the Kurds sacrificed the Christians to their political ambition. Not only 
Abu-Ghasan, but most of the Christians I met in Qamishly, believe that they were 
betrayed by the Kurds and view them as having a untrustworthy disposition (tabl'a). 
These views recreate the mystical history of the massacre and also tell us as much about 
the present as the past. Past historical events clearly cannot be separated from present 
cultural attitudes.
The interpretations of past historical events are thus recreated in historical 
narratives and provide a framework for analysing present events. These are widely 
shared in the society, not only among the Christians, but even among the Shawaya. 
The Christians and the Shawaya attribute base characteristics to the Kurds and refer to 
them thus: “Kurds are possessors (dawu) of a 'nasty heart' (qalb wasikh)”\ “Kurds 
always appear hospitable, but then stab you in the back. This is their natural 
disposition (tabl'a)”. The Christians and Shawaya regard this Kurdish disposition as 
founded on historically proven and innate characteristics. The Christians also contrast 
the Kurds to the Shawaya and say, “eat with the Kurds, and sleep with the Shawaya 
(Ukra rna Kurad wan an rna Shawaya)” This phrase demonstrates how local history 
attributes base characteristics to the Kurd which are then applied to their comprehension 
of the present situation in Qamishly. The Christians actually believe the Kurds are 
more civilised (mutaqqadim) than the Shawaya in some ways, such as in their attention
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to sanitation; but still consider them to be two-faced: “If a guest stays at night in their 
house, they might betray him/her and kill him/her.” In contrast, the Shawaya are 
regarded as ignorant of sanitation and sanitary ways of cooking, but nevertheless 
honest. The Christians identify themselves as intelligent urban people, having more in 
common with the Kurds than the Shawaya, who are less educated peasants (see 
Chapter 2). Yet, as discussed, the Christians apply their historical experiences of the 
Kurdish disposition, to interpret contemporary situations, thereby drawing considerable 
distinction between themselves and the Kurds.
Why are narratives of Kurdish brutality effective in recreating and sustaining an 
understanding of contemporary relations between the Kurds and the other residents of 
Qamishly? The key elements in the narratives provide a means for understanding 
contemporary sequences of actions and reactions in so far as they are a means for 
interpreting Kurdish behaviour toward the Christians. Narratives of contemporary 
social situations, for example those of the Christians soon after the Gulf war, create a 
sense of analogy between local history and contemporary events.
A fundamental reason for the suspicion felt by Qamishly Christians towards the 
Kurds is the formers' fear of being regarded as political enemies by the Kurds. The 
Christians are afraid of once again being sacrificed to Kurdish politics, just as they 
were when Kurdish ambitions of acquiring political rights in Turkish Kurdistan led to 
the Christian genocide of the 1910s to the 1930s. Moreover, the Christians consolidate 
their identity through emphasising urban/rural contrasts, such as urban professionals 
versus rural peasants, cultivated versus ignorant and refined Western-oriented life style 
versus traditional rural life-style ( see Chapter 2). The fact that the Kurds constitute a 
large proportion of the rural population in Jazirah means that the Christians' attitude 
provides the basis for antagonism among the rural Kurds. Although the Christians, 
themselves Arabs, do not adhere to Westerners' attitudes towards the Arabs, they still 
try to construct their identity as urban, by conforming with perceived urban middle 
class norms. They are simultaneously afraid of being regarded as supporters of the 
West by the other populations in their society. Yet, in terms of religion, Qamishly
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Christians are regarded by local Muslims, that is, the Kurds and Shawaya, as being of 
the same faith as Westerners. Since the Gulf War, the Christians' suspicion towards 
the Kurds has increased, based on fear that Kurdish anger at the response of the 
Western coalition to the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, might be turned on them. Some 
Christian women told me that they had even stored food and daily necessities in their 
basements in anticipation of raids on them by the Kurds.
The afore-mentioned stories of a Kurd attacking a handicapped Christian boy, 
and a Christian girl injured by a bomb planted by the Kurds, reinforce the negative 
disposition historically attributed to the Kurds. The Christians interpret these stories 
and conclude that, a) they will be sacrificed to Kurdish political ambition and b) the 
Kurds are capable of deceiving them. Narratives of historical events therefore underpin 
the process of creating local history and defining contemporary Christian-Kurd 
relations.
3.3 Stories of Prohibited Relationships
Conceptions of Christian-Kurd relations, reproduced with reference to local 
history, create boundaries between these groups. As Rassam states on relations 
between the Shabak and other groups in northern Iraqi Jazirah, "an historical analysis 
becomes crucial for the proper assessment of the factors involved in the formation of 
these groups • • • and their patterns of relatedness to each other" (Rassam, 1977: 158). 
Historical analyses provide elements for defining relations and distinctions between 
groups. In Middle Eastern anthropology, Barth is the first scholar to pay attention to 
strategic self-identification by local groups and boundary-making through interactions 
which allow for marking cultural differences (Barth, 1969: 13-15). Yet, Barth's 
analysis is criticised for lacking "an adequate notion of how social processes are related 
to the production of cultural conceptions with which people distinguish themselves 
from "other" ethnic categories and with which they account for, evaluate and weight the 
importance of those distinctions" (Eickelman, 1981: 159).
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The distinctions between local groups are created not only in historical 
narratives, but also in narratives of contemporary events. As seen at the beginning of 
this chapter, stories and rumours developed in the context of the Gulf War are part of a 
process of boundary-making between Kurds and Christians. These stories are not only 
understood with reference to local history, but are also linked to other cultural norms 
which form boundaries between local groups and which are generated through 
contemporary interactions between people from different social categories.
In both historical and contemporary narratives about Kurdish attacks on 
Christians, assaults on female sexual virtue assume a special significance. This type of 
assault highlights group separation between Christians, Kurds and Shawaya and is 
linked with norms of prohibiting relationships between men and women from different 
groups. Narratives concerning prohibited relationships between Christians and 
Shawaya, or between Christians and Kurds, are widespread in the daily life of 
Qamishly inhabitants and those of its surrounding villages. The most prominent and 
frequently repeated topic in these narratives is that men from different social categories 
damage the honour of an individual man through a sexual assault on a woman in his 
family. This same issue runs through the many variants of stories about prohibited 
relationships, told as social facts. Such stories reinforce an understanding of Qamishly 
society composed, as it is, of different social groups. Narratives of prohibited sexual 
relationships between people from different ethnic or sectarian groups revitalise 
contemporary conflicts and constitute moral parables intended to teach individuals their 
duties as members of a particular group.
A typical story of a prohibited relationship focuses upon problems of group
conflict in terms of male honour being damaged by an illicit sexual relationship between
a female relative, or wife and a man from a different social group. The contents of
these stories are diverse, but all evolve around the notion that losing control of a
woman's sexual acts renders her male relatives, or husband vulnerable. For example, a
story told by the Christians:
“A Kurdish girl and an Armenian man fell in love with one another. Her 
family noticed the affair, and consequently her brother killed her. Her
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lover, afraid of vengeance by her kinsmen, fled the area. Then, her brother 
attacked the lover's paternal first cousin in the absence of the lover. The 
brother had run into the cousin's pharmacy, closed the shutter and stabbed 
the cousin to death. The brother reported the murder to the police, but was 
not charged. And he was still looking for the lover for revenge.”
During my field work I heard several such stories of prohibited relationships 
between people from different groups, Christians, Kurds and Shawaya. All of these 
stories exhibit common elements that highlight group differences and the need for 
revenge to restore male honour. The common character of these stories is that: a) any 
sexual encounter outside marriage is forbidden; b) any marriage between different 
religious communities is forbidden; c) any marriage except for those arranged by the 
bride and bridegroom's families is forbidden. Moreover, norms of preferential 
marriages between kin, awlad 'amm, primarily patrilateral parallel cousins, make it 
difficult for individuals in Qamishly to choose spouses other than relatives. Religion, 
marriage regulation and the protection of female sexual virtue become important criteria 
in displaying classificatory boundaries between Christian, Shawaya and Kurd. The 
common theme of these stories is of an extra-marital relationship between a man and a 
woman from different religious communities. The stories then develop this theme 
further, punishment follows the violation of the sexual code and it is the woman's male 
kin, or husband who inflict punishment on the woman and the lover for this breach of 
social norms in order to restore their honour.
Because both of them are Muslims, it is possible for Shawaya and Kurds to 
inter-marry. Shawaya and Kurdish families whose social and economic status are 
similar, sometimes arrange marriages. Their attitude towards marriage is almost 
identical; they forbid themselves from marrying Christians; they have common marriage 
regulations, such as khyzr, precedent marriage right of male patrilateral parallel cousins 
and badail direct exchange marriage, both of which the Christians criticise as the 
customs which represent backwardness (mutaakhir). The Shawaya and Kurds, 
however, think that each of them has their own marriage rules and regulations and do 
not identify with each other's norms.
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I shall examine the significance of prohibited relationships within the context of 
group differentiation in society. Stories of prohibited relationships offer a framework 
for interpreting sexual segregation between men and women from different groups. On 
the one hand, accounts of the woman's kin murdering couples who have engaged in 
illicit sexual liaisons, are suggestive of the force of socio-cultural models in punishing 
acts which violate norms of group boundaries. On the other hand, such acts of 
vengeance give rise to the conflicts between the groups amongst which the illicit sexual 
liaison has taken place. Narratives of prohibited relationships provide a framework for 
seeing into confinement of women's daily activities, where they come into contact with 
people from different groups.
The stories of prohibited relationships depict the sexual offence by a gharib, 
(plural: gharaib) an outsider, a man from a different group, and vengeance by the 
woman's male guardians on the gharib, or his male kin. In the narratives, the outsiders 
prove their manliness by depriving a woman of sexual virtue. The following story 
demonstrates the interpretations of the outsiders' behaviour, and the anxiety of living in 
such circumstances where the breach of sexual norms creates conflicts.
A Shawaya shepherd cut off the arm of a Suriyan Christian dentist, who had
given the Shawaya's wife an anaesthetic in order to extract her tooth. The significance
attributed to the story differs totally between the Shawaya and Christian narrators. The
Shawaya Dubana villager's interpretation is the following:
“An Arab shepherd took his wife to a Christian dentist. After examining the 
wife the dentist wrote out a prescription for her. The dentist asked her 
husband to go to a pharmacy to buy the prescribed drug. The dentist's 
intention was to separate her from her husband, because she was a 
beautiful woman. The dentist told her that he had given her an anaesthetic 
and a sleeping pill in order to extract her tooth. Her husband, upon 
returning at the dentist's surgery, looked through the key hole into the 
office, and found the dentist being indecent with his wife. He took his 
wife without showing any reaction at the time. After a few days, he broke 
into the dentist's office and cut off his arm and put it in his pocket. The 
dental nurse, who saw what had happened, tried to phone the police. The 
Shawaya then stabbed both the dentist and the nurse. He has not yet been
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arrested, because he moves from place to place like a nomad. If he had not 
attacked the dentist, it would have been his ar(dishonour).”
The story as told by a Suriyan Christian woman:
“A Shawaya woman went to a Christian dentist to have her tooth 
extracted. She did not tell him that she was pregnant. She was given an 
anaesthetic and fainted. The dentist then carried out mouth to mouth 
resuscitation on her. After the treatment, she had a miscarriage. Her 
husband believed that the anaesthetic had caused her miscarriage. After a 
few days he stole into the dentist's office and cut off his arm. It is not 
because of the dentist that she had a miscarriage. Without his hand, the 
dentist cannot work any more. It is haram( sin), isn't it? This is the way 
of the Shawaya. They think of us, Christians, as their enemies and assault 
us. ”
The two different narratives are of the same incident which took place in 
Hassaka, a neighbouring town to Qamishly. The incident had already received much 
attention and was the subject of much gossip, before I was told about it by my 
neighbour, whose mother's sister's husband was the dentist. The two narratives 
presented above were also told to me directly without naming the people directly 
involved. The two narratives represent the standpoints of both the Christians and 
Shawaya in exaggerated and distorted forms. It provided both sides with an 
opportunity to endow a different significance to the incident and to reflect the different 
concerns of each group.
The Shawaya version interprets the incident as a Shawaya woman's encounter 
with a gharib. Their concern over the story is that a gharib man has threatened to 
assault the Shawaya woman's sexual virtue. The Christian dentist's actions are seen to 
exemplify the treatment by a gharib man of a Shawaya woman. Restoring honour, 
through revenging the offender who threatened the woman's sexual virtue, emerges as 
the key focus in the Shawaya version. The ferodty of the Shawaya husband's reaction 
towards the dentist, reflects his male obligation (ijbai) to restore his male honour 
(sharaf) in response to the assault on his wife's sexual virtue by a gharib. His 
manliness is demonstrated by overcoming this threat by a Christian outsider. The
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Shawaya narrative reconstructs an acceptable image of Shawaya man, thereby 
justifying the husband's violence.
The Shawaya therefore interpret illicit relationships on the basis of their own 
most important concern, that of protecting their honour. 'A-(great shame) is caused by 
assault on a woman's sexual virtue. When one of the female family members is 
sexually assaulted, all the men in her family are regarded by others in society as having 
lost their male honour (sharaj) through the loss of control over the conduct of their 
female members. Whether a woman is willingly involved in an illicit sexual liaison, or 
is raped, the violation of the sexual taboo is never forgotten by members of the 
community and serves to damage the social reputation of her family for generations. 
Stories of prohibited relationships warn Shawaya men to restrict opportunities for their 
women to encounter outsiders who might seduce them. Regarding outsiders as 
offenders, or potential enemies threatening their honour, the stories recreate group 
boundaries.
Meanwhile, Shawaya women voice a different concern when telling stories of 
forbidden relationships. In order to protect the honour of their male kin and husbands, 
they feel that they are obliged to refrain from behaviour regarded as shameful ( 'aib). 
Women's activities outside the home offer the possibility of committing sexual offence 
and are therefore regarded as shameful. Women collaborate to enforce this view 
because they are afraid of being mislabelled by others in society and in so doing they 
restrict their own behaviour. A woman wants to be seen herself as virtuous and 
protective of her chastity, thereby acquiring the social reputation of an honourable 
woman (shailfa), through her good deeds.
In contrast, the Christian version of the story shows the dentist, representing the 
Christian identity as an urban professional, as a victim of the brutality and ignorance of 
the Shawaya. The Christian narrator blames the miscarriage on the Shawaya couple's 
ignorance of medical matters, thereby projecting an image of the Shawaya as 
uncivilised, in contrast to the educated Christians. Underlying is the Christians' fear of 
the threat to their position in Qamishly, coupled with their inability to respond violently
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to the Shawaya or Kurds. In most stories, as have seen in this story, the Christians 
describe themselves as helpless victims of retaliation by the Shawaya and Kurds who 
use violent means. Their ferocious acts are not punished by the authorities, or in other 
cases, the offenders are on the run. The Christians' view that revenge is uncivilised 
behaviour reflects their weakness as a minority. The Christians' anxiety is also derived 
from the threat posed to their identities as urban professionals and the intelligent middle 
class, by the encroachment of rural immigrants, especially the Shawaya, into urban life 
and standards ( see Chapter 2). The Christians understand this incident by applying the 
Shawaya's collective dispositions which contrast to their own. Thus, the exaggerated 
portrayal of the Shawaya is derived from their perception of the Shawaya as backward 
and violent and thus a threat to their lives. Hence the group rivalry is created.
Why are narratives of prohibited relationships an effective vehicle for identifying 
individuals as members of one group and creating group rivalry? Firstly, narratives 
provide the conceptual backbone for constructing meanings of gharib behaviour from a 
temporally organised sequence of actions. Narratives formulate the dichotomy such as 
Christians/Shawaya, Christians/Kurds, and violation/protection into scenarios of action 
through which women's daily activities outside the home are interpreted. For example, 
even though these days men tend to encourage women's education, village girls have 
little opportunity to attend school in Qamishly after Finishing elementary level education 
in their village schools. One of the main reasons for this is their fathers' anxiety about 
incidents which may lead to them the loss of their virginity. Their concern is that there 
is no one to protect their daughters on trips between the school and their village. I 
heard of many fathers, who upon hearing the story about a bus driver raping a school 
girl on her way back from school, were afraid to allow their daughters to go to school. 
Interestingly, the ethnicity attributed to the bus driver depended on the narrator's own 
identity: Christian fathers said the driver was a Shawaya, or Kurd; Kurdish or Shawaya 
fathers said the driver was Christian. But the characteristics of this story are similar 
throughout; male actors think and decide their actions in relation to the 'plot' of
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prohibited relationships. They regard a gharib man as threatening to their honour. 
Consequently, they confine the activity of their daughters.
Women do not think that a gharib man threatens their sexual virtue in their 
activities outside the home. Young women criticise and ridicule their fathers behind 
their backs for believing the story of a bus driver raping a school girl. These women, 
however, do not rebel against their fathers' authority preventing them from attending 
school. They fear that others (na$ will interpret their behaviour with reference to the 
social schema of a gharib man offending female sexual virtue and so label their 
activities outside the home as immoral. Women strive to acquire a good reputation as 
obedient and chaste, which brings honour to the men in their family.
The second prominent impact from narratives of prohibited relationships on 
daily personal activities, is the conceptualisation of the behavioural meanings they 
embody. This is particularly important for women in terms of acquiring social 
acknowledgement of their adherence to the socially acceptable behavioural standards. 
A woman strolling in the street, talking with men outside the home, or visiting 
another's home, is seen as having contact with gharaib men. Such activities are 
relayed in stories of prohibited relationships which create an image of the woman as 
evoking her sexual desire and threatening group identity. The stories tell of women 
who engage in immoral sexual contact behind the backs of their kin and husbands. 
Women being seen in public places, or in enclosed private spaces belonging to gharib 
are believed to be undermining their sexual virtue. These behavioural standards created 
by stories of prohibited relationships, are applied when interpreting women's daily 
activities.
Women are unhappy with the social view that their activities outside the home 
often make them the targets of gossip about their involvement in sexual liaisons. 
Activities such as work, commuting, meeting with friends and shopping, all result in 
meetings with unrelated men and could be interpreted as having sexual implications. 
Women therefore need the permission of the men in their family in order to engage in 
these activities outside the home, if they are to secure their own position and to maintain
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their social reputation. Women fear social criticism, which could attribute to them a 
base disposition (tabl'a), that is, their ignorance of socially acceptable behavioural 
standards. They therefore act in collusion with the men in restricting their own 
behaviour. As a result, their attitude reinforces the social constraints on their 
behaviour.
The third effect of stories of prohibited relationship on the group identity is that 
women understand prohibition in relation to their restricted freedom in choosing their 
spouses. Women from all groups have the same view: a couple who are involved in a 
prohibited relationship and end up facing separation and punishment by death are 
tragic. They relate this tragedy to their obligation (ijbai) to accept arranged marriages 
within their own group and yet feel sad about their situation which suppresses their 
autonomous wish (raghba) to select their own spouses. The stories remind them of the 
group boundaries which oblige them to accept the norms of marriage.
The stories of prohibited relationships are also interpreted with reference to 
dispositions attributed to each group. Christians' hostility towards Kurds as created 
through local history, attribute to the Kurds a base disposition (tabi'ty which incites 
them to sexually assault Christian women for the sake of showing Kurdish power. To 
deprive a Christian woman of sexual virtue proves not only the manliness of the 
offender, but also the Kurdish men's superiority to the Christian men who failed to 
protect their woman's sexual virtue. The Christians ridicule the Shawaya, who cling to 
old customs of vengeance, by using the criterion of advanced/backward 
(mutaqqadimJmutaakhir), in order to affirm their own superiority as urban educated 
middle class on the one hand. Yet, on the other hand, they fear the Shawaya's 
violence. Kurds and Shawaya in return object to the Christians' attitude and attribute 
the label of 'Western supporters' to the Christians, who support the Western way of 
court justice and look down on traditional way of honour respect. Group hostility 
produced by these discourses highlights the attitude of each group to the others and 
creates the view that outsiders are potential enemies.
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In stories of forbidden relationships across group boundaries, even though the
couple may be devoted in their affection for each other and think much of mutual
respect, that is love between men and women (hubb), the relationship is regarded as a
sexual offence by the male lover against the woman's group. However, love between
insiders is often given as a reason for marriage, even though marriage is arranged
between the bride and bridegroom's families. This contrast between inter-ethnic love
and intra-ethnic love demonstrates the natives' cognition and differentiation of relations
with outsiders from those between insiders. Generally speaking, people from all ethnic
or sectarian groups say that closely related men and women have more opportunities to
get to know each other, because they can visit each other's families in their obligation
of keeping kinship relations. If a woman's family accepts frequent visits from their
young kinsman, the prospects for an arranged marriage between the two families are
heightened. In these cases the reason for the marriage given by the couple and their
audience is love, even though the marriage was arranged by mutual family agreement.
For example, in one case when a man living in Dubana married his first patrilateral
parallel cousin, his sister explained to me the process of their marriage:
“my brother Mahir loved his b in t'amm (FBD)(3), Firyal, and visited her 
family by playing truant. He loved her and asked our father to arrange his 
marriage with her. Our father at first was reluctant to arrange the marriage, 
because Firyal spent time with Mahir before marriage and our father 
worried that she might have loose sexual morals. Since Mahir insisted on 
his love for her and wish to marry her, our father accepted, and they got 
married.”
Between close kin or insiders of a group, love is accepted as the reason for 
marriage. Although a couple who love each other are ideal for marriage, any extra­
marital relationship is prohibited between them. The meaning of this prohibition is 
different in cases of inter-group relationships. As Mahir's father suggests, the sexual 
issue is a serious concern in personal relationships. If Firyal were sexually loose, she 
may commit adultery and undermine her husband's honour. It is not Mahir's family, 
but his own honour which would be ruined by his wife's immoral acts. Only if 
Mahir trusted her and was confident of maintaining his individual honour by
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controlling Firyal's behaviour, he could ask his family to arrange the marriage. 
Chastity is regarded as a woman's personal disposition {tabl'a), which is partly innate 
and partly acquired through upbringing by her natal family. Her personal disposition is 
therefore not only regarded as her individual character, but also indicative of her family 
members who are responsible for her. The woman and her family should therefore 
remove her from any sexual contact before marriage, in order to preserve the good 
reputation of both her and her family.
The fantasy of love can be realised in marriages between insiders. Individuals 
often tell me that their marriage is an ideal based on affection, even though the truth is 
quite different. I heard many women from different groups idealising their marriage in 
this way by claiming: “I loved my husband”. The actual process of marriage often 
contradicts this statement. In most cases marriages are arranged on the basis of 
preferential marriage between close kin or insiders and the wealth, and personal 
characteristics of the principals. Marriages are agreed upon between the bride and 
bridegroom's families with these factors in mind, but with little consideration for the 
couple's feelings. A man may ask for marriage to be arranged with his chosen woman 
with the support of his family or friends. A woman however, cannot express her 
feelings or make such a request, as this would be interpreted as an expression of her 
sexual desire and so is considered shameful Caib). She may be labelled as a woman 
who has a disposition (tabl'a) with a strong sexual appetite and may endanger her 
husband's honour. This social restriction forces women to refrain from expressing their 
own wishes (raghba), so that their feelings ultimately play little part in their marriage.
However, on occasions when married women feel free to idealise their marriage, 
it is portrayed as the realisation of their secret love. For example, a woman told me 
how she and her ibn Kamm secretly loved one another. While she was unable to 
express her feelings, or do anything about it, her cousin had asked for her hand in 
marriage, so that her feelings were finally realised. Another woman told me that she 
met her husband, who was her distant relative, at a wedding reception and that they had 
fallen in love with each other at first sight, even though they only saw each other at a
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distance. Although she could not request to marry him, he succeeded in persuading his 
family to let him many her, resulting again in the realisation of their feelings.
In all the cases where women claimed to be devoted in their affection towards 
their spouses, they had played little part in the marriage arrangement. They, however, 
insisted that they had communicated their feelings of love to their chosen man and so 
had succeeded in marrying on the basis of love. Lina, a Shawaya woman, whose 
arranged marriage with a man from a different tribe was cancelled by her ibn 'amm 
through the exercise of his precedent marriage right as her patrilateral parallel cousin 
(kbyai) over her, is one such example. Although Lina had no choice but to marry this 
cousin, she told me that she had married him because she loved him. She had lived 
with her mother and mother's father before her marriage. Her mother had not had a 
good relationship with her husband and had come back to her natal family where she 
was supported by her father. He was nearly eighty years old and found it difficult to 
sustain his household independently. Lina's mother's two brothers who lived in 
Dubana, negotiated an arrangement with their cousin. The latter agreed to exercise his 
right of kbyar on condition that Lina's mother and grandfather move into Dubana and 
live with the new couple in their new house, whose construction cost would be shared 
between the bridegroom and the grandfather. This marriage was preferable for Lina's 
uncles in terms of both fulfilling the norm of preferential patrilateral parallel cousin 
marriage and as the practical means of securing their father and sister's livelihood.
Lina's marriage arrangement was largely effected by her kin's intention, 
supported by the right of kbyar. Yet, she described her marriage as if it had been 
conducted in accordance with her will (raghba) and her love for her cousin. Her 
husband also claimed it was his love which motivated him to marry her. Whether she 
had willingly married him, or was forced to marry him I could not ascertain, since the 
marriage had taken place two years before we met. The important point however, is 
that love is accepted as a motivation for marriage within the same group and women are 
allowed to express love as a basis for their choice in selecting their spouses, even 
though love is not considered a key element in arranging marriages. Here, the
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expression of love has two important meanings for women. Their marriage is no 
longer dominated by marriage regulations, because it has happened on the basis of 
affection and mutual understanding between individuals. Also through the attainment 
of love women can express the freedom to decide about their own lives. This is never 
the case in inter-group relationships.
Practically however, marriage choice is restricted by various rules of endogamy, 
which support the creation of group boundaries. Preference for patrilateral parallel 
cousins is common between Christians, Shawaya and Kurds. The Shawaya and Kurds 
sustain the rule of khyar, which serves to retain their women within their groups. 
Khyar affirms the order of priority for marriage according to genealogical distance 
between a man and a woman. In other words, a man who is a woman's first 
patrilateral parallel cousin has priority in marrying her, or preventing her marriage with 
any other man.
For example, a Shawaya woman, who was asked for marriage by her first 
patrilateral parallel cousin accepted it, even though she did not wish to marry him. 
Since he often visited her family, she knew that her family would favour her marrying 
him. She also recognised his priority over her marriage and was afraid that no one 
would propose to her as long as the cousin wished to marry her. If his right over his 
kinswoman were rejected, the cousin would be dishonoured. The rule of khyar 
supports his priority to marry his first patrilateral parallel cousin and places him in a 
superior position to others. Choice of spouse is made on the basis of three factors: the 
personal characteristics of the principals, social distance between their families and their 
wealth. In this case, the two families were socially close and economically equal. If the 
marriage were refused by the woman's family, it would be regarded by the community 
as the fault of his own personal defect. This would in turn cause the loss of his 
honour. Patrilateral parallel cousin marriage affirms the notion of distinguishing people 
in terms of genealogical distance. When a man's family proposes to his patrilateral 
parallel cousin, his request would be supported by the notions which keep her away 
from further distant kin or strangers, and retain her under the control of her patrilateral
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kin. This male control over kinswomen is a source of male honour. Furthermore, this 
ideology of control over marriage is so structured that women find it difficult to resist, 
or to try and achieve their own wish. Although women can express their disagreement 
to their family, it is very difficult for them to dissuade their family when the cousin 
fulfils all the marriage conditions, in terms of both personal characteristics and 
economic ability.
If a woman succeeds in fulfilling her wish by rejecting such a proposal against 
her family's wishes, the result is obvious. Any breach of this order causes great 
problems between kin, as in the case of a Kurdish woman whom I came across. She 
was proposed to by both her first and second patrilateral parallel cousins. She wanted 
to marry her second cousin, but her father accepted the request of her first cousin out of 
respect for his priority to marry her. At the wedding reception, the second cousin 
kidnapped the bride who subsequently chose to run away with him to Austria, in order 
to realise their love. There was no other way for them to marry except by elopement. 
The first cousin who had then lost face, chose to leave his country.
Rules of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage enjoy intensive and collective 
support for promoting marriage between closer kin. These make it difficult for women 
to choose their own spouses. Direct exchange marriage (badait) is another rule which 
encourages marriage between close kin among the Shawaya and Kurds. Two 
households exchange their daughters as brides simultaneously, without paying a 
brideprice (mahr) (cf. N. Tapper, 1981:397). Although there are no definite regulations 
as to who can participate in this type of direct exchange marriage, they are usually 
conducted between first patrilateral parallel cousins. Both the Shawaya and Kurds 
explain that direct exchange marriage is conducted between intimate kin. The fate of the 
married couples is largely determined by relations between their families. If the 
relationship between the two families deteriorates, it may lead to divorce. Once one 
couple divorces, as a principle, the other couple should also divorce and exchanged 
women are then returned to their natal families. Since direct exchange marriage 
contains such risks, this type of marriage is not desired by young people. Out of thirty-
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five marriages among households in Dub ana, three were direct exchange marriages. 
Among these three, one resulted in divorce, because the wife refused to accept her 
husband's second marriage and her family supported her. Relations between the two 
families deteriorated in the course of the dispute. The other couple in the exchange 
consequently also had to divorce, regardless of the couple's own wishes. Another 
couple also faced difficulties, because the husband of their partner couple in the 
exchange had taken a second wife and divorced his first wife in order to terminate his 
financial support for her. However, after negotiations between the husband and his 
wife's natal family, agreement was reached not to divorce, even though the other 
couple in the exchange had divorced. As shown in these cases, the fate of such 
marriages is largely dependent on the regulations surrounding exchange marriages and 
family relations. Both young men and women subsequently feel that their wishes are 
neglected in direct exchange marriages.
In practice brideprice is a central concern in marriages. Both the Kurds and the 
Shawaya set the amount of brideprice to be paid to the bride's family, as a reflection of 
the genealogical distance between the bride and bridegroom's families. Accordingly, 
an ibn 'amm who shares an ancestor five generations back with his bride, pays half the 
amount of an unrelated man. More distant kin, qacaib, pay half the amount between 
these two amounts. In 1990, an unrelated man had to pay £S100,000 (approximately 
$2,500)(4). The brideprice paid varies according to these categorical divisions, rather 
than to household wealth and income between rich and poor. Especially at the present 
time, when financial difficulties make it difficult for ordinary young men to marry, this 
categorical division is important in finding a spouse and minimising the brideprice 
incurred. These categorical divisions all act to promote norms of preferential marriage 
between kin and consequently the choice in selecting spouses is more confined by 
preferential marriage. The principals of autonomy and freedom in selecting spouses are 
thus undermined.
Christians reject the ideas of khyar, direct exchange marriage and brideprice, 
which in their view represent the backwardness of the Shawaya and Kurds and their
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disrespect for women's humanity. Parents and elder family members of single men 
and women also prefer marriage between close kin and marriages are agreed upon 
between the bride and bridegroom's families with consideration of the social distance 
between the families, wealth and personal characteristics of the principals. The personal 
wishes (raghba) of the Christian women are more respected than those of the Shawaya 
and Kurdish women, when their families arrange marriages for them. The right of the 
final decision however, remains in their family's hand and thereby restricts their 
decision. In practical terms, preferential marriages between close kin are difficult to 
conduct. Although emigration abroad has decreased the Christian population, with 
those remaining also intending to emigrate, they still try to maintain endogamy within 
the same Christian sect Thus, parents willingly arrange the marriage of their daughters 
with emigrants, who are their relatives or friends. This arrangement also helps to 
facilitate their own emigration. These arrangements sometimes ignore their daughters' 
wish. For example, a young Suriyan woman was forced by her parents to marry a man 
who was an emigrant and nearly eighty years old. Before her marriage, she cried and 
asked her mother; “how can I share a bed with such an old man?” Her mother replied 
to her; “just close your eyes, and everything will be fine.” The desire to emigrate, 
generated by the political and economic difficulties of the Christians, thus becomes 
another factor in narrowing the choice for young women's marriages.
These facts tell us that individual choice is rarely reflected in actual marriage 
arrangements, even in endogamy. Marriage choice is restricted by endogamous rules, 
genealogical and social distance between bride and bridegroom's families and 
agreement of their kin on marriage. Women recognise that the prohibition of 
relationships across group boundaries symbolises these restrictions. Since marriage 
arrangement regards the personal characteristics of the principals - for men, economic 
ability and non-alcohol drinking and for women, modesty, obedience, hard-working 
and beauty, are the most important - as one of the important conditions for marriage, 
personal preference based on these criteria is not denied. Women are allowed to 
express love and describe the preferable characteristics of their husbands, as if these
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motivated them to marry them. This is allowed largely because the marriage has been 
acknowledged by the relatives of both the husband and wife, as having fulfilled the 
marriage conditions. Personal preference does not take priority over the maintenance of 
social order and kinship relations. Love between a man and a woman is prohibited 
because it gives priority to personal preference and ignores the order of kinship 
relations which control sexual acts. In this sense, even sexual irregularity within a 
group is strictly prohibited. The offenders should be strictly punished for breaching this 
order. Since control over women's sexual acts is linked to male and family honour, 
male members of the woman's family punish her and her lover for bringing about the 
loss of honour. The lover's family, who share responsibility for the breach, are made a 
target for revenge by the woman's family, if they are Shawaya or Kurds. Prohibited 
relationships therefore represent social constraints on sexual acts and love and marriage 
choices thus produce group boundaries.
I have discussed several elements which prevent inter-group relationships and 
promote intra-group marriage. Illicit sexual acts are not always identified as problems 
which breach the social order of group relations. This identification depends on the 
differing contexts in which responsibility for controlling women's activities and their 
misconduct is interpreted by the locals. The following section begins by examining 
complementary gender roles among agnatic kin, or between husband and wife. Then, I 
shall consider to what extent responsibility for controlling a woman's sexual conduct is 
transferred to her husband at marriage (Holy, 1989: 121). This discussion provides the 
interpretative possibilities for assessing whose honour is affected by a woman's sexual 
actions. I shall discuss the locals' cognition of adultery and its treatment, as expected 
by society, by the husbands and the adulteress's natal family.
3.4 Responsibility for Protecting Women
In this section I shall examine a woman's position within groups whose 
members share responsibility for her sexual virtue. A household, usra, is one such
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group. For all groups, Christians, Shawaya and Kurds, usra refers to a social unit 
constituted by a married man and all his dependants, including women and their 
physical dwelling space, the house (bait). The concept of usra implies a unit 
composed of parents and children. Many households are composed of a couple and 
their unmarried children. The usra, whose members share residential space (bait), is 
represented by the male head. The physical boundary of bait separates members of 
one bait from another. The bait is owned by the male head, who builds it at the time 
of his marriage. His wife provides the furniture and daily utensils for the house. The 
usra is built upon throughout the marriage, establishing the manhood and womanhood 
of a new couple through the achievement of their economic and residential 
independence from their natal usra-s. Marriage imposes complementary roles in the 
two spheres of activity between genders: the husband earns a living outside and is a 
mediator between members of his usra and the world outside; the wife processes what 
is brought from the outside by her husband and provides sustenance for its members. 
Children sharing the usra are reared in the same womb and are also children of the 
same father.(5) This division of roles also creates a division of spheres between the 
inside and the outside, as well as between men and women.
Women, as members of the usra, as wife, unmarried daughter and unmarried 
sister, are subject to the control of the male household head. The household head, 
husband, father or brother is responsible (maswul) for protecting his female household 
members from assault by outsiders, and also has the right to punish them for improper 
behaviour. This control of the household head over female members is related to 
gender roles. These women depend on his permission and arrangement for their 
activities outside the home, such as meeting unrelated men, in order to socially affirm 
their actions subject to his control. The man is a mediator between his household and 
the world outside, and between women in his household and people outside the home. 
The women's contact with these people, especially unrelated men, without the 
agreement of the household head, leads to loss of his control over them and damages 
his male honour. A wife's sexual misconduct however, does not damage the honour of
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her husband to the same degree as that of his daughter and sister. His honour can be 
restored once he divorces his wife and sends her back to her natal family. He is not 
obliged to kill her or the adulterer in avenging his honour, or that of his family. Once a 
wife commits adultery, the mutual dependency between her and her husband in terms 
of gender roles is destroyed. This break-down constitutes her denial of his protection 
over her from unrelated men and his monopolised right to have a sexual relationship 
with her, her rejection of his role as household spokesman and her direct relationship to 
the world outside. There is no longer any guarantee that her husband will control and 
protect her. Although a married woman is a member of her husband's household, it is 
only through their marriage tie that her husband takes responsibility for her. When their 
interdependent relationship is over, the husband's protection and control over his wife 
can terminate, while his daughters and sisters, whether they are married or not, 
divorced or widowed, are related to his usra through genealogy all their life. The 
responsibility for these women stays forever with their natal usra.
Members of a household may change for certain periods of time. In the domestic 
cycle, married sons and daughters move out of their natal household. After the father's 
death, one of his married sons retains his father's usra, managing both his father's usra 
and his own conjugal usra. Dubana villagers hold two different interpretations of this 
joint household: it is regarded as the father's usra encompassing his son's usra\ or it is 
composed of two usra-s, because the joint household is composed of two conjugal 
households. The villagers say that those who eat and work together and sleep in the 
same dwelling space compose one usra. Members of the joint household share their 
livelihood, which is ideally earned by the male head. Women cooperate to carry out 
chores inside the household, such as domestic tasks and the rearing of animals, the 
commercial side of which is carried out by the household head and brings income to the 
household.
Usra membership however, does not pass down more than two generations. 
Sons and daughters who move out of their natal usra are still regarded as its members, 
but their offspring are not recognised as members of the parents' natal usra. This is
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one reason why the villagers can insist that a joint household is composed of two usra- 
s, even though economically and politically, these members constitute one unit. Usra is 
the place where concepts of descent and sustenance are integrated and defined. Even 
though a broader definition of usra may be desirable in order to accommodate its 
enormous flexibility, usra provides descendants with a means of incorporating the 
paternal natal 'aila (family). Whether or not the term usra is used to refer to a 
household composed of two married generations, or whether the old mother lives with 
her married son and whether or not single sons and daughters and widowed daughters 
are living in the same compound with their parents, the household is nevertheless 
represented by the patriarch. His household ceases to exist after his death. When one 
of his married sons succeeds him, it becomes his son's household.
'Aila relationships, however, through which descendants are related across time, 
are generative. Although 'aila is generally translated as family, the meaning for men is 
different from that for women (e.g. Delaney, 1991: 112-3). For example, when I 
asked a middle-aged married man in Dubana whose sons had not yet married, about his 
'aila, he mentioned the names of his brothers' usra-s. He said, “this is our 'aila, 'aila 
Hamza”. Hamza is his deceased father, through whom his 'aila relationship is 
defined. During one's life time, a series of concentric kinship circles proceeding 
outward from the individual constitute 'aila relationships. A man is First involved in 
'aila relationships through his father. This relationship includes members of his 
father's brothers' and father's brothers' sons' usra-s. These relationships derive from 
blood relations through his father's father. When he and his brothers marry and 
constitute their own usra-s, his 'aila relationships connect him and his siblings as 
closer relations. After his sons' marriage and their independence from him, he is 
involved in 'aila relationships constructed by his sons. 'Aila relationships involve 
members of usra-s of the father, father's brothers, father's brothers' sons, brothers and 
sons. 'Aila relations are generative across time, because aila produce new usra-s 
which reproduce offspring. Maternal kin are not included in the 'aila
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A woman retains her 'aila relationships through her patrilineal line throughout 
her life, in the same way as a man. Her father, father's brother, brother and father's 
brother's son have to support her when she is divorced or widowed. She returns to 
her father's or brother's usra and obtains their support financially and politically. Her 
remarriage is arranged by them and in the cases of Shawaya and Kurds, the brideprice 
goes in full to her household head. At a married woman's death, either her natal 'aila 
or her husband's usra take responsibility for her burial, depending on their respective 
circumstances. Sometimes, if her natal 'aila are in a better position economically and 
politically than her husband's, her body is returned to her natal 'aila, and her burial and 
funeral are conducted by them. A woman's 'aila continues to retain responsibility 
(maswuliy^ for her throughout her life.
'Aila has different meanings for women and men. When a woman marries, she 
constructs a new usra with her husband, and consequently becomes involved in her 
husband's 'aila relationships. Women are brought into their husbands' usra as wives, 
for the purpose of perpetuating their husbands' patriline. They are imperative for the 
continuity of the patriline, and are directly involved in the process of this proliferation. 
A married woman becomes a member of her husband's usra, and as its member, 
participates in activities of mutual assistance between her husband's 'aila members. As 
an individual, however, she is not encompassed by her husband's 'aila relationships. 
Even though she becomes old and lives with one of her married sons and his household 
members, she still retains membership of her natal 'aila.
Marriage with patrilateral parallel cousins is the ideal in this society. The word 
for a patrilateral parallel cousin (male: ibn 'amm, female: bint 'atnrn) is used in 
classificatory sense, and usage of this word is contextual: it only refers to kinship 
relations with first patrilateral parallel cousins in one context, and in the other context, 
includes relationships with patrilineal kin who share an ancestor up to five generations 
back. Even though marriages with patrilateral parallel cousins are ideal and common 
among the Shawaya and Kurds, a married women's natal 'aila is different from her 
husband's 'aila, except for marriages with first patrilateral parallel cousins. Even in
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cases of marriage with one's patrilateral parallel cousin, the husband is not obliged to 
take responsibility for his wife based on his genealogical relation to her.
The responsibility (maswuliya) for protecting a woman is transferred upon her 
marriage from her natal 'aila to her husband, depending on their marriage tie, through 
which she and her husband constitute usra relations. The marriage tie, however, is 
based on personal relations between husband and wife. There are cases of Shawaya 
and Kurdish husbands terminating support for their wives, both financially and 
socially, after marrying another woman. Through marriage, a woman does not change 
her patrilateral affiliation and therefore she goes back to her natal 'aila and asks for 
their support for both herself and her children. Her husband's 'aila bears no 
responsibility for her and her conduct, because the marriage tie does not incorporate her 
into her husband's 'aila. Women sympathise with the separated wife, but no one 
condemns her husband's behaviour as a betrayal of his responsibility to his wife. While 
this constitutes separation, legally the marriage contract remains valid. This validity 
makes it possible for her to retain her children.
Hence, women affirm their identify with their natal 'aila, which retains 
responsibility for them all their life, even after their marriage. To understand the 
apparent ambiguity in a married woman's position and in responsibility for her, I shall 
examine the right (ha$ to control her activities, and the responsibility (maswuliya) of a 
woman's natal 'aila over her, look at which rights are transferred from the 'aila to her 
husband at marriage, and how responsibility becomes ambiguous in the context of 
adultery by a woman.
In most Arab countries it is a woman's agnates who are responsible for 
controlling her sexual conduct, whether she is married or not (e.g. Bourdieu, 1965: 
223; Marx, 1967: 104; Aswad, 1971: 54; Abu-Lughod, 1986: 158-9). In Qamishly, as 
in other Arab societies, the onus of responsibility for the protection of a woman's 
sexual virtue is placed firstly on her agnates. When a woman is single and living in her 
natal usra, it is her household head, that is, her father - if he is already deceased, her 
brother bears authority instead of her father - who exercises the ultimate duty to control
99
her conduct. An unmarried woman must therefore reside in her usra where descent 
relationships are integrated. She needs the permission of her household head to go 
anywhere outside the usra. This permission concerns allowing women to cross the 
boundary between the inside and outside. When a woman crosses this boundary, the 
inside-outside dichotomy is applied not only to the distinction between residential space 
and the outside, but also to the distinction between 'aila relations and outsiders. A girl 
can go out with men related to her through 'aila relations, such as her father, brothers, 
father's brothers, and father's brother's sons, who all share the responsibility for her 
sexual conduct. If a woman, especially a village girl goes out alone, or only with 
another woman without a male guardian to protect her, she faces outsiders, who are 
represented by gharaib men from different groups. She may be sexually assaulted by 
outsiders (gharaib), or there may be speculation that she is intending to visit a man to 
'sleep with him' ('tnam m'a-hu'). In this case, male members of an unmarried 
woman's 'aila must punish her for the loss of her family honour caused by her sexual 
misconduct. If a Christian single woman is suspected of involvement in sexual liaisons, 
her 'aila must ask the police to investigate whether it happened or not for the sake of 
their honour. If she is a Shawaya or Kurdish woman and the loss of her virginity is 
revealed, male members in her 'aila must then bear the responsibility for taking 
revenge on the lover in order to restore their honour.
Even when a woman marries, she remains a member of her natal 'aila all her 
life. A married woman retains the name of her father, signifying her incorporation into 
her agnatic line. To what extent the control of her conduct is transferred from her natal 
'aila to her husband, however, is ambiguous (cf. Pitt-Rivers, 1977: 43, 49; Meeker, 
1976: 416; Tapper 1979: 128). The marriage ceremony symbolises an agreement to 
transfer a woman from her natal usra to her husband's; but complete transfer is not 
admitted by both sides. Although her 'ailaare obliged to openly permit her transition to 
her husband's usra and her engagement in sexual activity once married, they do so 
reluctantly, for this signifies her transition from closely-guarded maidenhood to
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womanhood. Her family's resistance to accepting her transition, is ritualised in the 
marriage ceremonies of Shawaya and Kurds.
Among the Shawaya and the Kurds, ceremonial abduction of a bride takes place 
at her natal housed). In the afternoon of the wedding day, the bridegroom's female kin 
and neighbours come into the bride's house. They approach the bride singing and 
dancing. They surround the bride, cover her face with a green shroud and her body 
with a cloak. They take her to the bridegroom's house for the wedding. The bride's 
'aila members, gathered there, do not go with the bride or attend the wedding.
This ceremony, in which the bride is captured by the bridegroom's kin and 
neighbours, highlights resistance by the bride's 'aila to transfer the bride to her 
bridegroom. This ceremony takes place after the marriage agreement has been 
completed and the brideprice has been paid by the bridegroom. Therefore the agreement 
to transfer the bride from her natal 'aila to her husband has already been reached at the 
time of this ritual kidnap. Although the bride's 'aila collaborate in the ritual, the kidnap 
is nevertheless regarded as an action of the bridegroom's group transgressing the 
boundaries of their rights. This performance means that the bridegroom's group 
abducts the bride without asking her family for final agreement to her transition. The 
refusal to attend the wedding by the bride's 'aila is also a show of their resistance to 
her transfer. The kidnap, transgression and resistance performed in the ceremony, 
remind both the bride's and bridegroom's 'aila-s that family of the bride has not 
completely agreed to her transition and therefore she retains membership of her natal 
'aila (cf. Marx, 1967: 104).
During the first seven days after the wedding, called hawfa among the Shawaya, 
which literally means edge or border, the new couple must remain at the husband's 
house and must not go out. The bride's close kin do not visit the couple during this 
period. Female guests present sweets or nightdresses to the bride. According to the 
Shawaya's explanation, sweets convey religious blessing (boraka) for the marriage. A 
nightdress as a gift connotes presentation of the bride's sexual charm to her husband. 
Women say, “once married, a woman wears an attractive nightdress in order to show
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herself to her husband”. Presenting a nightdress means society's acknowledgement of 
the bride's transition from maidenhood, bint, to womanhood, hurma, through her 
involvement in sexual activity. In return, the bride serves coffee and cigarettes, a 
conventional way of entertaining guests. She gives the guests presents, such as 
dresses, perfume or shoes, and demonstrates the transition of her status to that of a 
married woman allowed to engage in social exchanges between married women and 
represent of women in her household. Through these exchanges, female guests 
celebrate the auspicious transition of the bride brought about by the marriage, and the 
potential creation of new life.
During hawfa, however, the bride's 'aila and her patrilineal kin still retain the 
right to annul the marriage. They could enforce this right through the bride's ibn 
'amm, patrilateral parallel cousin in a classificatory sense, by kidnapping the bride back 
from the bridegroom's house. This right is called khyac. It is only possible if the 
genealogical relation of the ibn 'amm to the bride is closer than that of the bridegroom 
to her. His right to exercise this abduction is defined by degree of genealogical 
closeness between the bride and him. This recapture of the bride also needs the 
agreement of her 'aila. Genealogical distance implies a distinction between the 
bridegroom and his bride's kin, in terms of outsider-insider differentiation. At times, 
this right of recapturing the bride is actually exercised. For example, a Shawaya 
woman married a man from a different tribe. During hawfa, her ibn "amm exercised 
his right to capture her and then, married her. My informants told me that this ibn 
'amm was not obliged to marry her. The recapturing of the bride signifies the resistance 
of her natal 'aila and her patrilineal kin to transferring her to another family who are not 
close to her in a genealogical or a social sense. By retaining the right of recapture 
during the period of hawfa, the bride's 'aila and her close kin warn her husband of 
their retained right over her. After this period, her departure from her natal usra is 
symbolised by the bridegroom's authority over his bride to decide whether or not the 
new couple pay a ritual visit to her natal usra. It is at this stage that her natal 'aila accept 
the bridegroom's authority over his bride.
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Marital relations continue only on condition that each partner carries out his/her 
roles in the usra. Once this cooperation breaks down, the dualistic position of women 
becomes apparent. The termination of a marriage may occur if the wife becomes 
involved in an extra-marital liaison. Ideally, the husband in such cases may divorce her 
and send her back to her natal ’aila, but he is not obliged to kill his unfaithful wife for 
the sake of restoring his honour; nor do her agnates in her natal 'aila bear the 
responsibility of killing either her, her lover, or other members of her lover's 'aila in 
revenge.
There are no stories of punishment for this type of transgression as there are of 
prohibited relationships, where the loss of woman's sexual virtue is deemed to bring 
unbearable shame to her 'aila If an unmarried girl loses her virginity, either by being 
raped or willingly committing affairs before marriage, it is clear where the 
responsibility for revenge lies. Once married, however, it becomes ambiguous: either 
her natal 'aila or her husband may fulfil the responsibility over her misconduct. This 
ambiguous position of married women was relayed to me in cases of adulterous 
relationships. If adultery happens within a group, that is between two Kurds, Shawaya 
or Christians, it is regarded as a personal problem between husband and wife. When a 
wife commits adultery, no one interferes with this problem, nor takes revenge for 
restoring honour.
A man must rely solely upon himself. Respect for the other requires concern for 
his independence; to intrude one's opinion upon a man whose wife commits adultery is 
regarded as disgracing the husband. Friends and neighbours of the husband have no 
obligation or right to report on his wife's extra-marital relationship. If his friends and 
neighbours report on his wife's adultery, the husband would become angry, and regard 
it as interference in his personal affairs, and would regard them as trying to tarnish his 
social reputation. It would break up friendships and neighbourhood relations. 
Therefore they pretend not to notice the affair for their own sakes.
Even though no one tells the husband about his wife's adultery, men gossip 
about it behind his back. The male view of adultery takes account of why adultery is
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not punished by the husband, even though male honour is paramount value to men. I 
questioned several men from all groups, Christians, Shawaya and Kurds, on their view 
of adultery, both in general and in relation to actual cases of adultery. In both cases, 
they gave the same response: “if the husband knows about his wife's adultery, he can 
divorce her and send her back to her natal ’aila. If he does not divorce her, it is because 
he does not know what is happening. No one can tell him either, even though every 
one may know about it, because this is a matter between a husband and wife.” The 
men's view thereby supports the husband's honour in the sense that avoiding intrusion 
into his personal affairs prevents him from knowing about his wife's adultery.
Women have a different view as to why adultery is not punished. I talked about 
this matter with Christian, Kurdish and Shawaya women in Qamishly, but it was 
difficult to find the opportunity to discuss this matter with village women. They were 
afraid of their private views being heard by other villagers who may drop in on any 
house without prior notice. If a wife commits adultery, her husband and natal 1aila 
may well have suspected her behaviour, but they might choose to turn a blind eye. The 
husband undermines his exclusive authority over his wife by disregarding his 
monopoly over her sexual activity. This is detrimental to the value of male honour. 
From the female point of view, male honour is a paramount value, but they accept that 
there are other values and priorities in real life. When women surmise that the husband 
might suspect something about his wife's behaviour, they also admit the practical 
priority of keeping his eyes closed to her misconduct. The following view is common 
among women in all groups, who talked to me about cases in which the husband does 
not divorce his adulterous wife: “if he divorces his wife, he has to prepare brideprice 
(mahr) or gift for his new bride. This is very costly. Also, his children will eventually 
have to have a stepmother, an often troublesome relationship. Or, he may love his wife 
and want to keep her.” Women regard a husband as a man who forfeits his honour for 
the sake of other priorities in his real life, rather than behaving in strict accordance with 
the ideal of male honour. Even though women may feel that the husband does not care 
about his honour, they do not regard his wife's adultery as his fault. If he is seen to be
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satisfactorily performing his role as husband and breadwinner in his usra, it is his wife 
who is regarded as the guilty one and thus held responsible for disgracing her husband 
and her natal 'aila.
While adultery takes place in Qamishly, I never came across a case of a married 
woman having been divorced because of such sexual misconduct. It seems that 
husbands do not want to admit loss of control over a wife's sexual acts in public, 
because it damages male honour. If a husband wants to divorce, he can do it at anytime 
without explaining the reason. His right to divorce is easy to exercise, because the 
ambivalent position of a married woman allows both her natal 'aila and her husband to 
shift responsibility from one to one another. Once the wife abandons her sexual role, 
by denying her husband's monopoly over her sexuality, she loses her right to 
protection by her husband. Responsibility for her misconduct, in the view of both men 
and women, is then transferred back to her natal 'aila, which restores her husband's 
male honour. The husband can justify himself with the explanation that he does not 
want to have a woman like her, who possesses a base disposition (tabl'd) either in her 
nature or acquired in the course of her upbringing by her natal 'aila He does not need 
to discuss his wife's misconduct and damage to his honour. He just needs to mention 
that the divorce is caused by her base disposition. Yet, her natal 'aila who had already 
conceded responsibility for her sexual actions to her husband, are no longer in control 
of her sexual activities. They regard this matter as a personal problem between the 
husband and his wife. If she is returned to her natal ’aila, they must accept her and 
support her life. They however, do not need to intrude upon the problems occurring 
during her marriage.
When adultery takes place across group boundaries, that is between Kurds and 
Christians, or between Shawaya and Christians, these cases of adultery are not 
interpreted as group conflict, as told in stories of prohibited relationships. These cases 
are treated as private issues between husband and wife in the same way as cases of 
adultery within a group. The following case of an adulterous relationship between a 
Kurdish man and his Christian neighbour, was told by the man's sister-in-law, who
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was a close friend of mine. Her interpretation of the extra-marital relationship was as 
follows:
“They have been involved in this relationship for more than one year now. 
She phones him early morning at four, five or six o’clock. Her husband 
does not appear to know about the relationship. She leaves her small 
children with her mother, and meets her lover during the day when her 
husband is at work. They often go out in the lover's car. When they 
come back, my brother-in-law drops her off on the street where both their 
houses are. Therefore, all our neighbours know about the relationship. 
Even my son (who is eight) knows. What a shameful woman she is! ”
I asked the sister-in-law whether rumours about such a relationship would not 
hurt her brother-in-law's social reputation. She said, “for my brother-in-law this does 
not cause any problem. For men it is not wrong to have extra-marital relationships, but 
for women it is shameful. If her husband finds out about the relationship, he can 
divorce his wife and return her to her natal family.” I asked her how her parents would 
punish their daughter if the woman were divorced. She replied, “the woman will have 
to stay at her parents' place. That is all. They do not punish her. I guess her mother 
must have guessed about the relationship, because she frequently leaves her children 
with her mother and goes out. Why does no one suspect her? Her mother must know, 
but closes her eyes to it.” This explanation tells us that adultery is a private problem 
between the adulterous wife and her husband.
My friend, the sister-in-law of the lover, lived with him in the same house. She 
and her husband were also fully aware of the affair, but did not bring it up with her 
brother-in-law; they just looked on the affair with humour. For example, on the first 
day of the feast after Ramadan, the sister-in-law and I were taking breakfast in her 
house. Her husband, the brother of the man who was having the affair, made the 
following joke: “Ramadan is over. Now my brother, who has not been seeing his 
woman during the holy month, can start to see her again.” As expected, the lovers did 
restart their relationship. Since revenge by the woman's agnates or husband is not 
expected in cases of adultery, the relationship is not seen as threatening to ’aila of the 
lover, either physically or morally. The relationship is seen as proof of his manliness.
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His behaviour does not trespass any moral boundaries associated with being a man. 
Adultery is shameful for the adulterous woman, because she does not care about her 
sexual virtue. It is not the lover, but her who disgraces the honour of her husband.
This lover was single and therefore I could not get the wife's view. I 
encountered several other women, mostly Shawaya, whose husbands had had affairs 
with other women. These wives sometimes expressed their sadness and anger at their 
fellow women. Their audience sympathises with these wives, but no one would think 
of intruding on their problem. Even in cases when a wife returns to her natal family, 
her audience interpreted this as the demonstration of her objection to her husband's 
affair. Thus her behaviour is useful in bringing her problem to the attention of the 
public and for gaining sympathy. No one would thus consider mediating, nor 
interfering. Such matters are regarded as a personal problem between husband and 
wife.
Christians do not exact revenge either. Adultery between a Kurdish man and 
Christian woman is not interpreted as a sign of Kurdish political hostility to Christians, 
but is regarded as a personal matter. A liaison between a Kurdish married woman and a 
Christian man is also understood as a personal problem between her and her husband. 
The adulterous woman's behaviour is regarded by both Christian men and women as 
shameful ( 'ai), and deserving of divorce. Some women however, sympathise with the 
adulterous woman in private. They understand their conduct to be in defiance of the 
prevailing social view that it is wrong for a woman to complain about her married life 
and her husband, as long as her husband fulfils his role as a bread-winner for his 
household. Since a woman's social position is established through marriage and a 
good reputation as an obedient and modest wife, women feel that they are obliged to 
hold on to their married status. Even if a woman is unhappy in her marriage, no one 
can intrude on the problem between her and her husband and help her. Women 
therefore regard the adulterous woman's conduct as that of a person seeking sympathy 
and understanding of her miserable life.
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Adultery of a married woman touches the male honour of her husband who 
controls her sexual behaviour. The husband therefore does not divorce her because of 
her sexual misconduct, but chooses to turn a blind eye in order to protect his honour. 
If the wife's adultery is exposed to the public, it is not only the husband, but also his 
sons who are regarded by others in society as men who may have the same disposition 
{tabfa) as their father who lost control of their mother (cf. Meeker, 1976: 390-1). The 
sons therefore inherit their father's personal characteristics which means that a disgrace 
for a father affects the male honour of the sons. Although exposure of adultery to the 
public does not directly affect the honour of the woman's natal family members, it 
implies that their personal disposition is such that they do not respect women's chastity. 
The sisters of the adulterous woman are regarded by others in society as the women 
who may have the same innate character as hers and may acquire such characteristics in 
the course of their upbringing by their family. Since the adultery severs the husband 
and the natal family of the adulterous woman from their individual sexual honour, it is 
better for both of them to chose to deliberately ignore the adultery.
Narratives of sexual assault and loss of virginity, both in the case of a woman 
being assaulted or having a love affair, eloquently depict who should be responsible for 
her sexual virtue and for confining her contact with the world outside in order to protect 
the honour of usra or ’aila. In contrast, adultery of a married woman is regarded as a 
private problem between a husband and wife. Her natal ’aila are not obliged to punish 
her or take revenge on the lover for their honour, since responsibility for her sexual 
activity lies with her husband as long as their marriage continues. Since a married 
woman is not incorporated into her husband's 'aila, her adultery does not affect their 
family honour. Whether or not a husband terminates his marriage for the sake of his 
male honour, or chooses to close his eyes to his wife's affair in order to retain her, is 
his personal decision. Adultery is not treated as reflecting group conflict between 
aggressor and the victim, because it is a matter related to the individual honour of the 
adulterous wife and her husband, and does not threaten the honour of either of their 
families.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I examined how narratives of contemporary and historical 
incidents create understanding of ethnic or sectarian group relations. First, I looked at 
stories and rumours among Qamishly Christians told during the Gulf war. Examining 
what these stories mean, and why they are told in stereotypical plots, leads to the basic 
understanding how the Christians regard the local Kurds with suspicion, and attribute 
to them base characteristics which depict relations between themselves and the Kurds.
The issues which repeatedly appear in these stories are violence and assault on 
female sexual virtue. These characteristics which appeared in the stories of Kurdish 
attack on the Christians are the same as those attributed to stories of the Christian 
massacre by the Kurds in local history. I have argued that the Christians give meaning 
to contemporary events in the light of their knowledge of Christian-Kurd relations 
constituted through local history and their experiences in the past, and thereby interpret 
Kurdish actions with reference to their history. The depiction of Kurdish attitudes and 
dispositions, as attributed in local history by the Christians, is applied to contemporary 
Christian-Kurd relations, and creates current Christian anxiety over Kurdish assaults on 
them.
Stories of prohibited relationships produced by each group act as a touchstone 
for interpreting the relations between these groups, as well as the local history produced 
by the Christians. The stories suggest the potential possibilities of women's sexual 
virtue being assaulted by men from different ethnic or sectarian groups. These stories 
therefore generate male anxiety over protecting women in their family in order to 
maintain their own and their family's honour. Women understand that their contact with 
men from different groups is interpreted by others in society as behaviour damaging to 
both individual and family honour in the schema of prohibited relationships. Women 
are therefore afraid of being gossiped about regarding relationships with outsiders, and 
need to obtain social acknowledgement through acceptance by their male guardians of 
their activities outside the home. This need means that women themselves collude to 
maintain the norms of gender segregation.
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The stories of prohibited relationships attribute dispositions to each group, both 
by themselves and outsiders. For the Kurds and the Shawaya, brutal revenge against 
sexual violation is deemed as fulfilment of their duty, and so reinvigorates their 
customs and identity. The Christians, however, understand this violent behaviour 
differently. Kurdish brutality is interpreted in the light of their historical experiences of 
Kurdish brutality towards Christian women. In the Christian version of a Christian girl 
raped by a Kurdish man in the context of the Gulf War, the man is regarded as 
exemplifying the same brutal and sly dispositions shown against Christian women in 
the past. The Christians interpret the Shawaya's brutality as resulting from their 
ignorance and backwardness, as portrayed in the Christian version of the incident 
involving the Christian dentist. In this light, the Christians attribute dispositions both 
to themselves and the Shawaya as a dichotomy of them as advanced (mutaqaddim) 
versus backward (mutaakhir). The Shawaya and Kurds regard the Christians as a 
weaker minority who are not able to rely upon co-operation between relatives to protect 
their honour.
These dispositions are referred to as criteria for identifying their own decisions 
and actions as distinct from those of other groups. Even though each group produces 
different criteria to separate their characteristics from others, common to all 
interpretations of prohibited relationship is the need to draw boundaries between 
'inside1 and 'outside1. Actual responsibilities and obligations of protecting a woman's 
sexual virtue are however attributed not to her ethnic or sectarian group, but to her 
family. Who bears these responsibilities becomes a boundary marker between her 
family and others in their group. The group members however feel responsibility for 
protecting women in their own group based on their awareness of the distinction 
between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. For example, male villagers in Dubana, who do not 
have responsibility for protecting the sexual virtue of their female neighbour, said to 
me, “when an unrelated man approaches her, we are afraid of his assault on her”. This 
statement indicates that they recognise the distinction between their own group and 
outsiders and show a fear of their group being disgraced by outsiders. Protecting
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women's sexual virtue does not only create boundaries between their family and 
outsiders based on their responsibility for the protection, but also produces insider- 
outsider distinctions between ethnic or sectarian groups.
Adultery is not understood in terms of group conflict. Who must take 
responsibility for women's sexual acts becomes ambiguous for married women, due to 
the retention of their membership of their natal 'aila, even after moving out to the 
conjugal usra. The husband of an adulterous wife regards her adultery as caused by her 
innate character and her up-bringing by her natal family. He can thereby transfer 
responsibility for her sexual misconduct to her natal family. By divorcing her, he can 
restore his honour. Since her natal family have already transferred responsibility for 
protecting her sexual virtue to her husband at marriage, they do not intrude themselves 
into the matter, because they regard her adultery as caused by the husband's loss of 
control over her sexual acts.
Since responsibility for a married woman's sexual misconduct is ambiguous, 
adultery is regarded as a personal matter between her and her husband. Adultery 
damages her husband's male honour, because she did not care about her sexual virtue. 
His loss of honour is not regarded as a result of sexual assault on her by the lover. 
Adultery between a man and woman from the same ethnic or sectarian group does not 
create conflict between her husband or her natal family and her lover's family. 
Moreover, adultery between a man and woman from different groups is not interpreted 
as assault on her group by the lover's group. Adultery damages only the individual 
honour of the adulterous woman, her husband and members of her natal family.
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CHAPTER 4. WOMEN'S DILEMMA 
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, relationships between men and women 
from different ethnic or sectarian groups of Christians, Kurds and Shawaya are 
prohibited. An illicit sexual relationship signifies offence to the honour of the woman's 
family. In the context of group oppositions, it is in breach of group boundaries and 
marriage regulations, as well as a political challenge for the men's group vis-'a-vis the 
woman's, because the woman's group has been dishonoured by the assault on her 
sexual virtue.
Single women's activities outside the home are more restricted than those of 
married women. Who must take responsibility (maswuliya) for married women's 
sexual virtue, and who suffers by their sexual misconduct, is ambiguous. The natal 
family retains responsibility throughout a woman's life on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, the natal family acknowledges the woman's transfer into the hands of her 
husband through marriage. This dual position of a married woman renders her sexual 
misconduct an individual matter between her and her husband. In this context only the 
individual honour of the two is a matter of concern.
Single women's behaviour is scrutinised by society more intensely, in 
accordance with the prohibition of sexual acts for the sake of maintaining the family 
honour and the insider-outsider distinction between ethnic or sectarian groups. Single 
women's sexual virtue is not treated therefore only as a matter of individual honour, but 
also a matter of family and group honour. Although single women try to meet their 
obligations and responsibilities to other members of their family and community by
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restricting their activities, they often are caught in a dilemma between accomplishing 
their social obligations to others and fulfilling their own wishes. Such problems arise 
in their activities outside the home, where they come into contact with unrelated men 
(ghacaib). I shall therefore examine women's dilemma in these activities.
In discussing self and morality, Gilligan (1982: 64-71) deals with the moral 
decision facing American female college students as an exercise in meeting one's 
obligations and responsibilities to others, whilst being caught in a dilemma between 
reclaiming the self and meeting these responsibilities. Even though the cultural 
background of the Western students is different from that of Jazirah women, the 
conflict or dilemma between conforming to social norms and accomplishing private 
wishes is the problem of a divided self which is the human social condition. In Jazirah, 
women from all groups, Christians, Shawaya and Kurds, try to present themselves as 
morally good (qais), whilst this presentation of self sometimes goes against their 
individual wishes. Women's morality is judged by both men and women on the basis 
of the following aspects: good women show their dependence on male support and 
protection, are obedient to male authority, and do not express sexual desire. Although 
outsiders can easily distinguish between these two aspects of obedience to male 
authority and constraints on sexual actions, locals describe a woman who has these 
good characteristics as an honourable woman (sharlfa). One aspect of the characteristics 
of a sharlfa is deference to male authority in the context of family relations. Any 
behaviour which ignores this male authority is regarded as shameful {'aib) by others in 
society. 'Aib is therefore tied up with the social evaluation of a woman's behaviour by 
others.
Another characteristic of a sharlfa refers to sexual modesty. I have already 
described how sexual relationships are used as a boundary marker between different 
ethnic or sectarian groups. Love and liaison across group boundaries are threats to the 
framework that orders sexual segregation between groups, and also to the honour of 
the patrilineal kin group. Family members related through patrilineal line must protect 
their women's sexual virtue if they do not want to lose their honour in the competition
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between ethnic or sectarian groups, families, and individuals. The bonds of agnatic 
family are constituted for these competitions, and work to eliminate the risks to female 
sexual virtue, the loss of which undermines the honour of those in this competition. 
Male family members are responsible for eliminating threats to their honour, while elder 
male members have a right to control the choice of marriage partners and the women's 
daily behaviour through sexual segregation.
The moral code distinguishing a sharlfa is the most effective force reminding 
women of the importance of social order and of responsibility to their family and 
community, as well as their own social worth. Female virtue is seen in the display of 
deference to family male elders, who represent the authority of the family. Women 
achieve this social value through the denial of sexual desire, and by keeping themselves 
away from personal contact with unrelated men. Inevitably, women do not always 
wish to submit to the restrictions imposed by family relations. This poses a dilemma 
for women between their own freedom and responsibility. I shall discuss here their 
attempts at resolving this dilemma, which necessitates a judgement of their behaviour 
on the basis of women's own private views, as opposed to those of men.
4.2. Women's Inner Conflicts
Women's honour anchors them in passivity, in a reactive rather than an active 
stance. Women must shoulder the responsibility and obligations of their behaviour in 
order to maintain their own good reputation and family honour. Social evaluation of 
their behaviour, becomes a collective force which restricts women's activities. 
Women's reaction in the face of this, is to behave in such a way in public as to prevent 
others (nas) from harming their reputation. Other people's evaluation of women's 
behaviour and the norms applied to this evaluation therefore elicit particular forms of 
women's behaviour. Thus, public behaviour requires the concealment of one's will, 
because of the need to please others and the fear of losing the self-esteem which can 
only be obtained through deference to male authority. Women rarely express their 
own wishes, and state scrupulously their attachment to the social standards of prudence
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and deference. They force themselves to behave amiably and obediently in the face of 
both social rules and male authority, in spite of the potential contradiction between their 
own wishes and their obligations. This kind of behaviour is demonstrated by May, a 
daughter of the Tai paramount sheikh, in the following incident.
May, who wanted to attend a wedding reception, showed me an invitation card 
and explained that “the bridegroom is the son of a religious sheikh. He is not our close 
relative (qarify, but from the Tai. We will attend the reception together.” On the day of 
the wedding I came back from Damascus in order to attend the reception. When I rang 
May, she told me that she would not be going, but would ask her father’s brother to 
take me to the reception. When I visited her, her relatives, both men and women, who 
had come to Qamishly in order to attend the wedding in the evening, were gathered in 
her house. May told one of the older women of her desire to arrange for me to attend 
the reception. By applying the notion of friendliness or kindness (lutf) to me as a 
foreigner, she was finding a pretext under which she might also be allowed to go. May 
used lutf towards me as an excuse in order to relay her true wish (raghba), which was 
to attend the reception. The older woman turned to one of her male relatives, “Noriko 
has come back from Damascus in order to attend the wedding. Will you take her to the 
reception?” He said to me, “I will take you there.” But as we waited for the man and 
May's father's brother to arrange for a car to take us to the reception, May's request 
was turned down. While all her relatives left to attend the reception, we were left 
behind. May had no choice but to obey her elders.
May did not react when her request was turned down and hid her wish to attend 
the wedding reception. Since many of her relatives were present when she had asked 
for us to be allowed to attend the reception, it was now necessary for her not to arouse 
criticism. This is because her relatives might scrutinise her reaction after her request 
was rejected. If she failed to give the impression of obedience and deference to them, 
they might attribute to her a bad disposition (tabl'd) that is, that she had strong sexual 
appetite and therefore wanted to look for a man in the reception. If she was attributed 
with such a bad disposition, she would have no offer of marriage.
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A wedding reception is an occasion when men and women mix and dance 
together. Even though most male guests in that reception were her relatives, and 
friends and members of the bridegroom's family, the couple were not May's kin (I 
knew of the situation because I was able to attend the reception, accompanied by 
Dubana villagers, after our attendance was rejected by May's relatives). May's father's 
brother and relatives therefore decided that, as a single woman, May should avoid the 
contact with unrelated men which would have taken place at the wedding.
May correspondingly needed to show her obedience to their decision in a 
situation in which she saw herself as subject to a consensus enforced by the norms of 
sharifa and authority by her family, whose protection and support she depended on. 
Her display of deference and consent was aimed at reconfirming the assessment of her 
as a good (qais) woman. She thus chose to accept her responsibility to her family for 
the sake of her own image and to acquire their approval for her behaviour. She could 
only measure her own self by conforming to an image of sharifa with others' 
recognition of her behaviour.
The discrepancy between May's wish and the fulfilment of her responsibility and 
obligation to her family is a source of inner conflict for May. She was reluctant to 
speak publicly of her own wishes, and of the constraints imposed on her through 
family relations. Women from any ethnic or sectarian groups think that their behaviour 
is subject to the judgement and evaluation of others in society and they therefore need to 
sacrifice their private wishes. A good woman must mask her own desires, and strive to 
meet her obligations, even if this presentation of her self is not congruent to another 
part of her self who wishes to satisfy her private wishes. Although women are 
constantly seeking affirmation of their good character, I encountered many occasions 
when women were caught in a dilemma between their public faces, expecting to be 
socially evaluated, and their private desire for autonomy.
Scott (1990) analyses transcripts of the power relationship between the dominant 
and the subordinate, and points to the discrepancy in performance between the public
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transcript, which he uses as a shorthand way of describing the open interaction between
subordinates and those who dominate, and the hidden transcript.
"The hidden transcript is produced for a different audience and under 
different constraints of power than the public transcript. By assessing the 
discrepancy between the hidden transcript and the public transcript we may 
begin to judge the impact of domination on public discourse" (1990: 5).
According to Scott the hidden transcript, which takes place beyond direct observation
by power-holders and is revealed in the comparative safety of friendship, makes it
possible for us to know how contrived or imposed the public transcript actually is
(ibid.: 4-6).
Jazirah women judge their own behaviour in different ways from the public 
interpretation. They have commonly held private standards among themselves; but 
these are never talked about in public. Their private conversations and narratives are 
different from their public performances, in which they try to maintain their good 
reputation and family honour. Private conversations and narratives show how women 
contrive to create their public image, and what devices they use when faced with the 
discrepancy between their personal intent and the public face they wish to maintain. To 
demonstrate this discrepancy, I shall refer to information which I collected as a result of 
the personal trust between my friends and myself, as well as through my own direct 
involvement in their lives.
Women use devices to resolve the discrepancy between their non-sexual public 
image, which pays deference to male authority over them and their inner wish for 
autonomy and freedom. Salwa, a twenty-eight year old Suriyan Christian living in 
Qamishly, told me of her obligation to her family and the construction of a socially 
acceptable character. She also gave an example of how women can enjoy some 
freedom, without failing to fulfil their obligations.
In a conversation which took place in her house when her household members
were all out, soon after the marriage of her sister, we talked about the social evaluation
of women's behaviour in Qamishly. Salwa said:
“I go out to work everyday. I am obliged (lazim. literally 'necessary' or 
'imperative') to commute directly from my house to the school where I
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work. I am never allowed to drop in on a friend. I must (mulzim, literally 
'compulsory* or 'binding') come back home at a fixed time. Otherwise my 
eldest sister, who is like a mother to me, worries about where I've been. I 
cannot often visit my friends either. I must behave in such a eood (qais) 
way, otherwise people may spread rumours about me having an illicit 
relationship with a man. People (nas) here always gossip about any 
woman they see with a man. A woman often slanders another women and 
talks of another's shameful behaviour in order to reconfirm her own 
chastity. She wants to boast and imply that she is better (ahsan) than these 
women. I am fed up with this attitude of Qamishly women.
It is shameful ( 'aib) for us to ever think of having sexual relations 
(literally 'sleeping together', niyam m'a ba'ad). Even so, there are women 
who secretly have boyfriends. For example, all of my family are absent 
now; I could lend the key of my house to my friend and she could meet her 
boyfriend in my house. No one would know except for us. As long as 
you are discreet in these matters, it is not a problem; she will be regarded 
as a good woman by others.”
Salwa used words which define social and moral judgement - 'obliged', 'must', 
'good' and 'shameful'. These words express her subjective intention to obey social 
rules and her concern over the evaluation of her behaviour by others. She knew that a 
social evaluation by others, imposed on her behaviour, would be recognised by society 
as her own personal characteristics (tabai'). She was also afraid that evaluation of her 
behaviour might be used by others in order to boost their own good character in 
comparison to hers. Therefore, the evaluation of her behaviour by others forces her to 
restrict her behaviour. She felt it was right that she should be responsible for her 
behaviour not only to herself, but also to her family members, whose honour is 
affected by her behaviour. Moreover, her personal characteristics would be regarded 
by others as innate and common among her female family members. She thus strove 
to conform to the ideal that a good woman must never have personal contact with 
unrelated men. Although she gave priority to concern for the reputation of her family 
members and the ideals of female value, she was clearly unhappy with the tensions in 
her life.
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The dilemma caused by giving priority to responsibility to one's family, creates a 
private view of women who covertly rebel against the restrictions imposed on their 
behaviour. Women develop their private view of how they can be free from the 
restrictions of gender segregation without damaging their own and family honour. 
Many other women told me in private; “if no one sees you when you meet a man, you 
are regarded as a good woman”. Women create their own standards of behaviour in 
order to preserve their social reputation as honourable women and be free from social 
constraints on their behaviour. I myself never heard any of the women, whom I knew 
had engaged in forbidden romance in secret, express feelings of betrayal towards their 
family. Although they morally consent to respect family honour, this morality is 
derived only from their concern for social esteem. The women's main concern is how 
others in society evaluate them with regard to their fulfilment of their responsibilities 
and obligations to their family, rather than issues of morality or social values. For 
them, moral justice is tied to their social reputation, determined by their sexual modesty 
and family honour. Women's view of moral justice thereby sets their private standards 
for interpreting their own behaviour.
Women, therefore, believe that seeking freedom through romance is not wrong 
as long as it does not damage family honour. The concept of love is a socially accepted 
value associated with aesthetics and independence. Seeking romance is not regarded by 
women as egocentric, but as a way of fulfilling their freedom, aside from their 
responsibility for family honour and social evaluation. This private view of seeking 
freedom is reflected in their secret behaviour. For Qamishly women the telephone is the 
most useful means of pursuing romance without damaging their social reputation. I 
overheard several such conversations over crossed telephone lines. For instance, a 
woman said to her male friend; “do you still keep my photo?” He replied to her; “yes, I 
like it very much.” She said to him; “I cut my hair. I think you will like my new 
hairstyle. I will give you my new photo with this hairstyle.”
There is another example. The woman on the other line was talking passionately 
to her male friend; “I really love you. I will kill myself if I do not win your heart. Do
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you think that I am a beautiful woman? I bought a dancing costume. It is an attractive 
one. I will dance in front of you in this costume. You will see how beautiful I am.” 
My neighbour woman who was with me knew both the man and woman concerned. 
The man was an Alawi government official and the woman a local single Christian. 
Their relationship was forbidden because it involved sexual encounter outside marriage, 
outside the kin group and between individuals from different religious communities. 
Their love went against the social order, and if revealed, would bring dishonour to her 
family. Hence, such conversations often remain secret, not revealed even to one's close 
friends.
Alawis are a Shi'a minority sect, living in Jabal Ansariyya in north-western 
Syria. They represent only twelve per cent of the total population in Syria (Ma'oz, 
1988: ix, 19). Qamishly inhabitants understand the government policy to send Alawis 
to Jazirah as follows. The Syrian president Asad relied on his fellow Alawi officers for 
political and military control. Alawi officers who are sent to Jazirah in charge of the 
security and intelligence networks therefore occupy higher and middle levels of 
government posts in this region. The government has also sent many young Alawi 
school teachers, including a large number of female teachers, to Jazirah in order to 
overcome the shortage of school teachers in accordance with the government policy 
which has increased the numbers of schools in towns and villagers in Jazirah. Both 
officers and school teachers are the agents of the government and perform political roles 
to keep watch over the locals.
Although Qamishly inhabitants are kind and hospitable to the Alawis as well as 
to other outsiders, they do not wholeheartedly trust the Alawis. For example, my 
neighbour Alawi school teacher visited me and my host family every day. The family 
allowed her to use their telephone, lent her an iron and offered her meals. Although 
their kindness and hospitality towards her was genuine, they never told her their 
personal matters and political attitude. They told me behind her back; “these people ( 
Alawis) try to spy out us. We therefore can not frankly tell her what is on our mind, 
even though we know that she is a good woman.”
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Romance is sought not only by city women, but also by women in villages. 
Village households usually have no telephone, and so do not have the same means of 
access to their fantasies of love. Instead, close relations between neighbours sometimes 
help them. Women may well fall in love with or have fantasies about their neighbour's 
relatives and friends, and will therefore visit their neighbours during these men's visits. 
I was secretly told by village girls in Dubana of such feelings, and was asked several 
times to visit their neighbouring households with them so that they could see the object 
of their romance. Anyone can visit his/her neighbours freely. Close relations therefore 
makes it easier for a single woman to drop in on her neighbours and thus see the man 
concerned.
Women develop fantasies of secret love, which are shared in social situations in 
which responsibility for their sexual reputation and obedience to male authority in their 
family have restricted their activities. These women told me that they understood why 
women in their society seek such fantasies: “women who are looking for love want 
someone who truly wants and understands them, and who would not hesitate to 
contravene social obligations (ijbat).” Women often fantasise about unrelated men who 
are regarded as potential aggressors to their sexual virtue. These fantasies are 
subversive of the social order and defy the authority of their family, whose honour is 
established through preserving this order. Contact with these men is a challenge to the 
authority of family elders and the social system, whereas love as a concept is admired 
as an ideal of autonomy and independence. True love might be realised by the strong 
will of a couple who do not hesitate to rebel against the social order in the exercise of 
their freedom and autonomy. Women therefore fantasise about such love.
Most women whom I knew, however, did not seek sexual relationships nor did 
they engage in sexual acts. They only enjoy feelings of love, through which they can 
relieve themselves from the tension in their lives caused by their striving to be 
honourable women. They do not want to distract from their public face, but it is too 
burdensome for them to care about their social reputation all the time. They therefore 
seek fantasies of love in order to be free from the social reality.
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Women who are subject to the consensus and judgement of men in their family, 
do not show resentment towards these men. This may come from the mutual 
understanding of gender roles between them: men protect and support their women, 
and women respect men's authority and protect their honour, which depends on the 
women's sexual modesty. It is others (nas) in society whom women resent, because 
they feel themselves subject to their judgement and evaluation. Women do not think 
therefore that it is the men in their family who enforce obedience to these norms, but 
others in society. Others judge their behaviour according to the men's view which is 
the official language of society. It is not only men, but also women who apply this 
view to other women's behaviour. As Salwa said, it is widely believed by women 
themselves that women use other women's misconduct in order to highlight their own 
better (absan) character in comparing their own and other's behaviour. Thus, this self­
presentation, aimed at acquiring social acknowledgement, applies the men's view to the 
interpretation of other women's behaviour. The following example shows how a 
woman can fear assessment of her behaviour by others, who use it for their own self 
presentation.
Nuha, a Suriyan Christian and my friend, visited me with her fiancd. I was with 
my neighbour, Salma, a single Suriyan Christian. Nuha asked Salma about the 
employees of a foreign company in Qamishly. Both Nuha and Salma had once been 
invited to one of their parties by the wife of an employee. After Nuha's departure, 
Salma cried at having been shamed by Nuha. Salma told me that Nuha wanted to 
present herself to her fiancd as an honourable woman (sbarlfO) by comparison to 
Salma. The fact that Salma liked one of the employees at that company was an open 
secret. Salma thought that Nuha's intention in asking her about the company was to 
remind her fiancd of Salma's open secret. Later I told Nuha about Salma's anger and 
asked the reason for her question to Salma. Nuha denied she had used Salma for the 
sake of her own self-presentation in front of her fiancd.
Salma's understanding was based on the feelings of vulnerability felt by women 
whose social evaluation is dependant on others' judgement of female sexual virtue.
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Salma thinks that Nuha is one of those (natf who are not close to her and who can 
easily label her as having a bad character or disposition (tabi'a) towards a strong 
sexual desire; in other wards, that she does not know how to protect her honour. To 
highlight one's own honourable character often therefore takes the form of presenting 
another woman's bad characteristics. Even if a woman boasts her own good character 
by slandering other woman's shameful behaviour behind her back, the slandered 
woman is often acutely aware of who spreads such gossip. By hearing rumours of who 
slandered her, she is full of suspicion and fear that others may interpret her behaviour 
badly and attribute a base tabi'a to her.
Wikan analyses gossip and slandering among women in Cairo. She says, ’’when 
a woman purveys gossip, she is actually more concerned with her own self­
presentation than with the person she is slandering” (1980: 58). Jazirah women do not 
think that they themselves use these tactics of gossip and slandering in order to 
emphasise their own valued characteristics and to devaluate other's reputation. 
Moreover, they believe that close friends and relatives support each other and keep their 
secrets. When a woman speaks ill of her friend behind her friend's back, she loses the 
trust of her friend, and the friendship is terminated. Although betrayal happens in 
presenting one's own good character, no one admits to spreading gossip. Every one 
presents herself as a person who does not slander her friends and relatives. The gap 
between the trustworthy attitude in front of her friends and relatives and the slandering 
behind their backs is sometimes revealed through gossip. The slandered woman 
terminates a friendship with her two-faced friend. The reason of distrust is explained: 
“she speaks too much (tahaki katiz) [about my private matters to others]”. To be a 
gossipmonger is one of the worst characteristics used forjudging one's character. It 
often happens among Jazirah women that a secret is revealed by close friends and 
relatives for the sake of their own self-presentation of good character. Women 
therefore, fear that their friends and relatives may in turn use these tactics. For Jazirah 
women, 'others' have the social power to ruin their reputation. On the one hand, they 
seek ideals of friendship, trust their close friends and ask their support when they are in
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vulnerable situation, yet on the other hand, they are also afraid of telling their secrets to 
their friends, for fear that their friends may reveal them to others.
For women, establishing a social reputation as respectable and modest is the 
objective measure of their social worth, whereas love between a man and a woman is 
thought to be the true reflection of personal value between individuals who are not 
affected by social constraints. Women therefore seek romance as an act which reveals 
their own sense of self-worth. This act leads to the negligence of male authority over 
women's activities and the norms of gender segregation. Through personal contact 
with an unrelated man, a woman endangers her reputation and family honour. When a 
woman attempts to seek romance, and her clandestine activity is not found out by 
others, she can keep her reputation as a good woman and does not feel that her 
clandestine activity is morally wrong. Once it is revealed, she is not able to hide her 
indiscretion or maintain her respectable social front. Her clandestine activity is 
interpreted by others in society as sexual misconduct. She may lose marriage chances, 
because she may be sexually loose and have a strong sexual desire which undermines 
her husband's honour. This character is regarded as her personal disposition (tabi'a). 
Honour of her family members is ruined by her misconduct; her sisters receive the 
same disposition as her; male family members are labelled as men who lack the ability 
to control their woman's sexuality. The disgrace of the family is tied to the woman 
through patriline and therefore the family retain the bad reputation over generations. 
This risk constitutes a dilemma for many women. The following example of Ghada's 
clandestine visit to an unrelated man's flat demonstrates well a woman's dilemma: she 
does not want to tarnish her good social reputation, but her attempt to seek romance 
runs contrary to the behaviour required for a positive social acknowledgement of her 
disposition (tabi'a).
Ghada, a thirty-seven year old single Suriyan Christian woman from Qamishly
and my friend, who wanted to meet a man secretly, approached me one day: “will you 
be free tomorrow? Shall we go to the ice-cream parlour?” I agreed to go to the ice­
cream parlour, one of the few places women could sit and talk outside the house on hot
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summer evenings. When we went out together the next day, she walked past the ice­
cream parlour. I asked her, “aren’t we going to this ice-cream parlour?” She replied, 
“no, we will visit my friend”. I asked her “which friend?” She replied in a low voice, 
“Raid.” He was an Alawi man from another region, who worked as a civil servant. 
We had met him by chance in his office a month ago. I knew Ghada often rang him 
secretly. A man who was Raid's subordinate in the office was waiting for us in front 
of a kiosk about a quarter of a mile from Raid's flat We did not exchange greetings, 
kept our distance from him, and followed him.
Raid lived alone. He offered us coffee, fruits and sweets. We spent most of our 
time talking about the tourist attractions in Turkey, where we had all visited. The man 
who took us to the flat did not join in our conversation. We stayed just twenty minutes 
or so. When we were leaving, Riid did not come with us. On the steps outside we 
came across a man and his family sitting in the courtyard of the house opposite the flat. 
Ghada suddenly jumped, “he is a friend of my brother. He must have seen me. If he 
tells my brother where I was, or someone in his family spreads gossip about my 
visit, • • • what shall I do?" She had obviously not told anyone about this visit.
Ghada was careful to hide her clandestine visit to Raid from her family. She had 
even told me a lie to secure my company. As long as her activity was not noticed by 
others, she did not think that her search for romance was wrong. Such clandestine 
activities, however, create feelings of isolation from the family amongst many women. 
Without acknowledgement of their activities outside the home by their family, they 
cannot acquire self-esteem. Hiding their clandestine activities from their family and 
giving priority to fulfilling their own wishes (raghba) prevents women from access to 
this source of social evaluation and self-esteem. Their covert rejection of male authority 
within the family deprives them of their protection. Even though often no one finds 
out about women's betrayal of their families, the act of rejecting their obligations causes 
feelings of loneliness and isolation.
What Ghada worried about was the exposure of the discrepancy between her 
position within her family and her attempt to seek romance, with its potential threat to
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dishonour her family. In order to solve this discrepancy she chose isolation from her 
family. Nevertheless her attempt to seek romance, while maintaining her responsibility 
to her family's honour, had failed when she feared that her clandestine visit was seen 
by her brother's friend. Even if no one directly brought Ghada's visit to the attention of 
her brother, she would not be able to control the gossip. She thus found herself in a 
dilemma trying to claim freedom through seeking her romance, and keeping a good 
reputation. For Ghada, 'the family' represents others (nas) who may spread gossip 
about her visit and tarnish her relationship with her family. They could attribute to her 
a base disposition (tabl'd) of a woman with sexual desire (raghba) to 'sleep with a 
man' (tnam m a shah), as proved by her visit to Raid. The social evaluation of her as 
a possessor (dat) of such a disposition, would classify her as ignorant of the behaviour 
required of an honourable woman (sharifa).
Raghba means personal wishes and desire. Raghba often causes behaviour 
which goes against the behavioural standards required of an honourable woman. 
Raghba therefore indicates sexual desire which undermines a woman's respect for her 
sexual virtue which in turn affects the honour of her family. What Ghada feared was 
being labelled by society as a woman whose strong sexual desire will lead her into illicit 
relationships. With this stigma, others would judge her as a woman whom no one 
wants to marry, and also judge her male family members as incapable of controlling the 
behaviour of their female kin.
In reality no one would tell Ghada's brother about her clandestine visit. This 
would be regarded as trespassing on others' autonomy, and interference with another's 
business, regardless of whether or not Ghada's brother was able to exert control over 
her behaviour. Such interference would be seen by him as confirmation of his inability 
and thus destroy his honour. A man should be a possessor (male: du, female: dat) of 
authority over his women, but must achieve this by himself.
Women whose behaviour deviates from social values are regarded by people in 
society as having failed to develop respectable dispositions. What is crucial in social 
interaction is "(1) demonstrating one's respect (ihtiram) for the social honour of the
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other in some symbolic act, which is simultaneously (2) a. demand for respect of one's 
own honour, also demonstrated in a symbolic act, by the other" (italic original) (Caton, 
1986: 294). Women's deference to male authority and sexual modesty are symbolic 
acts, through which they can identity themselves as respectable women. Through their 
modesty and respect towards male authority over them, the women also expect to 
receive acknowledgement of their honourable character from others in return. A single 
woman going out alone without her family's consent is seen by others in society as 
offending the male authority over women. Regardless of her intention, her act is 
interpreted with sexual connotations. One typical example was the case of Nabila, a 
twenty-eight year old Shawaya woman from Dub ana
Nabila often visited her relatives in Qamishly alone. She exchanged greetings in 
the street with men whom she defined as her relatives, krif of her brothers, and 
neighbours (but they were from the neighbouring village). I visited her mother's sister 
in Qamishly with her several times. Once she asked me to visit her grandfather from 
her mother's side, who was recovering from a heart attack and was back home from the 
hospital. A few days after our visit, Nabila's young male neighbour, Hamid, warned 
me against visiting others outside the village in the company only of one other woman, 
and especially with Nabila. On another occasion when I was talking with a middle- 
aged man, Aban, about our visit to Nabila's grandfather, he warned me: “do not visit 
people whom you do not know. Even though they are relatives of our neighbours, you 
should not go with only one other woman. It is bad for two women to go out alone.” 
One month later, Nabila asked me to visit her grandfather again, in front of 
Hamid and his brothers. After Nabila had left, Hamid said, “Nabila has many male 
friends and goes out alone to visit them. When her mother warns her not to go out 
alone, she does not obey her mother. She does not respect her mother and even hits 
her with her sandal. The man whom Nabila referred to as her grandfather is not her 
real grandfather. He is just her kin (qaiffi). I am worried about you. You should not 
visit her tomorrow and should avoid going out with her.” Another day when I was 
sitting with Nabila she told me privately: “I go to Qamishly alone like you. My
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neighbours judge a woman like me as a woman whom no one wants to marry. I know 
what they are saying about me.”
Nabila was the only single woman in Dubana who travelled to Qamishly alone. 
My conversations with Hamid and Aban provided me with the male perspective on 
Nabila's behaviour. They did not speculate on the reasons why Nabila went out alone, 
or why she was not obedient to her parents. No one commented on the underlying 
reasons for her conduct, thus totally ignoring Nabila's discontentment and her 
vulnerability, expressed through her anti-social behaviour. From the male perspective, 
Nabila was disobedient to the authority of her senior family members and went out 
alone. Her lack of respect for her family was regarded by these villagers as a sign that 
she did not preserve her sexual virtue/1) Nabila was regarded as the possessor (dat) 
of a bad disposition (tabi'a), unable to control her own desire (raghba), or to develop a 
sense of the behaviour required by a single woman. This failure made her lash out with 
a sandal, like a child trying to justify itself against the advice of its elders. More 
importantly, a sandal is a special object related to the social order created by Allah. A 
sandal with the sole up symbolizes disobedience to Allah's will. In order to 
demonstrate obedience to the social order, a sandal's sole should always touch the 
ground. Nabila's throwing of a sandal at her mother was regarded, in the light of a 
child's action, as the behaviour of someone who does not know the social order that 
requires her to respect elders; someone who, faced with the gap between what she 
wants to do and the social constraints imposed on her, cannot control herself.
The interpretation of Nabila's attitude by the men, classified her as a person who 
has failed to acquire any awareness of obedience to the elders in her family or control 
over her wishes, just like a child. Men regarded her disposition as derived from her 
lack of morality, which sustains social relations based on shared norms and values; her 
ignorance of the need to demonstrate her respect for the social honour of the others 
made her behave purely on the basis of her own individual needs.
From the male villagers' point of view, Nabila's reason for going out, i.e. to 
visit her relatives ( qaraib) - who would return her visits frequently - was unacceptable.
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For these men, her behaviour was derived from her disposition, i.e. her failure to 
control her individual needs. Even though Nabila insisted that she visited her 
grandfather, Hamid doubted her intention and suspected her of meeting strange men 
(garaib), because he regarded her as a woman acting according to her wishes.
The man Nabila mentioned as her grandfather was her mother's foster father and 
her mother's father's brother. Natela's mother, Warda, was brought up by this foster 
father from the age of three months, after her biological father's death (Figure 2). All 
of Nabila's brothers and sisters addressed their mother's foster father as their 
grandfather. He was also Natela's father's patrilateral kin.
Figure 2. Genealogical relation between Nabila and 
her mother's foster father
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Natela's household and her grandfather's household were closely related. These 
two households frequently exchanged visits and supported each other. Natela's mother 
also often visited her foster father. Despite such close relations, Natela's visit was 
nevertheless defined by the male villagers as a challenge to the norm of male authority 
over women. Men define women in terms of the latter's social position that requires
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respect for male authority and maintenance of her sexual virtue. A woman's obedience 
and modesty are a source of affirming individual honour for herself, as well as her 
respect for family honour. Nabila's behaviour ignored concerns about her virtue and 
her family honour by failing to conform to the norm of gender segregation. Natela's 
wish to care for her sick grandfather and to keep intimate relations with her relatives - 
both of which are socially acceptable - was not however in keeping with the 
behavioural standards of a single woman.
Nabila had confronted the fact that her future prospects, formed by her earlier life 
situation, had become marred. She had been engaged when she was eighteen years 
old. Her engagement had been broken off by interference by her male kin, encouraged 
by one of the tribal sheikhs, who had not been on good terms with her husband-to-be. 
The marriage had been cancelled by her ibn "amm, who had the right of kbyac. 
preventing her from marrying other men whose genealogical relation to her is more 
distant than him. After the breakdown of this engagement, Nabila had had no offers of 
marriage. Thus, Natela was already a loser in the competition for prestige, for she had 
no hope of socially consolidating her position through marriage. Through my 
friendship with Nabila and my observation of her behaviour, I knew that she had no 
intentions of seeking relationships with unrelated men, or of disregarding male 
authority over her. She had simply constructed an alternative behavioural rationale, 
based on the idea that exchange between close relatives is essential in order to solidify 
the patrilineal kin group. Such activity is allowed for middle-aged married women as a 
means of maintaining and enhancing relationships between women and their kin, and 
establishing a social position as a married woman who can be a spokes-woman among 
women in her household. Nabila tried to construct her social worth through this social 
exchange. It is, however, not allowed for a young single woman, because refraining 
from going out alone in order to protect her sexual virtue, is the most important role for 
single woman.
Other village women viewed Nabila's actions in different ways from men. The 
women usually did not criticise Natela in front of her; criticising others is thought to be
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intrusive and offensive. Once a middle-aged married woman advised Nabila in private 
not to go out alone: “no man wants to marry a woman who strolls alone in the street.” 
This interpretation, similar to Nabila's own analysis, focuses on the issue that others' 
interpretation of her behaviour, based on male values, becomes a social force which 
attributes to her an unrespectable disposition. Although the middle-aged woman did 
not doubt Nabila's sexual innocence - there were no rumours about Nabila's sexual 
relations -, she was concerned that Nabila should acknowledge people's (iras) views of 
responsibilities and obligations which she must take, and behave in a way that would 
not allow others to attribute a bad disposition to her.
Women interpret other women's behaviour on the same basis as men, but for a 
different reason. Nabila's female neighbours did not compare her to a child who has 
not yet learnt dunya, that is, the social relations constituted on the basis of norms of 
responsibility and obligation to others. Women understand very well how others judge 
them and their behaviour. If their behaviour is deviating from the way of dunya, they 
are regarded as women undermining their honour. Thus, Nabila was advised to refrain 
from embarrassing behaviour in order to avoid social evaluation which lowered her 
social esteem. Women believe in the ideals of autonomy and freedom, and refuse to be 
dominated by men's values of confining their activities. They would not criticise 
Nabila's actions because they signified her freedom, nor attribute to her the kind of 
personal characteristics which led her to refuse male authority. But at the same time, 
women recognise that women's autonomy cannot be achieved without the consent of 
their male elders and others in society whose view is authorised by social consensus.
4.3. Conclusion
If male control over women in their family is not publicly observed, people (jras) 
will say that these men have no honour. The construction of an honourable (sharif) 
male self is crucially competitive and entails the others' evaluation of, whether or not 
his male authority over women in his family is exercised. The construction of this role- 
oriented male self, imposes social constraints on women. These constraints are derived
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from the social value of honourable women (sharlfa), who must be obedient to male 
authority and sexually modest, and preserve gender segregation. These constraints 
sometimes cause a dilemma for women because they need to sacrifice their wishes 
(raghba) and their autonomy in order to protect male and family honour and establish 
their own social reputation. They are afraid that their individual-oriented behaviour 
may undermine their social self.
Women feel that their behaviour is constrained by these social obligations. They 
try to find a way to express their own wishes beyond the direct observations of their 
family and others in society by whom their behaviour is scrutinised. Secret romance is 
such an expression. Although extra-marital relationships and those between individuals 
from different ethnic or sectarian groups are prohibited, women seek their autonomy in 
romance and these prohibited relationships. Sentiments of love are subversive of the 
social order which demarcates groups and prohibits extra-marital relationships. To 
express love is a challenge to this order, and is disobedient to the family whose honour 
is achieved by serving this order. Love is, however, the paramount ideal because it 
gives priority to personal value and understanding between individuals. Women 
experience a sense of freedom, initiative, and autonomy through fantasising about love. 
However, they are well aware of the social situation in which they live. They must be 
aware of the inconsistency of being honourable women who attempt to seek love. 
They regard society as constituted of individuals who scrutinise their behaviour and 
prevent them from realising their fantasies by imposing on them the collective values of 
honour and norms of gender segregation.
Women are therefore concerned with the damage which others can inflict upon 
them, and try to find a way in which their wishes can be realised without damaging 
their reputation. They justify their fantasies as long as they remain undiscovered and 
their social reputation remains intact. This is the private view of women who have to 
gain their respective freedom within the social system which constrains their behaviour 
(cf. Abu-Lughod, 1992: 35). They know what others expect of them, and want to be 
acknowledged by others for the sake of acquiring social reputation and self-esteem. In
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order to avoid damage to their social image, they contrive not to reveal their fantasies in 
public.
Men deal with women's misconduct on the basis of women's sexual modesty 
and their obedience to male authority. These male concerns are more formal, and 
impose expected roles on women. If women do not voluntarily pay deference to male 
authority, and are engaged in actions which are regarded as negligent of their sexual 
virtue, it is not only threatening to male honour and that of their family, but also 
challenges the social order constituting relations within the family, the marriage rules, 
and the insider-outsider distinction between ethnic or sectarian groups. Men in the 
community therefore attribute a woman's resistance to authority to her disposition 
(tabi'a), which they believe has not allowed the woman to acquire sufficient 
knowledge of her obligations and the need to control individual desire (raghba), 
including sexual desire. This labelling becomes socially imperative because men relate 
this disposition to the loss of individual and group honour, both of which are 
paramount values in society. Women accept this labelling, because they want to be 
evaluated as honourable women and this reputation is a source of their self-esteem. 
Women also know that other women, as well as men, support this labelling, and 
attribute another woman's misconduct to her base disposition as a way of highlighting 
their own good character.
Interpretative differences between men and women shed light on the meaning of 
single women's activities in seeking a sense of freedom and initiative. While women 
acknowledge the dominant discourse imposed on them by men to construct a 
conventional role-oriented self in public, they seek their own discourses in private on 
deciding their own behaviour and acquiring freedom. These discourses offer an 
alternative to reconciling the discrepancy between individual wishes and social 
obligations. Ghada's behaviour of seeking her freedom in romance, and Nabila's care 
of her grandfather through which she tried to acquire self-esteem as a woman adherent 
to the norm of mutual support between close kin, were based on such private 
discourses. Both of them are regarded as subversive of social relations which require
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respect to male authority and family honour, once they are scrutinised in pubic. Both 
love and mutual support between kin are paramount ideals. The legitimacy of male 
authority restraining women from seeking these ideals is questionable in women's 
eyes. But single women's role and social evaluation based on honour render these 
women's attempts futile. Autonomy and freedom are admirable values, but on the 
behavioural level, women must face many obstacles in realising them. In the following 
two chapters I shall describe how women can achieve relative freedom and autonomy 
within a system in which deference to male authority dominates.
134
CHAPTER 5. TRIBAL RELATIONS
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I shall discuss kinship and tribal relations among the Tai. The 
categories of kinship and tribal relations are described in the same way by both men and 
women. These categories are used for describing relationships between patrilineal kin, 
and are also used for defining alliances between tribal members among the Tai, 
especially between the sheikhs and commoner tribal members. Relations between the 
Tai paramount sheikh and the commoner tribal members are historically hierarchical, as 
mentioned in previous chapters. The commoner tribal members try to reduce status 
difference between themselves and the sheikh by applying the ideology of egalitarian 
tribal relations to their relationships with the sheikh. This chapter firstly describes 
those kinship relations which are constituted on the basis of the ideology of 
complementary tribal opposition and social obligations between kin, and then discusses 
how egalitarian attitudes of commoners affect political and economic relations within 
the Tai tribal community.
The Tai is one of the largest Shawaya tribal confederations in north-eastern 
Syrian Jazirah. Their tribal territory stretches from Mount Singar in the south, to 
Diyarbakr in the north, and from Malkiya in the east, to Qamishly in the west. The 
sheikh of the Tai tribal confederation estimates their population to be 75,000, but actual 
figures are unobtainable. Tribal members regard the Tai as a confederation composed 
of twelve tribes ( ' ash air. plural of 'ashlra): 'Asaf, Maharat, Bu'ashi, Rashid, Jarith, 
Jarb, Juwala, Bni-saba'a, Baqara, Ghanama, M'amara and Zbaid. They view the Tai 
as an affiliation of these 'ashlra-s, and the 'Asaf 'ashirn as the sheikhly tribe within
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which the position of the Tai paramount sheikh is passed down. Amongst the Tai the 
title of 'sheikh' is generally used to refer to members of the 'Asaf, even though each 
'ashlra itself has a head-man, called raisu, who in some cases may be called a sheikh. 
The Tai tribal members believe that the judicial superiority of the 'Asaf, as keepers of 
the position of the paramount sheikh, derives from their descent from Hatem Tai, a 
prominent ancestor who led the Tai from Yemen to Hijaz. Although genealogical 
relations between 'ashIra-s within the Tai are not identical, the Tai recognise that the 
tribal confederation is constituted by the alliance of each 'ashlra with the 'Asaf.
The term 'ashlra is used to refer to a tribal unit. At the top level of the 
confederation, the Tai is referred to by the tribal members as 'ashlra, because ' ashlra 
in this sense refers to the Tai as a tribal entity. Below the level of the Tai tribal 
confederation, each tribal group, such as 'Asaf, Harb and so on, to which the English 
term 'tribe' may be applicable, is also referred to as 'ashlra, in the context of where the 
affiliation of members inside each tribe is claimed in order to distinguish one's own 
tribe from others. This contextual usage of 'ashlrademonstrates that 'ashlra is a tribal 
category, which precedes actual description by actors and is used for distinguishing 
'we', as members of an 'ashlra, from outsiders.
On the one hand, the term 'ashlra is used for distinguishing between their own 
'ashlra A  and 'ashlra B, whose members they regard as outsiders, or aliens, gharaib 
(single: gharib). On the other hand, however, the relationship between the tribes, i.e., 
' ashlra-s, within the Tai, is regarded by the Tai tribal members as that between 
'brothers' (ikhwan), regardless of genealogical relations. By claiming ikhwan 
relations, each ashlra can define its relation to other ’ashlra and constitute alliances 
between them on the basis of Tai tribal confederation.
While the Tai is an assemblage of tribes, the sheikhly ' ashlra, 'Asaf, is only one 
of the tribes amongst the Tai However, the political and economic history of the Tai is 
characterised by the sheikhs wielding power over tribal members of other 'ashlra-s 
within the Tai The relationships between the 'Asaf and other tribes are historically 
hierarchical, whereas relationships between other 'ashlra-s are equal. Moreover,
136
below the level of tribe, the Tai apply the term ' ashlra to a tribal group, on the 
assumption that they constitute a tribal unit composed of members who can trace 
patrilineal genealogy. On this level, members within an ' ashlra are patrilineal kin and 
are in equal relations. Since 'ashira is a category to describe tribal relations, its 
membership is explained by the members when the ideology of tribal segmentary 
opposition is working. Individuals identify their membership of an 'ashira in 
opposition to a complementary group of their 'ashira. When this complementary group 
is a tribe, they identify themselves as members of a tribe. In another context, if the 
complementary groups are tribal subdivisions, such groups too are referred to as 
asAJra-s and they identify their ’ashira membership as that of a tribal subdivision. 
Since 'ashira membership is defined in opposition to its complementary 'ashira, in the 
Tai tribal structure, relations between 'ashira-s must be equal. The commoner tribal 
members apply this idea of 'ashlra relations to their understanding of relations between 
themselves and the 'Asaf members, and seek egalitarian relation to the sheikhs.
A contradiction is found between egalitarian tribal relations based on the tribal 
structure and actual relations between the sheikh and his tribal members, which are 
largely affected by his political and economic influence upon them. The commoner 
tribal members try to resolve this contradiction through discourses on tribal alliances 
with the Tai sheikhs. I shall examine these discourses in terms of ceremonial 
exchanges and women's agricultural activities. In both of these, the value of 
'brotherhood' (ukhuwa), constituted by tribal alliance, and the ideas of honour 
(sharaf), force the sheikhs to accept the tribal members' egalitarian attitude, while the 
sheikh's political influence on them is still accepted by the commoners.
5.2 Tribal and Kinship Relations
Below the level of tribe, the Tai tribal members assume genealogical relations 
with each other, even though they cannot actually trace the genealogical line to the 
upper level of the tribe. They use the word fakhd (plural: afkhad) in order to explain
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genealogical division within an ' ashira. Fakhd means, literally, thigh. In everyday 
life in Dubana, composed of people from different tribes, the villagers identify 
themselves, or other villagers, through their relationship to their ’ashira. For example, 
they understand that nine households among twenty-one households in Dubana belong 
to the same tribal segment, the Garaksha of the Maharat tribe. The members and other 
villagers refer to the Garaksha as an 'ashlra, when they mention the Garaksha as a 
tribal group in contrast to other tribal groups, 'ashira-s, to which other villagers 
affiliate. Garaksha members identify themselves as belonging to the same ' ashira, 
regardless of the ' ashlrds tribal subdivisions (afkhad) which cannot trace genealogical 
relations each other. Figure 3 shows genealogical relations which are recognised by 
the Garaksha members in Dubana. They trace their patrilineal ancestors, at best, back 
to five generations at the level of the Garaksha fakhd. Although fakhd A and fakhd B 
cannot trace a common patrilineal ancestor, members of both fakhd A  and fakhd B 
agree that they belong to the same ' ashira, the Garaksha. Through my interviews and 
conversations with them, I understood that relations between patrilineal kin (qaraib) 
incorporate them into 'ashlrabased on mutually agreed genealogical relations. They see 
genealogy as legitimising the present relationships between patrilineal kin.
Qaraib (single: qarib)t which means patrilineal kin, is a word derived from qurha, 
meaning 'to get close'. These close relationships are not only determined by 
genealogy, but also by actual practices according to the norm of patrilineal kin 
'supporting each other' (musa'ada ma'a ba'ad). Past genealogical relationship is 
simply a presupposition, brought into play as present relations are constituted. Tai 
members sometimes complain about the qaraib behind their back: “qaraib cannot be 
close if they fail to fulfil their obligations (ijbar) in supporting each other.” They 
understand that co-operation and mutual support maintain qaraib relationships. The 
following example is how Garaksha members in Dubana describe their membership of 
the 'ashira by carrying out obligations of co-operation and how little reference is made 
to the genealogical past in order to maintain their relationship.
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When Awid, one of the villagers, (see Figure 3 ) came out of hospital and 
returned to the village, most of the Dubana villagers visited him in order to wish him 
well. Some villagers stayed with him when others had left, in order to prepare the 
communal meal offered as thanksgiving to God for the patient's recovery. One of the 
women who stayed on, Fatima, told me, “we all here are from the Garaksha. We all
Figure 3. Two fakhd-s of the Garaksha 'ashira ( A means deceased, or non-resident 
in Dubana)
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are his qaraib”. As shown in Figure 3, because of intensive inter-marriage within the 
Garaksha, most of the women married to Garaksha men in Dubana are also from the 
Garaksha. Among ten women who married Garaksha men in Dubana, only two are 
married-in from the outside: one is Awid's Kurdish wife and the other is v Ali's wife, 
from a different "ashira of the Tai. Fatima is Salah's wife, and is from the same fakhd 
as Salah. Her natal family ( ai/a) and Salah's family belong to fakhd B, and are 
therefore not able to trace a genealogical link to Awid, who is from fakhd A. Fatima 
explained the present relationship between the villagers from the Garaksha in terms of 
how 'we', members of the Garaksha, carry out our kinship obligation ( ijbat)
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preparing and participating in celebrating Awid's recovery, whereas other villagers, 
who did not attend the celebration were not Awid's qaraib. Dubana villagers 
understand their kinship relations in terms of their incorporation into 'ashira relations 
based on the fulfilment of their obligations. The fulfilment of obligations between kin 
requires their participation in reciprocal social exchanges. Awid's kin who participated 
in the preparation of the communal meal and celebration of his recovery, can expect the 
same kind of service from Awid's family, when they need it. Relations within 'ashira 
are constituted through such kinship obligations. They are close, because they fulfil 
their obligations each other. 'Ashira is not an abstract concept. Since 'ashira defines 
relationships between kin who fulfil obligations to one another, the relationships imply 
separation from people who do not take part in carrying out their kinship obligations. 
The Garaksha is described as an 'ashira whose members owe obligations to support 
each other, in contrast to other villagers who do not participate in the circle of their 
social exchange.
The Garaksha is not always recognised as composing one tribal group in 
contrast to another tribal group to which other villagers affiliate. The 'ashira is 
composed of patrilineal kin and therefore relations between members within the 'ashira 
are defined in terms of genealogy. Since 'ashira refers to a tribal group, kinship 
relations among the 'ashira and those in segments of the 'ashira must be explained 
from the point of tribal structure. I shall take an example of how the villagers from the 
Garaksha 'ashira understand their inclusion into segmentary groups of the 'ashira and 
how they describe the relationships between them. Their cognition of 'ashira relations 
is affected by their contextual definition on the basis of the ideology of complementary 
group opposition. In talking about relations with Widad, Sleiman and Husain, who 
were Dubana villagers from fakhd A of the Garaksha, I was told how they define 
subdivisions (afkhad) of the fakhd A, and the relationships between them. Figure 4 
is drawn based on Sleiman's kinship chart. I omitted some names and people shown 
on his chart, as they are not directly related to our discussion about relationships 
between their patrilineal kin.
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Figure 4. Aswad and Hawiwu fakhd-s
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Sleiman explained to me that all the people on this chart are related as ibn 'amm -s 
patrilateral parallel cousins (ibn 'amm is literally FBS, but here he used it in a 
classificatory sense), and are members of one of the afkhad of the Garaksha. He 
depicted his fakhd by separating it from others in Garaksha ' ashlra, and expressed the 
relationship of his fakhd members as ibn'amm. He referred to members of the 
Garaksha, other than his fakhd, as patrilineal kin, qaraib, in comparison to relations 
between members of his fakhd. Qaraib in its comparison to ibn 'amm refers to 
relations between more distant patrilineal kin than ibn 'amm. Then he started to divide 
his fakhd into two. For Sleiman and Husain, anyone who can trace his/her descent 
from Aswad is related as ibn 'amm. However, widad is descended from the Hawiwu 
line, and therefore, she and all the people who trace descent from Hawiwu are qaraib 
of descendants from Aswad, but not ibn 'amm. Sleiman expressed the close patrilineal 
relationship between members of the Aswad fakhd as ibn 'amm, in order to
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differentiate the relationships between themselves from those with members of the 
Hawiwu fakhd
Then Sleiman explained kinship relations between Widad and her husband Nabil 
as ibn khalu. Ibn khalu is literally, MBS, but used in a classificatory sense. Widad's 
and Nabil's mothers are sisters and Widad and Nabil are maternal first cousins. 
Maternal and affinal ties are mentioned in cases where relations between two persons 
are distant in patrilineal line, but actual relations between them are close. In cases where 
the patrilineal genealogical relations between two persons are sought, affinal or 
maternal links become devices to explain alliances between those who belong to 
different genealogical lines. This thought is supported by notions that marriage ties 
should be found between two genealogical lines to which the persons concerned 
belong, because preferential marriages between patrilineal kin are highly practised. 
Even though maternal ties are not always found between persons whose relationship is 
defined as ibn khalu among patrilineal kin, they suppose that marriage must have been 
conducted amongst their kin in previous generations in order to reinforce relations 
between these two patrilineal lines. Referring to relations as ibn khalu is a means of 
reinforcing the patrimonial bond among 'ashira members from different afkhad 
through maternal and affinal ties between them.
Sleiman divided members of the Aswad fakhd into three categories according to 
genealogical lines derived from Aswad's three sons. He said that the greater the 
sharing of common nisba, the closer the relations. Nisba itself means 'attribution' and 
'relationship'. Nisba is shown in patrifiliative pedigree as composed of a series of 
names of male ancestors. Nisba is a classificatory device, and becomes an indication 
that the persons who share certain nisba may be affiliated to the same patrilineal 
association. Nisba carries information about the person's genealogical relationship. In 
our conversation about relationships within the Aswad, Sleiman distinguished himself 
from Husain by nisba. Husain's pedigree is shown as Husain Nabii 'Antal Aswad, 
whereas Sleiman is Sleiman Hani Muhaimld Aswad. Their nisba -s show division of 
lines to which Husain and Sleiman belong. On the basis of their respective nisba,
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members of the Aswad who share several common patrilineal ancestors' names, are in 
closer relations, because they are included in the same segmented groups.
There is, however, no decontextualized usage of nisba. Nisba shows a person's 
affiliation to patrilineal groups and how that person is included in larger segments of 
tribal groups. Although the ancestor's name represented in nisba suggests a 
genealogical link, the importance of nisba describes significant relations between 
patrilineal kin who are living in comparison to others whose patrifiliative pedigree 
indicates more distant genealogical relations to them.
Since nisba, patrifiliative pedigree, becomes a means to explain his/ her 
affiliation, the person mentions his/her own patrifiliative pedigrees in different ways 
according to his/her relation to others involved in conversation with him/her. For 
example, when Husain mentions his nisba in conversation with Sleiman, his nisba is 
HusainNabii 'Antal. This nisba conveys enough information to indicate his affiliation 
to a genealogical line of'Antal and distinguishes his kinship affiliation from Sleiman's. 
This nisba also suggests a genealogical link between Husain and Sleiman, because 
'Antal was a son of Aswad who was a common ancestor both of Husain and Sleiman. 
Meanwhile, he may introduce his nisba to non-Aswad Garaksha members as Husain 
Nabii Aswad. He needs to reveal his pedigree derived from Aswad in order to indicate 
his affiliation to one of the afkhad of the Garaksha 'ashlra and also to differentiate his 
affiliation from the person to whom he talks. He may give his nisba as Husain Nabii 
Garaksha, which shows his affiliation to the upper level of tribal grouping, when he 
introduces himself to people other than Garaksha members.
Patrifiliative pedigrees are the attribute of a person. This attribute indicates his/her 
affiliation into tribal segments. This also suggests a genealogical relationship between 
the person using the nisba and his/her audience, and thereby indicates social distance 
between them. They do not aim to understand their relationship by tracing all the 
ancestors who link them. In many cases this is not possible, because at best, they 
possess genealogical knowledge for five or six generations back. The significance of 
genealogical links is to provide a means to understand relations between people in the
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present by categorising their genealogical relations through nisba. Eickelman (1977: 
47-52) suggests that among the Bni Battu in Morocco, the genealogical linkage to the 
past continues to pervade the present, and that temporal order to a certain extent is 
directly related to social order, in which past events provide a positive value to the 
present relationships.
Nisba primarily signifies tribal affiliation of actual persons through genealogy, 
whereas other terms, such as father, brother, father's brother, ibn 'amm and qaraib, 
refer to kinship relations between the persons involved. These terms constitute 
categories of kinship relations, which are supported by the ideology determining roles 
of patrilineal kin. Kinship relations affect the domain in which patrilineal kin sustain 
bonds by carrying out obligations (ijbar) with each other. Relationships between 
persons charged with these obligations are typically described in stories of murder and 
revenge, in which the conceptual structure of tribal segmentation reveals itself. The 
obligation to seek revenge over an offender is defined by genealogical closeness to the 
victim. Although the Tai is not fully segmented into levels, obligations between 
patrilineal kin are understood with reference to the notion of kinship relations, such as 
brother (akh), ibn 'amm, qaraib, and the ideology of complementary group opposition 
in which their kinship relations are defined.
Segmentary lineage theory has been prominent in studies of Middle Eastern 
tribalism. Gellner discussed what this means, by developing the model of Evans- 
Pritchard (1940). Gellner's idea is that the notion of a segmentary society contains a 
theory of social cohesion which can be maintained by a balance of power between 
constituent groups; reliance on opposition to generate cohesion will be achieved within 
this system (1969: 41-44).
Peters, however, in his study of the Cyrenaican Bedouin, criticises the theory 
which Gellner attributes to Evans-Prichard and says that "the model [of lineage system]
• • • can only be a representation of what a particular people, the Bedouin, conceive 
their reality to be; it is a kind of ideology - to understand their field of social 
relationship" (1967: 270). He suggests that the Bedouin act contrary to the model, and
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they do not maintain equivalent relationships in terms of balanced opposition between 
structurally equivalent groups (ibid.: 271). One of his reasons for objecting to lineage 
theory is that the numbers of segments at the tertiary order of the Cyrenaican Bedouin 
are more than two at a given level, and that combinations can occur which are not 
explicable by the theory of balanced opposition (ibid.: 271).
Salzman (1978) suggests that deviation of actual behaviour from the lineage 
theory does not necessitate disregarding the role of indigenous lineage ideology (ibid.: 
65-66). He says that lineage-based complementary opposition does not work 
exclusively, and that extraneous principles are recognised by the actors as additional 
principles which are used within the agnatic system (ibid.: 61). He says that it is 
possible to establish the extent to which the ideology of contemporary opposition is 
exhibited on a behavioural level, and that it is necessary to comprehend actual patterns 
of behaviour not only by referring to the complementary opposition, but also by taking 
into consideration other principles held by the actors (ibid.: 80).
The Tai clarify themselves as a confederation of tribes Cashlra-s). They do not 
assume anything about the kind of entity they constitute. The confederation is not 
regarded as having a common ancestor. Below the level of tribe('ashlra), the members 
are regarded as sharing descent. The shared descent lines, however, are not elaborated.
Tribal members do not have a unifying economic and political structure. The 
only norms which allow them to cooperate with their patrilineal kin are obligations of 
reciprocal support between kin and alliance based on the idea of complementary group 
opposition. At the ideological level of complementary opposition, closer patrilineal kin 
stand in opposition to genealogically distant kin when conflicts arise. They, however, 
do not constitute groups of solidarity at a higher structural level. The Tai concern with 
genealogical relationships is only from the viewpoint of closeness between living 
people. They can classify relationships between patrilineal kin according to 
genealogical closeness with terms indicating kinship relations, such as ibn 'amm or 
qaiaih Yet, although they say that group conflicts involve all the ibn 'amm or qaraib in 
accordance with the level of complementary group opposition, their description of who
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are actual participants in a dispute is ambiguous. Moreover, men who are expected to 
take action, such as revenge and settlement of blood money, in order to fulfil their 
obligations in restoring the honour (sharaf) of patrilineal kin, are limited at the range of 
FBS of individuals who caused the dispute. Although their more distant kin may offer 
suggestions to close kin of the men who caused the dispute, as to how the group 
should settle the dispute, these distant kin may not get directly involved in the 
settlement.
I shall examine how the Tai tribal members conceive of the reality of group
opposition and obligation between patrilineal kin. The following story of conflict
between men who are from different "ashira-s (tribes) told by Dubana villagers,
relayed to me their understanding of group alliance on the basis of complementary
opposition and persons who actually take responsibility for carrying out vengeance.
'Ali and Balu were friends, but were from different'asbira-s. 'Ali asked 
Balu for a cash loan to which Balu agreed. Ideally, if a person is in a 
vulnerable situation, and asks help from his/her friend, the friend should 
give him/her assistance. Furthermore, it is a shame for Balu to ask 'Ali to 
pay back the debt. However, because of Balu's urgent need for his 
money, there was no way but to ask 'Ali for the money back. 'Ali, 
however, refused to honour his debt, thereby infuriating Balu. In the 
ensuing fight 'Ali killed Balu. One month after the murder, Balu's two 
brothers' sons ambushed 'Ali early one morning in the field, on his way to 
work, and shot and killed him. 'Ali's kin, qaraib, who had accompanied 
'Ali to the field, fought back and killed both men. One of 'Ali's kin 
(qarib) (informants could not give the exact relationship to Balu) was also 
killed in the fighting. Younger brothers of these two brothers have yet take 
revenge. One day, however, when the younger brothers have grown up, 
they are expected to carry out an attack on one of 'Ali's kin, because the 
number of the victims on each side is presently unequal.
I heard this story from persons not involved in this conflict. It represents a 
stereo-typical understanding of those involved in seeking vengeance. This story is an 
example of a conflict between men from different tribes among the Tai. The narrator 
told me that the conflict involved all of 'Ali and Balu's kin, qaraib,that is, members of 
their tribes. When someone is killed, the victim's kin should kill one of the offender's
146
kin, or ask the offender's kin to pay blood money as compensation to the victim's kin 
for the loss of his life so as to restore the honour of the victim's kin; otherwise the 
victim's kin suffer shame ( ar). Women, however, cannot be a target of vengeance. 
According to my interview subjects, all the qaraib of 'Ali may become a target of 
vengeance. It means that any men from the same tribe (' ashlra) as 'Ali may be 
attacked by men from Balu's ' ashira. This conflict is understood on the basis of 
balanced opposition between 'ashira-s which are structurally equivalent groups in a 
segmentary tribal structure.
The narrator's concern was to describe kinship relations between persons 
involved in this conflict: those who carried out the vengeance, and their degree of 
closeness to Balu and 'Ali, were therefore important in describing this conflict. Ideally 
speaking, as I was told by Dubana villagers, persons obliged to seek vengeance are 
firstly, the victim's brothers, and then his brother's son and FBS, ibn 'amm. The 
order is determined by genealogical distance from the victim. The victim's father or 
father's brother are generally regarded to be elders who do not participate in physical 
confrontation, even though they take responsibility for the vengeance and sometimes 
carry it out as the victim's closest kin. Young close kin of the victim are therefore 
usually expected to carry out the vengeance. The closer one's genealogical relationship 
to the victim is, the greater the responsibility {maswuliy^ he bears. In this case, Balu's 
closest kin who were able to participate in the vengeance were his brother's sons. Once 
these brother's sons were killed, the responsibility for vengeance would lie with their 
younger brothers who were the closest kin of the second victims. No other member of 
their kin, qaraib is expected to take vengeance. Even though the conflict ideally 
involves qaraib, in terms of constituting a balanced opposition between kin groups of 
'Ali and Balu, actual vengeance is expected to be sought only by the victim's closest 
kin.
All the participants in this conflict are identified in terms of kinship relations to 
'Ali or Balu. Interestingly, the men who killed Balu's brother's sons and the man who 
was killed by these brothers, were identified as 'Ali's qaraib, and the details of their
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genealogical relationship to ' Ali were not in question. Qaraib in this context means 
patrilineal kin who belong to the same tribe as 'Ali, but who do not necessarily belong 
to the same tribal subsection. Since this conflict was described as that between the two 
' asbira-s to which 'Ali and Balu belong, all the participants are classified according to 
kinship categories which describe their relation to 'Ali and Balu: Balu's 'brother's 
sons' and ' Ali's 'qaraib. Who murdered Balu's brother's sons, or who was killed by 
them, was explained according to the classification of their kinship relations to 'Ali. 
There was no concern for who had actually murdered Balu's two brother's sons, or 
indeed for the person they had killed.
The relationship of the persons to the victim is classified according to their 
genealogical closeness to the victim: his brother (akh), and then, brother's son (ibn 
akh), father's brother's son {ibn 'amm) and kin (qaraib). Ibn 'amm is not a category 
which refers only to FBS, but also to the victim's fakbd members who share a 
patrilineal ancestor with the victim of five generations back. Ibn 'amm is seen as a 
closer relation to the victim them other patrilineal kin, qaraib. A group members 
involved into a conflict are subdivided according to their genealogical closeness to the 
persons who started the conflict.
In the case of killing, when the two kin groups which are involved in the 
conflict do not share a common ancestor five generations back, men who share a 
common ancestor five generations back with the murderer will be chosen as a target of 
vengeance. The bereaved group recognises these men as ibn 'amm-s of the murderer 
and therefore, they share the responsibility for the killing. In the context of the 
vengeance, even though ideally all the patrilineal kin who share a common ancestor 
five generations back with the victim constitute the vengeance unit, only a few of these 
men, whose relationship to the victim is defined such as B, BS and FBS, conduct the 
act of vengeance (cf. Lancaster, 1981: 29).
In cases of conflicts between close patrilineal kin, the conflict is regarded as 
between members of a division or subdivision of tribes. In such cases, ibn 'amm stand 
against each other. The following story, which was told by Dubana villagers, reflects
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the idea that the genealogical closeness to the victim defines the responsibility to take
vengeance. In such cases, conflict splits close kin into two opposing parties. The
participants on each side are structurally equi-distant in relation to their opponents.
' Adnan killed a ferocious dog kept by his FB, Basim. Basim became angry 
with 'Adnan, and they quarrelled over the matter. After the quarrel, Basim 
killed 'Adnan. In revenge 'Adnan's brother, Al, killed one of Basim's 
sons, Bl. The conflict continued between 'Adnan's brothers and Bl's 
brothers: Bl's brother, B2, killed Al,; Al's brother, A2, killed B2; B2's 
brother, B3, killed A2. 'Adnan's brother, A3, will kill B3, because the 
numbers of the victims are not equal between the parties: 'Adnan's side lost 
three persons, whereas Basim's side had only two victims.
The conflict between 'Adnan and his father's brother, Basim, split the kin into 
two groups. 'Adnan's brothers stood with each other against Basim's sons who are in 
relations of ibn 'amm to 'Adnan and his brothers. The ibn 'amm group was 
subdivided in terms of the vengeance. 'Brothers’ as a category, are in a closer 
relationship than ibn 'amm and therefore, should ally and share the obligation for 
vengeance against their ibn 'amm. 'Adnan's brother, A l, chose Bl, one of the 
members of Basim's group, as a target according to the principle that Basim's closest 
kin take the responsibility for the killing. Al's obligation to participate in vengeance is 
defined according to his relation to 'Adnan as his 'brother', which is regarded as one of 
the closest kinship relations. In this respect, the obligation is determined by closeness 
between individuals in terms of kinship relations. The degree of closeness between the 
victim and his kinsman defines the kinsman's obligation to participate in the vengeance. 
For example, Bl's brother, B2, was obliged to take vengeance, because of his 
brotherhood relation to Bl. No one asserts that an ibn 'amm except descendants of 
Basim and 'Adnan's father is involved in the conflicts. Obligation to actual participation 
in the conflict is determined by kinship relation between two individuals, that is, the 
victim and his avenger.
A conflict is therefore understood as that between groups, which are defined 
according to genealogical distance between the persons who initiated the conflict. Even 
though a conflict happens between men who do not share a common ancestor five
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generations back, kin other than B, BS and FBS of the victim avoid the obligation to 
participate in the conflict. As a result, large scale avenging groups are not constituted at 
any level of group conflicts. Even though only close kin of the victims are obliged to 
take vengeance, they do so for the sake of honour of their kin group. Why does the 
discrepancy between classification of the vengeance group and members who owe the 
obligation of actual vengeance emerge? This should not be understood as a discrepancy 
between the ideology of complementary opposition and behavioural patterns. Dresch 
criticises Salzman's approach to lineage theory (1978) as reducing segmentation to a 
summary of empirical observation (1986: 318). He says: "the categories and the 
structure [of complementary opposition] preexist the actions. A new set of actions (a 
pattern of alliance) that does contradict the original categories becomes possible only 
with explicit redefinition" (ibid.: 320). If complementary opposition is not just an 
ideology, classification of groups involved in conflict and the obligation of vengeance 
among the Tai must be congruent with their cognition and descriptions of kinship 
categorisation.
Their cognition of present kinship relations which define one's relation to others 
among the members of a tribal group, seems to be similar to the Rwala Bedouin. 
Lancaster (1981: 152) constructs a diagram to illustrate the ego-centred kinship 
relations of the Rwala, in which an individual defines one's relationship to the other in 
terms of the kinship categories in which both of them are included. In this sense, 
genealogy and definition of kinship relations are not static. As with the previous 
example of the Garaksha ' ashira (see Figure 4), relationships between people in the 
Aswad fakhd and the Hawiwu fakhdof the Garaksha are described by members of the 
Aswad in various ways according to the setting of its complementary group. When the 
Aswad derive meaning as a patrilineal kin group in opposition to the Hawiwu, 
relationship between kin within the Aswad fakhd is expressed as 'ibn "amm, 'in  
opposition to the Hawiwu fakhd whose relations to the Aswad are defined as further 
distant kin, qaraib. In another context, in which the Aswad and the Hawiwu are 
regarded as constituting one fakhd in opposition to other fakhd of the Garaksha
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'ashira which is not composed of descendants of these two brothers, Aswad and 
Hawiwu, the Aswad and the Hawiwu are in relations of 'ibn 'amm', and other 
Garaksha members are classified as 'qaraib' in their relation to descendants of Aswad 
and Hawiwu. The Tai describe kinship relations with consideration of contexts in 
which group opposition is recognised. Kinship relations within the group are 
considered in terms of genealogical links which include oneself and others in a kinship 
category. The basis of understanding kinship relations and obligations between group 
members is to discern one's relation to his/her kin A from his/her relation to his/her kin 
B, whose relation to him/her is more distant than his/her relation to kin A in genealogy. 
This principle of differentiating kinship relations is applied so as to constitute both 
complementary group opposition and social obligations between kin.
Classification of kinship relations within the group has meaning when its 
complementary tribal group is established. For example, when relations between 
members within the group are referred as ibn 'amm, the relation is understood by the 
Tai in its differentiation from qaraib relation, which is the relation between more distant 
kin than that of ibn 'amm. When group membership is referred to as qaraib relation, 
the relationship separates them from people from different 'ashira or outsiders. Within 
a group, kinship relations are further classified according to the genealogical distance 
between the members on the bases of differentiation of one kinship category from the 
other. When relationship of members in the group is classified as ibn 'amm, sharing 
an ancestor five generations back, relations of the group members are subdivided into 
different kinship categories according to genealogical distance between each group 
member. One's relations to his/her B/Z, FB/FZ and FBS/FBD are recognised as closer 
than those of ibn 'amm, which include all the group members.
In everyday conversations, classification of kinship relations and obligations 
adherent to kinship relations are understood by the Tai according to the same principles 
applied to cases of vengeance. For example, women gossip about a woman's marriage 
and say that she was obliged to marry her ibn 'amm. In the context of marriage 
arrangements, the category of ibn 'amm includes her patrilineal kinsmen who share
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with her an ancestor five generations back, and who thereby have the primary right to 
ask her family for her hand in marraige. Ibn 'amm also have a right of khyar to annul 
marriage arrangements between her and her more distant kin or outsiders. The ibn 
'amm relation is classified in order to define genealogical closeness between patrilateral 
parallel cousins, in contrast to relation to other distant kin or outsiders, and admits 
special rights and obligations between them, because of this closeness. The women 
talking about the marriage keep in mind the genealogical division which separates men 
included in the ibn 'amm category from more distant kin. They also recognise the 
bride's obligation to accept a proposal from her ibn 'amm, and regard this obligation as 
part of the kinship relation between her and her ibn 'amm.
One of the women then explained the reason for the bride's acceptance of 
marriage; “the bride feared that no one wanted to propose to her as long as this ibn 
'amm had not given up the idea of marrying her”. Here, the narrator subdivides the 
men included into the category of ibn 'amm according to their genealogical distance to 
her. Her husband was her first patrilateral cousin, and therefore had the primary right 
to marry her, more so than any other ibn 'amm whose genealogical relation to her was 
more distant. Kinship closeness therefore laid greater responsibility on the bride to 
accept his request. This attribution of kinship right and obligation, according to 
subdivision of the kinship category, confused me many times during my field research. 
This is because people talked as if all the men who are included into ibn 'amm category, 
in terms of their relation to the bride, share the same right to her, their patrilateral 
parallel cousin. However, the rights and obligations between individuals in ibn 'amm 
relation are affected by their genealogical distance. Even though relations between first 
cousins and second cousins are both mentioned as ibn 'amm, the relation between first 
cousins imposes greater obligations in comparison to that relation between second 
cousins. There is an implicit understanding in conversations about kinship obligations 
which are defined according to the genealogical distance between the individuals 
involved. Members who are categorised into a kinship category, such as ibn 'amm, are
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therefore further subdivided according to the rights and obligations which are defined 
by genealogical distance between them.
Another matter related to the principle of complementary opposition and the 
definition of obligations among the kin, is the subject of female sexual virtue. Female 
sexual virtue should be protected from offence by unrelated men who belong to 
different ethnic or sectarian groups. Although these groups are not tribal, the group 
membership is explained by separating their own group from other ethnic or sectarian 
groups and attributing group characteristics to each other. Their membership is defined 
by differentiating other group's characteristics from their own (see chapter 2 and 
chapter 3). Outsiders, that is, men from other ethnic or sectarian groups, are attributed 
the characteristics of potential enemies who assault women within their group. Sexual 
offence, or the possibility of women being assaulted, is described as assaulting the 
honour of the women's group.
However, as has been discussed in previous chapters, actual obligations to 
protect a woman's sexual virtue, or the obligation to seek vengeance - if she was 
assaulted by outsiders - is shouldered by her male family members: her father, father's 
brothers, brothers and father's brother's sons. Actual obligations surrounding the 
matter of female sexual virtue are defined by closeness between patrilineal kin. No 
other kin except for her family members can intrude on the matter, because it is 
regarded as the family's business. Jazirah inhabitants understand sexual assault in 
terms of conflict between groups to which the woman and her offender belong, and 
define the obligation of vengeance according to the classification of kinship relations to 
the assaulted woman.
5.3. Relationship between the Paramount Sheikh and his Tribal 
Members
Kinship classification and obligations adherent to kinship categories are 
important for establishing everyday interactions among the Tai- Relationships between
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the sheikhs from 'Asaf tribe and other tribal members are also important in everyday 
life among them, and attribute obligations to each other. These relationships however, 
cannot be identified as kinship relations. Their obligations therefore, cannot be defined 
according to classification of genealogical distance. In examining the relationship 
between the paramount sheikh and his tribal members, firstly, the structure of the Tai 
tribal confederation and the relationship between the sheikh and commoner tribal 
members within the tribal system should be described. Each tribal member refers to 
his/her relationship with a member of a different tribe as 'brotherhood' (ukhuwa) in the 
context that they express their fellowship as members of the Tai. 'Brotherhood' 
(ukhuwa) in this context is not the same meaning as 'brothers' which is based on blood 
relations in kinship relations. 'Brothers' in relationship between tribes means that the 
tribal groups and their members are associated with each other as the Tai through their 
alliance to the'Asaf sheikhly tribe to whom the paramount sheikh belongs.
Figure 5 is drawn by a tribesman in Dub ana when he and an old man, who 
was a relative of a family in Dubana, explained to me the nature of the Tai 
confederation. This chart shows that the Tai members understand relationships 
between the tribes among the Tai as a configuration composed of each tribe's alliance to 
the 'Asaf. There is no idea of a shared descent between these tribes constituting the Tai 
confederation. The system of the Tai confederation cannot therefore be explained by 
the segmentary lineage system, in which there cannot be any single authority in a tribe, 
as Evans-Pritchard described in the ideal case of the Cyrenaican Bedouin (1949; 59). 
Even though relations between 'ashira-s among the Tai are those between equals and 
are described as 'brothers', they admit the political authority of the 'Asaf as the 
sheikhly tribe.
At an ideological level, each tribe within the Tai confederation allies to the Tai 
paramount sheikh. The Tai paramount sheikh, however, cannot command tribal heads 
of these tribes to form an alliance with him, because the confederation is ideally 
constituted on the basis of voluntary alliance of each tribe to the 'Asaf. The ideal of
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Figure 5. Tai tribal confederation
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alliance existing in tribal configuration does not always allow the Tai paramount sheikh 
to win support from these tribal heads. For example, in the 1990 Syrian 
parliamentary elections, the Tai sheikh was one of the candidates in Hassaka 
province. The sheikh invited these tribal heads and other influential tribal members 
amongst the Tai in order to ask for their support. The sheikh started his meetings with 
communal meals at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan, more than one month 
before the voting day on 22 May. Following the first meeting, around fifty men 
gathered in his tent everyday. Accepting their host's hospitality, sharing meals with 
him and drinking the bitter coffee served by the host's party, signalled the declaration 
of the guests' support for the host. Although at the gatherings, the sheikh's guests 
promised their support for him, according to news reports of election returns 
distributed by the Government, the sheikh had gathered only 18,178 votes - the nearest 
elected candidate had got 26,592 votes - and was therefore defeated. Even though the 
sheikh insisted that there were 75,000 Tai members in this region, he had failed to form 
a tribal alliance.
This fact demonstrates the gap between the sheikh's political influence, and the 
abstract position of the paramount sheikh inherent in the Tai tribal confederation. The 
formal structure of tribal confederation allows for the superior political position of the
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paramount sheikh, alliance to whom constitutes the configuration of the Tai 
confederation. The structure also allows the voluntary alliance of each tribe to the 
'Asaf. At a behavioural level, whether or not tribal members accept his authority is 
largely dependent on their own personal intentions.
The patronage relationship between the sheikh and tribal members among the Tai 
coexists alongside the configuration of the Tai tribal confederation which defines tribal 
alliance with the paramount sheikh. This patronage, however, contradicts the principle 
of the Tai tribal system that relationships between tribal members are between equals, 
as members of tribes\ashafr) among the Tai. Yet, patronage and egalitarian tribal 
structure coexist among the Tai, even though they seem contradictory, as in case of the 
Yemeni tribes studied by Dresch (1984: 32).
Relationships between the sheikh and the Dub ana villagers largely depend on 
patronage based on the sheikh's personal economic and political circumstances. Since 
the grandfather of the present Tai paramount sheikh moved into Dub ana at the 
beginning of the 1950s, in order to engage in commercialised agricultural business, the 
political relationship between the two parties has been affected by the sheikh's 
economic wealth. This derived largely from the land he owned, given that he was a 
great landowner and his estate was in the tribal territory of the Tai. Each tribe within 
the Tai had its own territory, where the right over the land had been monopolised by 
tribal heads, or sheikhs. The commoner tribal members had not owned any right of 
land possession of their territory, as individual property owners. The domain of 
sheikhly power was largely dependent on the sheikhs' economic power. The sheikhs 
or tribal heads therefore cultivated followers through this means. The commoner tribal 
members were obliged to be dependent on sheikhs in order to survive. They became 
underpaid workers in sheikhs' fields. The Tai paramount sheikh was more powerful 
than the other tribal heads in terms of economic means and the political influence 
derived from his ability to manipulate ethnic or sectarian group relations (see Chapter 
2).
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Looking at the population composition in Dubana, it is seen that the villagers 
who constructed the village under the leadership of the grandfather of the present Tai 
paramount sheikh and those who moved into it later, when the father of the sheikh 
introduced productivity enhancing machinery in the late 1960s, were from various 
tribes. Most of them were members of tribes among the Tai other than the sheikhly 
tribe, 'Asaf. The villagers explained to me their own, or their fathers' motivation for 
moving into the village: “we moved here in order to work for the sheikh”. Although 
the tribal structure of the Tai confederation allows them to ally with the sheikh, this 
alliance is alien to the hierarchical relation based on patronage. The villagers, however, 
admit that they used to be followers ( 'abld) of the sheikh.
Among the villagers there are people, for example, from the Sharabln tribe, who 
did not originally belong to the Tai They later became followers of the sheikh. The 
villagers from the Chumal tribe, who were originally Kurds and had converted their 
alliance from the Shammar to the Tai a few generations ago, constructed their status 
among the Tai through personal alliance with the paramount sheikh. These villagers 
from Chumal and Sharabln are recognised by other villagers as members of the Tai, 
even though their status within the tribal structure is ambiguous, being based on 
patronage, that is, personal relations with the Tai paramount sheikh. The manner of this 
relation is different from that defined by the principle of tribal confederation, where 
relation between the sheikh and tribal members among the Tai is defined as alliance 
between the sheikh's tribe and tribes to which the commoners belong.
Since the sheikh's influence had been largely dependant on his economic means, 
his followers regard their status in relation to him as having changed, as a result of their 
gradual economic independence caused by the regional industrial development and 
Syrian land reform. In their discourse they refer to their status in the past as the 
sheikh's slave-followers ( 'abid) who were obliged to accept the sheikh's political 
leadership, even to commit murder, because they did not posses the economic means to 
survive separately from the sheikh. Since the commoner tribal members have 
gradually become economically independent of the sheikh, they think that class
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difference between the sheikhs and the commoners has also diminished. Commoner 
tribal members insist that their support for the sheikh is no longer that of slave 
followers, but that they willingly support him now as their representative and tribal 
leader. The sheikh's political power, dependant on class difference, is therefore 
challenged by his followers.
The villagers express their attitude to the sheikh as: “if we want to help the 
sheikh, we will do so”. Even though this egalitarian view emphasises their voluntary 
alliance to the sheikh based on the structure of the Tai confederation, the behavioural 
patterns of commoner tribal members toward the sheikh both in everyday interaction 
and on ceremonial occasions, suggest political inequality between them. Their support 
for the sheikh often takes the form of labour assistance, although they never expect to 
receive the same kind of support in return from the sheikh. This kind of personal 
service is similar to the obligations imposed on the abld, who were assigned to act as 
the sheikh's domestic servants.
The most striking aspect of their behaviour towards the sheikh was reflected in 
the conduct of unmarried village women, who occasionally stayed at the sheikh's flat in 
Qamishly in order to carry out domestic chores for the sheikh's family. This flat was 
set up for the sheikh's sons who attended school in Qamishly, and also served as a 
meeting place for the sheikh's relatives and tribesmen. Even though the sheikh's 
daughter and his father's widow did their own household chores, one of the village 
girls was sometimes asked to help. The girls would stay there a few days at a time 
without their family. A single woman is never allowed to stay in a household other 
than her family in any other circumstances because of concerns over the protection of 
her sexual reputation and family honour. I asked these girls who worked for the 
sheikh's family, whether or not it was a shame Caib) for them to stay at the sheikh's 
house, without their family. The girls tried to explain their behaviour as voluntary help 
for the sheikh's family, but were not able to justify their staying there.
Domestic services to the sheikh's family are not carried out only by these girls. 
Both single and married women are asked by the sheikh's wife to provide labour, when
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the sheikh has guests. Male villagers also assist in the slaughtering of animals for 
communal meals and serving coffee to the guests. They try to explain these services as 
social exchanges between neighbours (jiran). Neighbourhood relationship requires 
such obligations of social exchange, such as mutual visits on a daily basis and 
assistance on ceremonial occasions. This domain is constituted not only by their close 
relations based on residential proximity, but also on the basis of 'brotherhood' 
{ukhuwa) relationships between tribal members among the Tai. 'Brotherhood' means 
tribal alliance among the Tai who are equals. The paramount sheikh as a member of 
the Asaf tribe is also in 'brotherhood' {ukhuwa) relations with his neighbour tribal 
members. The commoner villagers apply this principle to their relationship with the 
sheikh and so justify their services to the sheikh as fulfilling the obligation of helping a 
neighbour.
Despite the egalitarian attitude of commoner villagers, the sheikh's family have a 
strong class consciousness. This is reflected in marriage. The sheikhly family believe 
that, as a principle, they should marry within the 'Asaf. Although marriages between 
the sheikhly family and other influential families from different tribes or Kurdish 
sheikhly families are sometimes undertaken, marriage between the sheikhly family and 
commoner tribal members is never considered. The pattern of marriage distinguishing 
the sheikhly family from the commoner tribal members thereby reflects the class 
consciousness of the sheikhly family. Marriage is allowed only between two families 
of equal political and economic status.
In my private conversations with sheikhly women, they sometimes suggested 
that there were two different kinds of people in their society; sheikhs and 'abld. Since 
they are well aware that their class consciousness can create antagonism and lead to 
potential conflict between themselves and the other villagers, they usually disguise it. 
Yet, these women, sometimes in an oblique manner, expressed their status 
consciousness and disapproval of the attitudes of commoner tribal members, much like 
the women in the Oasis community in Oman (C. Eickelman, 1984: 136). May, one of 
the sheikh's daughters, revealed her status consciousness to me in private. In
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describing the wedding party of a sister of her father's sister's husband, she mentioned
a woman who had been dancing in the party.
May: Latifa is very dark skinned. She sang in the wedding party. All of 
us laughed at her singing. Do you know her?
Noriko: Yes, I met her twice in your house.
May: In Jazirah, there are two kinds of people: sheikhs and 'abld All 
human beings are"abld who must obey the will of God. She is from the 
Tai, but from a household working for a sheikh. She was brought up in a 
sheikhly household and helped with their domestic work, such as washing, 
cooking, and cleaning. She married, but her husband has died. She has 
married sons and daughters. Her father is still well, but her mother has 
died. She likes to put lipstick on her lips and use powder on her dark- 
skinned face. At the party, she had make-up on her face, and was dancing 
oriental and foreign dances. She made crude gestures.
Noriko: Are there a lot of 'abld ?
May: People do not say that they are 'ah/d. All the villagers here are 
'abid We are sheikhs, and they are 'abld They never admit that they are 
abid Latifa said, "I am aM  I am a daughter of an 'abd* When Latifa 
talked to Raghd in this village, who suggested that Latifa should not label 
herself as an 'abd> Latifa replied to Raghd, "I am 'abd, or bint al-'abd. 
Why do you say that you are not 'abd ? You are 'abd." 'Abidstill exist 
We are all 'abid of God.
This conversation illustrates well the snobbery of the sheikhly women. May 
tried to distinguish the commoner tribal members as inferior to themselves, the sheikhs. 
She took for granted that the role of commoner women in carrying out compulsory 
labour for the sheikhs, such as domestic chores, indicated their inferiority. She also 
suggested that the dark-skinned face of Latifa indicated the status difference between 
commoner women, who were obliged to work in the fields, and the sheikhly women, 
who stayed at home. May tried to say that only the sheikhly women could keep fair 
skin, which was one of the most important elements of female beauty. She spoke of her 
superiority to a commoner tribal woman simply because she enjoys the status of a 
sheikhly woman. May tried to attribute Latifa's behaviour in the wedding party to her 
inferiority, meaning her disregard for her honour. A woman singing in front of men 
and putting on make-up is generally considered to be a show of sexual charm intended
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to attract men. Such behaviour threatens the honour of herself and her family. In 
wedding receptions, where female guests are accompanied by men from their family 
and relatives, and other male guests are in close relations with the host family, no one 
offends the honour of the participants. The women can even enjoy dancing with these 
men, forming a line by standing next to one another, touching their bodies. Latifa's 
behaviour, therefore, is not directly connected to base traits inherent in commoner tribal 
women. May tried to indicate Latifa's lack of caring about her honour in order to 
distinguish the attitude of the sheikhly women from these commoners. There is, 
however, nothing to testify to the commoners' inferiority in this respect. Even though a 
woman may be criticised because of her way of dancing and singing, connoting sexual 
actions on such occasions, these traits are attributed to her personally, not to her group.
The class consciousness of sheikhly women often leads them to make demands 
on the commoner villagers such as various forms of labour support. They understand 
that showing obedience is the obligation of inferior to superior. Since commoner 
villagers are aware of the sheikhs' class consciousness, which is indicated in their 
requests for labour support, the commoners apply the norm of mutual support between 
neighbours to the services which they subsequently render to the sheikhs. By applying 
this norm to their services, they can to some extent, reduce status differences between 
themselves and the sheikh. Although they seek an egalitarian relationship between 
themselves and the sheikh, the hierarchical aspects of their relationship are nevertheless 
revealed in social exchange between them, which are not completely reciprocal. The 
sheikhly family gives the commoner villagers help in the form of gifts or money on 
occasions such as a wedding, or a child's birth, boy's circumcision, sickness and a 
funeral. These exchanges can also be conducted between the commoners, and are 
regarded as reciprocal. The sheikhs, however, never give the commoners labour 
support. Egalitarianism based on tribal ideology and the status difference between the 
sheikh and commoner tribal members therefore seem to contradict, yet coexist, in their 
society, but creates tension between the sheikh and the commoner tribal members. In 
the next two sections, I shall examine discourses of ceremonial exchanges and
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women's agricultural activities, where such tension between the sheikh and commoner 
tribal members in Dubana is to some extent resolved.
5.4 Exchanges on Ceremonial Occasions
On tragic occasions such as death, the neighbourhood network is immediately 
activated and is of crucial significance. Neighbours of the deceased immediately 
suspend all other activities and rush to offer their sympathy and labour assistance to the 
family. During the funeral, which usually continues for seven days, the family of the 
deceased (i.e. spouse, parents, children, brothers, brothers' sons, father's brothers, 
father's brothers' sons and their household members) are busy arranging the burial, 
and receiving callers offering condolences. The support offered by neighbours of the 
deceased is crucial, and is considered as their obligation (ijbrn).
Male and female neighbours have different tasks. Since male and female callers 
are received separately, the male and female neighbours prepare separate rooms. 
Women usually place themselves in the front of the deceased's house. Men prepare a 
tent for the callers in another place. During the time when the male family members of 
the deceased secure the legal papers for the burial and arrange for a religious specialist, 
mul&, to recite from the Quran, some of the neighbouring men undertake to notify the 
relatives and close friends of the deceased. Other neighbours, usually young men, go to 
the graveyard with a few men from the deceased's family in order to dig the grave. 
Since burial must be carried out within a day, the corpse is taken to a mull\ who 
performs the ritual washing and sprinkling of fragrance, after which the body is 
wrapped in a special white shroud. When the deceased is a woman, a few elder 
women perform the ritual washing. Henna is applied to the hair, hands and feet of the 
corpse(l).
The corpse is put on a mattress, with the head facing the direction of Mecca. The 
mulla and another religious man sit in front of the corpse and recite from the Quran. 
As soon as the corpse is ready, the sons, grandsons, brothers' sons, father's brothers'
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sons and sisters' sons of the deceased carry it to the grave (if the deceased is a woman, 
her husband usually organises the burial). Only male relatives and the husband can 
attend this procession. All of them help fill in the grave, and recite the Sura of al-fatiha.
While the procession is taking place, the wife or daughter of the deceased 
receives the female callers in the women's section. Since male household members and 
close kin are busy arranging the burial on the first day of the funeral, and female 
household members receive the callers throughout the funeral, neighbours willingly 
take responsibility for preparing meals. While the family attend the procession, the 
neighbours start to prepare the meal for the callers. Since the funeral, or period of 
mourning ('aw*), usually lasts for seven days, neighbours divide themselves according 
to descent groups, and each group takes turns in preparing the meal composed of meat 
and bread, and serves it to the callers.
In Dubana, the villagers refer to each group of neighbours as Kashira (tribe or 
tribal section). When the villagers say, for example, that “the Garaksha 'ashiratakes 
its turn today”, the participants whose households are sharing the cost of the meal and 
offering labour may only consist of some neighbours of the deceased from that'ashira 
In fact, all the neighbours from the same 'ashira do not always act together. Other 
neighbours from the Garaksha may take their turn another day. Since a neighbouring 
group is classified according to their relation to the family of the deceased and his/her 
'ashira, their support to the family is organised according to the principle of mutual help 
between their 'ashira and 'ashha of the deceased's family.
I shall show an example of such groupings during periods of mourning. Sahir 
and his brother, who are from the Garaksha, co-operated with two men whose 
relationship to Sahir is ibn 'amm, and who share a common ancestor five generations 
back with Sahir. They also co-operated with an old man who was from the Garaksha, 
but from a different fakhd (sub-section of Garaksha ' ashira), in order to share the cost 
of the meal and to cook it. All their households' members co-operated in taking their 
turn on the first day of the funeral. On the fifth day, one of Sahifs brothers, Majd, co­
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operated with another Garaksha member, who belonged to a different fakhd from 
Majd, in preparing the meal.
When neighbours of the bereaved family constitute a group which gives the 
family help, the ' ashira division acts as a framework of group composition. 
Temporary co-operation between kin is constituted, with regard to categorical divisions 
between the neighbours, in terms of ashira affiliation. Genealogical distance between 
the participants is not important, because they co-operate in order to fulfil obligations to 
the family of the deceased as neighbours. Co-operation (musahama) between patrilineal 
kin accomplishes the task of helping the deceased's family, who are neighbours and 
'brothers' in the structure of the Tai confederation. Co-operation between kin is not 
derived from fulfilling obligations between them, but is organised in order to fulfil 
obligation to their neighbours, i.e., the bereaved family. In their relation to this 
neighbouring family, they need to label their group as 'ashira in order to stress the 
'brotherhood' relation to the bereaved family and to define obligation between 
themselves and the family. Co-operation between kin is organised for fulfilling this 
obligation, and hence the group which is composed in this context is of a practical 
nature. Therefore it does not matter who, within the ’ashira, co-operates in order to 
fulfil this obligation to the deceased's family.
Patrilineal kin of the deceased also take turns to prepare meals. Their groups are 
identified by the name of the 'ashira to which the deceased belonged. These temporary 
co-operative groups are composed of kin who are neighbours to each other. This 
grouping of kin is referred to as qaraib of the deceased, from such and such a village. 
They fall within the same 'ashira and can constitute a co-operative group in order to 
fulfil their obligation to the family of the deceased, based not on genealogical relations 
among them, but on their closeness to the deceased, whose family they are obliged to 
help. They make up an ad hoc kin group in the same way as the neighbours of the 
deceased organise their groupings. Their 'ashira members contribute in order to fulfil 
their own obligation to the family of the deceased.
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Neighbouring women of the deceased are identified by their membership of their 
respective households, and therefore, married women are incorporated into their 
husbands' kin groups. Elder women take a role in attending the condolence ceremony 
as female representatives of their households. Single women and young wives offer 
labour support more than the elders. Even if their group is not in charge of preparing 
the meal on that day, they help by baking bread and washing the dishes, offering their 
assistance not to other groups of neighbours or kin of the deceased, but to the bereaved 
family as their neighbours.
Financial and labour assistance between neighbours is a reciprocal exchange. 
Members of the deceased's household who are offered help by their neighbours will 
reciprocate the same kind of assistance to their neighbours in their time of need, 
according to the principle of mutual help (musa'adam'a ba'ad).
The family of the sheikh, however, never offers assistance in the preparation of 
the communal meals, even though his commoner neighbours give assistance to the 
sheikh's family when a family member dies. Despite the lack of reciprocity, which 
signifies status difference between the sheikh and commoner tribal members (Eisenstadt 
and Roniger, 1981: 276-7), social exchanges on religious occasions have great 
importance for the commoner villagers in their insistence on neighbourhood relations 
with the sheikh. Commoner villagers stress the obligation of organising kin group 
support for the bereaved neighbours whenever they offer their labour support to the 
sheikh. Since this obligation is conducted on the basis of assistance between 
neighbours who belong to different 'ashira-s among the Tai, an alliance between 
'ashira-s which are 'brotherhood' relations in system of the Tai confederation is in 
operation.
The focus of the following discussion is the way in which commoner villagers 
constitute a discourse insisting on egalitarian relations between themselves and the 
sheikh at the funeral ceremonies. I shall, Firstly, consider religious ceremonies held for 
expressing the suffering of the living and for the redemption of the soul of the 
deceased, and then, compare the religious meanings of these ceremonies with those
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held on Islamic feast days. Secondly, I shall discuss the social domains of these 
religious ceremonies, especially social exchanges between the commoner villagers and 
sheikhs on these occasions.
Condolence ceremonies are occasions on which women communicate their sense 
of sharing in the tragedy. They wear black, dark blue or brown dresses, expressing 
their grief by the observance of sombre colours. A mother, sister, wife or daughter of 
the deceased expresses her grief by wailing, crying, beating her breasts, scratching her 
face and pulling her hair. One of the women close to the deceased becomes the 
performer of these acts while the rest are less expressive. The performer's concern is 
to express grief at the loss of her much-loved family member. She has a great deal 
invested in evoking the callers' sympathy for her family's tragedy. The callers cry in 
sympathy with her.
The following laments of a mother who had suddenly lost her young son, who
had just finished his military service, moved the callers to tears. The mother repeated
the following phrases while crying and pulling her hair:
“his heart is upon us. O, my father, my father (Ya qalbu 'alainaya abui, ya 
abui) ! You left us, my father. You left us. You left us. O, my father 
(tarakna abui, tarakna ya abui) ! Big disaster strikes me. How did you 
leave us, my father O, my father (yawwaili siloon tarakatna ya abui ya 
abui) ? O, my father, your death has burnt my heart, O, my father, and O, 
beloved my heart, O, my father (ya abui, haraqt qalbi ya abui wa ya 'asir 
qalbi ya abui).”
Callers reply in stock phrases for consoling her sorrow:
“[I wish that] life will continue [even without the deceased], and other 
family members will remain with you all your life (baqiya bi-hayatichi). A 
living person is better than a dead one (al-haya abqa mina-l-mayyit). ”
It means that the deceased has already left, but you will not lose any one or any
pleasure again. Living people have further opportunity to behave religiously, but the
deceased no longer has any opportunities to acquire religious merit through good
deeds. Callers also ask for God's mercy upon the deceased through the good conduct
of his family: “the deceased remains with children (al- khalq birds al-awlad).” They
believe that the soul of the deceased will acquire God's blessing when the adult
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members of the bereaved family guide children onto the right path, since children 
cannot themselves distinguish right from wrong.
The mother's grief is for her loss and love toward the deceased son. She 
addresses her deceased son as her father. It implies that the deceased son would 
support her if he were alive, as would a father. However, her expression of sorrow is 
regarded by men as forbidden (haram), because death is brought by the will of God. 
Secondly, the expression of sorrow, especially the pulling of her hair and shedding of 
blood by scratching her face, pains the soul (rat) of the deceased and therefore this 
expression by women is sin (haram). Men believe that once in paradise, the deceased 
will see the rivers flowing in the garden of paradise (genna), mentioned in the Quran, 
filled with hair and blood shed by the women during the condolence ceremonies^. 
After resurrection, hair and blood are believed to bother the deceased. Even though 
expressing grief at losing a much-loved individual in this world is against the belief of 
official Islam, women nevertheless express their suffering.
Sered characterises the domestic religious realm thus: it is "the area in which the 
ultimate concerns of life, suffering and death are personalised. Thus domestic religion 
has to do with the lives, sufferings and deaths of particular, usually well-loved, 
individuals" (Sered, 1988: 516)(italic original). Sered (1988) discusses domestic 
religion and the religious behaviour of Jewish women in Jerusalem, where women 
professing their alliance to a wider religious system use the same symbols and rituals as 
those used on formal religious occasions, and by gaining access to them, they make 
personal petitions.
In Jazirah, rituals conducted at condolence ceremonies, which use the same 
symbols and ritual frameworks as those used in Islamic feasts, express the devotion of 
the bereaved family and the callers to Islam. Women's condolence ceremonies describe 
the path to understanding the meaning of death in Islam and ask God to bring them 
personal and family blessing by redeeming the soul of the deceased. Women's 
ceremonies are composed of two parts: performances conducted by women from the 
bereaved family who express their suffering and personal loss by using religiously
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forbidden acts; and performances by female callers who console the bereaved family 
and advise them to behave in accordance with religious dictates in order to assure 
themselves and the soul of the deceased of the blessing of God (khair). The callers try 
to persuade the bereaved family to accept the death as a trial by God, and that their 
personal benefit {khair) will be acquired through their religious behaviour. If they 
overcome their sorrow and ask for God's mercy upon the deceased through their 
devotion to God, their good conduct will bring them and the soul of the deceased 
religious blessing {khair).
Death for Muslims "is seen as part of a natural pre-oriented, immutable order, •
• • and part of a continuing process in the destiny of the individual" (Ahmed, 1986: 
130). No one can escape from the consequence of death. According to the Quran, 
death repudiates ties between the deceased and living people. The fate of the soul of the 
deceased is determined by God. The only way people in this world can redeem the 
soul and relieve themselves of the suffering caused by the death, is to ask for God's 
redemption of the soul through their devotion. The women's condolence ceremonies 
describe the path by which accept the fate of human beings is accepted.
In Jazirah, Muslim women's behaviour and role in condolence ceremonies seems 
to be highly gender-specific. Although they orient themselves towards dealing with 
their own suffering and the concern of the entire family, their performance contrasts to 
that of men. During funerals men never shed tears or grieve. They believe that the 
women's weeping is caused by the weakness of their heart or mind {qalb), which 
renders them unable to endure the pain of loss. Women do not agree with this male 
explanation. Their way of expressing suffering is highly formalised. This expression 
separates the women's ceremonial role from the men's in the funeral. Women from the 
bereaved family express their suffering by stereotyped manners only during formal 
condolence ceremonies. They seek the most efficacious moment when interpersonal 
communications between themselves and the callers would enhance the feeling of 
suffering caused by the loss. Female callers talk about the wailing woman thus: “she 
cannot eat after the suffering she has gone through by the death”, or “she cannot open
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her eyes because of her continuous weeping”. These women sympathise with the 
sufferer in their stereo-typed expressions and shed tears. Their formalised performance 
expressing sorrow and sympathy for the loss is not the only feature which contrasts 
with the men's performance. The prominent feature of the women's ceremony is that 
the women of the bereaved family and the callers share the sorrow of the deceased's 
departure to another world, and the callers try to lead the women of the bereaved family 
to religious deeds bringing religious blessing {khair) to the soul of the deceased and the 
family.
Women are not allowed to hold religious readings and recitations of the Quran, in 
which they could beg for God's blessing for the soul of the deceased. Their access to 
religious expression in asking for God's salvation for the deceased's soul is limited. 
Men, in contrast, are able to perform religious activities which convey God's blessing 
during condolence ceremonies. Recitations from the Quran and other religious readings 
are all conducted by men. The most remarkable ceremony which specifies men's 
religious role during the mourning period is mawlid, held on the last day of the period 
of mourning CazaT) for the sake of redemption of the soul of the deceased. Women are 
not allowed to perform or attend this ceremony. A religious man presents readings 
from the book on the prophet Muhammad's life, Mawlid Ibn Hajar ( 'Umal Rihawl 
and others, n.d.). At the end, all those present recite: “al-fatiha for the soul of the 
deceased to beg the blessing of Allah (al-fatiha'an ruh al-mayyit wa natlubkhairmin 
Allah) ”, and recite the Sura of al-fatiha. Men's ceremonies are concerned with 
redemption of the deceased's soul by showing their own devotion to God.
The only religious act in which women as well as men are able to receive 
religious merit {boraka) during the period of 'aza' , is the communal meal. Communal 
meals in religious ceremonies can be analysed from different dimensions: their Islamic 
meaning which the locals evaluate in their practices, and their social meanings which 
link with moral and political evaluation (Tapper and Tapper, 1986: 63). Gathering in 
order to partake in communal meals and foods which are served at ceremonies is 
regarded as bringing khair (religious power, blessing). Acquiring khair is important in
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terms of carrying out one's Islamic obligations in the religious domain. In the social 
domain, gathering for acquiring khair serves to constitute relations between a host and 
his guests by feeding the guests and sharing the meal, and confirms self-respect of the 
participants engaging in religious conduct. In Dubana, only the Tai paramount sheikh 
sacrifices and hosts Islamic festivals. This act is important to legitimise his religious 
and moral authority and social status. He honours his guests with ritual food which 
indicates his hospitality and wealth.
The Tai follow the practical obligations based on the religious doctrine of Hanafi 
sources. Ceremonial food must be religiously sanctioned (halal), in order for Muslim 
obligations to be fulfilled and access to khair gained. Ceremonial meat must be halal. 
Animals, mainly sheep and cows, should be sacrificed by evoking the name of God, 
and the meat should be clean by allowing the blood to run from the animal. Through 
this processing, the sacrificial animals become halal for dedication to God. Although 
women cook the meat, they are not allowed to sacrifice animals themselves. Women 
can sacrifice animals only if the men are absent. Forbidding women access to the 
religious sacrifice of animals is to some extent associated with blood. Because of 
menstruation and childbirth, women are regarded as being associated with religious 
impurities more than men are. They are thus discriminated against and prevented from 
gaining the religious blessing of God. Men, who can purify meat, are allowed to 
acquire religious merit
The main foods for communal meals are meat and bread. Lamb boiled with fat, 
salt and onions served with fresh bread, is the best in terms of flavour, and is the most 
prestigious food which the host can provide. This meal is served in private religious 
gatherings, such as a funeral, or religious ceremony for redemption of the deceased 
(mawlid) during the month of Ramadan, or on the Islamic feast at the end of Ramadan 
( Id al-fitt), and in other private parties, such as weddings.
Meat is the primary focus which conveys religious merit (baraka). The Tai also 
pay special attention to bread, salt and sweet foods. Bread means food in general and 
is regarded as vital food. It therefore brings baraka. Bread is never thrown away. A
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piece of bread dropped on the ground is kissed and pressed to the forehead and kept. 
Dried bread, which is not edible, is stored and given to animals. It is also donated to the 
poor who feed their animals with it. Salt is regarded as an essential ingredient which 
enhances the flavour of the meal and brings power to the body.
Sweets are another notable food which convey baraka. Sweets are distributed on 
various occasions - mawlid, Islamic feasts, visits to the graveyard. At the end of 
mawlid, dates, sweetmeats and soft drinks are distributed with salt and wheat grain 
among the host and guests. After the mawlid, which is the last ceremony of the funeral 
which has continued for seven days, the household of the deceased offers bread and 
sweets to one of their neighbouring households on the following day, and then bread 
and sweets to another neighbouring household on the next day. This is called ash a' 
maytin.Then, they distribute sweets and bread to all their neighbouring households on 
the same day. This is called 'asha' tawiL After asha' tawiL, the household of the 
deceased bring sweets and bread to one of their neighbours every Friday during the 
period of mourning. How long they mourn the death is decided by the household, 
and is less than one year. Dubana villagers explained to me that distribution of sweets 
was conducted in order to contribute to the redeeming of the deceased's soul. This 
religious dedication to God, conducted by the bereaved family, asks for God's blessing 
on the soul.
Sharing food within a community is a social action in which all participants fulfil 
their obligation as Muslims. All participants achieve a sense of communality while 
asking for God's favour (khair), and sharing the focid imbued with religious merit 
(baraka). God acknowledges these dedications of halal food which have baraka, and in 
return, favours the participants who petition God to redeem the soul of the deceased 
and happiness of their family. God receives their spiritual dedication. There is no 
sense however, that they share this food with God. (cf. Tapper and Tapper, 1986: 
75). In this framework the participants can achieve equality in the eyes of God. 
Through food-sharing women as well as men are enabled to beg for God's blessing.
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There is no status difference between the sheikhs and other commoner tribal members 
who dedicate themselves to God and ask for God's blessing.
The women's ceremony describes the path to understanding the meaning of death 
in Islam, whilst men's ceremonies during the mourning period only manifest their 
devotion to Islam in the same way as Islamic feasts. For example, mawlid ceremonies 
held during the mourning period and the prophet's birthday, follow the same procedure 
and use the same religious symbols. Even though men's ceremonies during the 
mourning period are intended to redeem the soul of the deceased, their ceremonies 
cannot express why their devotion to God will bring religious blessing to the soul of 
the deceased and themselves. It is women's ceremonies which tell the meaning of 
death in this world where living people should overcome the suffering caused by loss 
of the deceased. To accept the loss of the deceased as a trial by God, behave 
religiously, and show their devotion to Islam, makes it possible for the community and 
the family of the deceased to ask for God's redemption of the deceased and to petition 
for happiness for themselves.
Commoner villagers sacrifice animals only on the occasion of domestic religious 
ceremonies. They ask for khair for a good life for their own family and for the soul of 
deceased members. Personal religious ceremonies share symbols, ritual frameworks 
and belief in dedication to God with official religious ceremonies which are the great 
tradition of Islam (Gulick, 1983: 171-80). Sacrificial animals in Islamic feasts are 
implicitly identified with the victim, whose life is dedicated to God. This spiritual 
dedication is seen to elicit God's favour. The difference between the meaning of 
sacrifice in Islamic feasts and that in domestic rituals is intention: official feasts are 
occasions to manifest abstract devotion to Islam; domestic rituals concern the life and 
death of members of the family. Even though the intention of the performers differs 
between official and domestic ceremonies, domestic religion interacts with the great 
tradition of Islam (Sered, 1988: 516). The symbols of ritual congregation, food and 
the communal meal used in domestic rituals, are applicable to Islamic feasts. In this 
respect, commoner villagers can carry out Islamic obligations by playing host to
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domestic rituals in the same way as the sheikh who alone can act as host in Islamic 
feasts in Dubana. Their ability to dedicate victims to God and share meals which have 
baraka with their guests, makes it possible for the commoners to insist on equality 
between themselves and the sheikh in terms both of religious piety and hospitality.
All households in Dubana can host domestic religious ceremonies as social 
gatherings. The commoner villagers as well as the sheikh, honour their guests with 
ritual food. The hosts, who are represented by men, fulfil their religious duty through 
the congregation. Hosts should be generous and humble to their guests. Hosts require 
their guests' acceptance of their hospitality. Guests in turn, put themselves in a position 
where they can receive their hosts' hospitality(diyaia) and, therefore, obtain the right to 
receive both food and religious khair. Guests confirm the hosts' political ability to 
offer the prestigious meat dish. At such ceremonies, relations between the host and 
guests are of unequals. Since neighbours invite each other to their domestic religious 
ceremonies, their exchanges are reciprocal. The host household in a domestic 
ceremony will be guests of another ceremony held by other neighbouring households. 
Since host-guest relations may be reversed at some later date, status relations between 
neighbours, even the sheikh and other villagers, are equal in the long term.
At Islamic feasts, host-guest relations do not work in reverse. In Dubana only 
the sheikh arranges official Islamic gatherings and communal meals on the Islamic 
feasts of Id  al-fitr and on the prophet Muhammad's birthday, mawlid al-nabwL He 
enjoys the superior position as a host to his guests. The sheikh feeds all the household 
heads in the village on 'id al-fitr and mawlid al-nabwL On the Islamic great feast of 
sacrifice ('Id  al-adha), it is only the sheikh who sacrifices sheep or cows in order to 
distribute the raw meat amongst other village households. This distribution is called 
dahiya which on the one hand means an act offering a victim to God in order to show 
devotion to God and on the other hand, is an act of charity to the poor for the sake of 
the host's access to khair.
Women are excluded from these gatherings. This exclusion of women may 
implicitly differentiate domestic ceremonies concerned with life and death in a family,
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from official Islamic ceremonies. Women take an important role in the link between 
domestic ritual, that is, making family petitions to God, and that of Islam. While 
Islamic feasts solely express dedication to God and devotion to Islam. Differentiation 
of purposes between domestic and official Islamic rituals separates rituals in which 
women can participate from those only permitted for men.
Commoner villagers pay respect (ihtiram) to the sheikh and voluntarily accept a 
communal meal in which the sheikh acts as a host Without the commoners holding the 
sheikh in veneration (ihtiram), the political influence of the sheikh cannot be achieved. 
The sheikh is obliged to apply the code of hospitality (diyafa) to feeding his guests. 
His hospitality to his guests signifies his claim of his religious piety and political 
superiority over those whom he feeds. The sheikh, however, cannot arbitrarily force 
the commoners to accept his political superiority, because the commoners honour him 
with respect for his virtues of observing religious duties, which is the only way to 
legitimise his religious and moral authority. Even though the commoners do not 
sacrifice sheep on Islamic feasts, they do intend to carry out Islamic obligations. 
During the two big Islamic feasts, they prepare sweetmeats imbued with baraka, which 
can be substituted for sacrificing animals, and offer them to their guests. Their 
economic inability to dedicate victims to God does not create inequality between 
themselves and the sheikh in terms of religious piety (cf. Tapper and Tapper, 1986: 
67). Moreover, the commoners can insist on their equality with the sheikh by hosting 
domestic rituals in which they affirm their devotion to God and can claim their political 
ability to be hospitable to their guests, in the same way as the sheikh on Islamic feasts. 
In this sense, the commoners try to seek an egalitarian position through their religious 
performance. Religious symbols of food and the communal meal provide grounds for 
reducing political inequality between themselves and the sheikh. The sheikh is then 
obliged to claim his political superiority by applying the code of hospitality (diyafa) to 
the religious congregation in which his religious and moral virtues are acknowledged 
by his guests.
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5,5 Women's Agricultural Labour
In the past, the power of the Tai paramount sheikh has not been based solely on 
his position in the Tai tribal structure, but also on his economic wealth and on the class 
difference between the sheikhs and commoner tribal members. It was the sheikh who 
imposed the tribal members' submission to his authority based on patronage, and who 
enjoyed the status of constituting alliances between 'ashira-s among the Tai tribal 
confederation. His power was used to enhance his political influence in state politics. 
These days, as the State succeeds in integrating minorities and tribes^3), tribal sheikhs 
have few opportunities to exercise influence on their tribal members by dealing with 
conflicts with other tribal or ethnic groups, and negotiations with the state. Moreover, 
tribal members are economically more independent of the sheikhs than in the past. 
Tribal leaders are therefore no longer powerful figures in charge of all their affairs.
Although the economic disparity between the Tai paramount sheikh and other 
tribal members in Dubana is still enormous, the sheikh no longer enforces slave labour 
on tribal members. Most household heads in Dubana have income sources outside the 
village, independent of the sheikh. Although most young men cannot find jobs in 
Qamishly, or the other industrial sites nearby, because of the shortage of employment, 
they only rarely work for the sheikh as agricultural labourers. The sheikh thus finds it 
difficult to hire his tribesmen for his agricultural business. As a result, he employs 
managers, tractor drivers, shepherds, horse breeders, and seasonal labourers from a 
Christian villages next to Dubana, YazIdiC4) immigrants from Iraq, or peasants from 
villages near Aleppo and so on. Male villagers in Dubana no longer accept hierarchical 
subordination to the sheikh on the basis of his economic power and wealth.
Women are more caught up by the restrictions on production activities, which are 
created by norms of gender segregation and family honour. Because of these 
restrictions imposed on these women, their scope for finding work outside the home is 
limited. These women find an opportunity to be engaged in agricultural activities as 
seasonal agricultural labourers in the sheikh's fields. This, however, seems to 
contradict their egalitarian attitude to the sheikh. They seem to be caught up by the
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historically created class differences between themselves and the sheikh derived from 
the obligations to do compulsory labour for the sheikh. The focus in this section is on 
examining the discourses of women’s agricultural activities in the sheikh's fields that 
reflect the commoners' egalitarian attitude toward the sheikh. I shall first look at 
women's production activities which are restricted by gender roles.
Agricultural production divides men's tasks from women's. Weeding and the 
harvesting of cotton and lentils are exclusively undertaken by women. Both men and 
women say, “it is shameful ('aib) for men to do such tasks”. The men's role in 
agricultural labour is ploughing, seeding and harvesting wheat and barley. All these 
tasks are mechanised. Women are not allowed to drive cars and tractors, which is 
regarded as shameful. Shame in the context of agricultural work means conduct which 
breaches the assignment of tasks according to gender division. This notion separates 
women's tasks from the men, and confines both men and women to participating in 
tasks which are allocated according to gender division. Sahlins argues that taboo creates 
"the social nature of persons and groups, [and] tabu is itself the principle of these 
distinctions. For the same reason, tabu is never a simple reflection upon practice; it is in 
the order of practice, as [is also] the organisation of it" (1981: 51-2)(italic original). 
Exclusion of one gender from particular agricultural tasks is derived from a kind of 
taboo related to ideas of shame Caib). This prohibition and exclusion establishes social 
distinction between men and women in agricultural production. Women depend on men 
for core production activities. Moreover, only men have the privilege of storing crops, 
transforming them into cash and distributing them for consumption. Women are not 
allowed to acquire these male privileges, even though they have become a major part of 
the agricultural labour force.
These gender divisions in production activities are applied to seasonal agricultural 
labour. Women carry out actual production labour, weeding and harvesting cotton. 
Men have access to more privileged jobs - as tractor drivers and managers of female 
labourers and the harvest. Production relations between men and women among 
agricultural labourers, require enormous female labour forces, especially in the fields
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which are owned by big landlords. The Tai paramount sheikh as a big land owner 
needs a female labour force and it gives commoner women opportunities to work as 
seasonal labourers.
Women's engagement in agricultural labour cannot always be accepted, even 
though their work satisfies the practical need both of the sheikh and these women. 
There is another taboo which prevents the women from working outside the home. As 
a principle, women cannot work outside the home, because the activity threatens female 
sexual virtue unless in conditions which guarantee its protection. Women in Dubana 
say, “we work in the sheikh's fields, but do not work in fields next to the village 
owned by the State. It is shame for us”. This statement reflects insider-outsider 
differentiation. The state farm is managed by men unrelated to women in Dubana. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, Jazirah inhabitants believe that unrelated men (ghiaib) are 
potential enemies, threatening women's sexual virtue. Sexual assault is understood by 
them in terms of ethnic or sectarian group opposition. Men in the Tai feel that if their 
woman is assaulted, it means that the Tai are dishonoured by the group to which the 
aggressor belongs. Female workers in the sheikh's fields need to justify their 
engagement in agricultural work on the basis that they must be protected by the sheikh 
who is a member of the Tai.
In opposition between the Tai and outsiders, the value of 'brotherhood' 
(ukhuwa) as structured by tribal confederation may justify engagement of female tribal 
workers in the work on the sheikh's fields. If their engagement is justified solely by 
tribal alliances based on 'brotherhood', these women should be able to work for any 
landlord among the Tai In reality they are not allowed to work for most of them. The 
Tai landlords, including the paramount sheikh, are not obliged to undertake 
responsibility for the protecting the sexual virtue of their female workers. Only the 
family ( ai/a) members are obliged to take responsibility for women's behaviour. This 
obligation is derived from the principle of kinship classification. The closer their 
relations, the more obligation they owe, as discussed in the previous section. If an 
illicit relationship is revealed, male family members of the woman involved in this act
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are obliged to kill her and the male lover for the sake of restoring their family honour. 
According to this principle, no relatives or tribal members, except for the women's 
family members, are obliged to take vengeance.
Even though ethnic or sectarian opposition works as a protective factor for 
women inside the group, the actual obligation to protect them is not attributed to the 
tribal members other than from the women's family. The principle of insider-outsider 
opposition should have meaning in its connection to another principle. Women can 
work on condition that they do not threaten their family honour through illicit contact 
with men. Work for the krif, who is a guardian of their brother's circumcision and a 
friend of their father, fulfils such a condition, if the krif is from the Tai K rif is a 
category within which children of the krif cannot marry the circumcised boy, his 
brothers and sisters. Women in the family of the circumcised boy can have contact with 
his krifh family, regardless of any sexual implication.
The relationship between the families of the circumcised boy and his krif is 
based on personal alliance between the father of the boy and his krif. Since the 
problem of female sexual virtue is a family matter, male family members of the women 
are obliged to protect it for the sake of their and the family's honour. These men, 
especially the household head of the women, who is a representative for her protection, 
are required to create the conditions in which their women can work without damaging 
their sexual virtue. Personal alliance with krif makes it possible for the women's 
family to ask the krif to take custody of them during their work. The krif guarantees 
the protection of these women through personal alliance with men in the women's 
family.
It is possible for the Tai paramount sheikh to have custody of his female 
workers. His guarantee of protection involves his politics in tribal and regional matters. 
This is an important means whereby the sheikh establishes his political influence. The 
relationship arising from this guarantee obliges the sheikh to protect the women from 
sexual offence by outsiders. Such relations are supported by tribal 'brotherhood' 
relations, which are inherent in ties between the sheikh and other tribal members.
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'Brotherhood' relations cement an alliance, when the sheikh takes custody of the 
women and protect them from outsiders.
When women can justify working for the sheikh, alliance between their family 
and the sheikh should contain factors which reinforce guarantees of their protection. 
This is derived from the sheikh's political influence. I shall present a case in which the 
sheikh took a woman involved in an illicit sexual act into protective custody. The 
reason why I present this here is that this case reveals how his custody has meaning 
both in tribal relations and regional politics. This case helps me to understand why 
women can be allowed to work for the sheikh on the basis of alliance between their 
family and the sheikh.
The Tai paramount sheikh took a woman involved in illicit sexual acts into 
protective custody. She, a single woman from the Tai, had had a stillbirth and her illicit 
relationship had been exposed to the public. Police investigated the case and asked the 
sheikh to become an arbitrator in order to save the woman's life. The woman's family 
agreed that the sheikh could accept taking custody of her. The family cannot therefore 
kill her because the murder would disgrace the sheikh (yaib-hu) who is her custodian. 
The settlement does not however prevent revenge, that is, the murder of her male lover. 
Dubana villagers say that the revenge may be conducted when her brothers who work 
abroad return, or when her younger brothers grow up. As for the settlement of the 
problem, the sheikh's arbitration establishes a specific relationship between him and the 
woman's family: the sheikh has her in his custody and prevents her from further sexual 
offence; the family can save face without sanctioning the woman out of respect for the 
sheikh's dignity (min shan waj-hu). While the sheikh acts as a guardian, anyone who 
interferes with the woman's life is seen as disgracing the sheikh. Since such a 
guarantee for the woman's life and the honour of her family exemplifies the sheikh's 
authority, anyone who tries to offend the settlement is regarded as a challenger to the 
sheikh's political authority. Since tribal structure does not define his right to intervene 
in the problem of the woman's family, his undertaking depends on his personal
179
influence. The acknowledgement of this guarantee by society illustrates the political 
success and influence of the sheikh.
As shown, the sheikh's political dignity provides a guarantee of protection of the 
woman's sexual virtue to her family. When tribal women work for him, a woman's 
family, especially the household head who is obliged to take responsibility for her 
sexual virtue, respects the political dignity of the sheikh and agrees to entrust the 
woman to him for work. Although the household head can ask for the sheikh's 
protection over the woman's sexual virtue, it is conducted by paying respect to the 
sheikh's political ability, and the principle of alliance of their tribe to the sheikhly tribe, 
'Asaf. The commoner tribal members are not subject to his influence on the basis of 
sheikh- 'abid relations. The egalitarian attitude of commoner tribal members does not 
accept such hierarchical relations. The sheikh cannot depend on his advantaged status 
created through the course of history, nor convert his wealth into political power over 
his tribal members. His political power is accepted by the commoners in the sense that 
they pay voluntary respect to his personal ability to prevent his tribal women from 
sexual offence. His dignity is acknowledged as his personal disposition (tabi'a), which 
enables him to carry out his responsibility to the female workers, and his honour which 
he receives from his ancestors who played important political roles in the past. His 
political power supported by alliances of his tribal members is enhanced, and no one 
can offend his dignity. This power guarantees protection of women who work for the 
sheikh.
The women's relative freedom is acquired by the demands for their labour, 
respect for the sheikh's political ability to guarantee their sexual honour and egalitarian 
tribal alliance. The acceptance of the sheikh's political influence in the form of paying 
respect to his dignity and tribal alliance, underpins women's liberation from 'abid 
status. In practice, both commoner men and women need the sheikh's undertaking in 
order to acquire opportunities for women to earn income from agricultural labour. The 
sheikh also needs the female labour force in his fields. Both sheikhly influence and 
commoners' egalitarian attitudes are therefore sustained in part, in the course of
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fulfilling the economic needs of both sides. Consequently, women enforce their 
opportunity to retain income from their work to some extent, and acquire relative 
freedom from the restrictions imposed on them by the principle of gender segregation.
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CHAPTER 6. WOMEN’S ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
6.1 Introduction
Regional economic developments in Jazirah have had a considerable impact on 
the productive activities of Shawaya village women and their access to economic 
resources. Village women have been engaged in animal rearing and dairy production, 
and have contributed to the household economy, following increased regional demands 
for their products. These productive activities of the women not only contribute to the 
provision of domestic food, but are also a source of cash income for the household. 
These activities reflect commoner villagers' economic independence of the tribal 
sheikhs. They think that the ownership of small numbers of sheep and cows, as well as 
the right to agricultural land leased out by the Syrian government, symbolise their 
liberation from slavery status. The villagers regard the lack of access to these economic 
resources, which used to be monopolised by the sheikhs, as the root of their 
enslavement by the sheikhs. The acquisition of these economic resources therefore, 
becomes important in reducing status difference between commoner and the sheikhs.
The following narrative told by a married woman, who has been living in
Dubana for more than thirty years, describes how common villagers view the
improvement of their life, brought about by the land reform and ownership of livestock: 
“We were all poor. All the fields in Jazirah used to be owned by five tribal 
sheikhs, before the land reform. There was one rich man in this village, 
and the others were poor. The sheikh was the only rich man. In those 
days there was no other work except for working for the sheikh. We 
worked hard in his fields for ten hours every day, but he paid us only two 
lira a day.W We were slaves ( 'abid) of the sheikh. We did not have any 
dishes to eat on. We did not have makarom (spaghetti), makhashi (stuffed
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vegetables) or other food which are now available to us. We only had 
boiled onions (which represent poor food for the Shawaya) and clarified 
butter. We rarely ate wheat bread. I often went to the field after harvest 
and picked up grains from the ground, to bake bread for my small children. 
We could not afford to eat meat. God blessed us. We now have the right 
to our own land for cultivation and our own sheep and cows. Our life has 
improved. Few people nowadays say that they are 'abid of the sheikh.”
The political motivation for common villagers to acquire economic autonomy is 
to resist the hierarchical sheikh- 'abid relation. They believe that acquisition of 
economic resources has brought an opportunity to insist on a politically equal status to 
the sheikh. Even though the size of their flock and agricultural land are small in 
comparison to the sheikh's, they now possess the same kind of economic resources as 
the sheikh, by which they are able to live independently. They no longer need to 
subject themselves to the sheikh in order to acquire economic gain. Therefore, there is 
an overriding economic and political need for livestock rearing and the processing of 
dairy products, as a means of establishing economic and political independence of the 
sheikh.
Different roles in production are allocated to men and women. Women process 
most of the available surplus into valuable commodities and bring cash income to the 
household. Women shoulder a heavy work load. They feed and water animals, 
process their dairy produce, and sell these at Qamishly market, whereas the men's 
participation in animal production only goes as far as hiring a shepherd, making a 
contract with a shopkeeper for selling the dairy products, and trading their animals in 
the livestock market. There is no co-operation or exchange of labour between 
households.
Women, as well as men do not think that their work brings cash income to their 
households nor do they receive acknowledgement for their economic contribution to the 
households. Neither the women nor the other members of the household value their 
sale of dairy produce in the market as independent commercial ventures. Their 
economic activity is regarded as part of the female role within the household. Women 
are reminded that their work fulfils their responsibility (maswuliyn) to provide
183
sustenance for their household members. Their income is used for buying food and 
other daily necessities for the household. They do not retain the fruits of their labour, 
i.e. cash. Therefore, women cannot turn their activities into a source of power, either 
in the public or domestic sphere.
The rationale underlying these perceptions rests on the norms; women's role is 
to process food which is extracted from resources men possess; a woman should be at 
home and avoid contact with unrelated men (gharaiB) in order to be an honourable 
woman (sharlfa) who respects her own sexual virtue. Although women acknowledge 
these norms, they are actually engaged in productive activity and commercial contacts 
with unrelated men(2).
Women's sale of their dairy products at Qamishly market and their participation 
in commercial activity are undertaken with the consent of their family, whose honour is 
affected by the women's sexual modesty. Although the marketplace is a public space 
where a woman's appearance, activities and contacts with unrelated men (gbraib) are 
open to public scrutiny, they walk freely in the market among unrelated men and sell 
their dairy products to them. In this context, the socially pervasive idea that unrelated 
men are potential enemies threatening female sexual virtue does not directly affect 
women's activity in the market place. Thus normative rules that confine women's 
activities within the domestic arena, in order to keep them out of sight, prove to be of 
limited use.
Activities of these women in the public space, however, cannot acquire value as a 
commercial activity in which they are given a free hand, as in the case of baladi women 
in Cairo (Early, 1993). Baladi women show initiative as merchants and creditors in the 
marketplace, and their individualized work is accepted by the traditional value system as 
mualimma, a tough "street woman" who is respected and is untouched by innuendoes 
of loose morals (ibid.: 87-8). On the contrary, Jazirah women's commercial activity in 
the marketplace is understood as a part of women's role to provide sustenance to 
household members and is protected by their household heads. Their work is not 
independent of men in their household and this interdependence of the men's and
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women's spheres makes it possible for women to participate in the business. Men 
possess animals from which women extract dairy produce. Women provide their 
household members with these products and with other food which they purchase with 
money gained by selling these products. Because of the sexual codes that women 
should avoid unrelated men, they require their household heads to make contracts with 
shopkeepers to whom they sell dairy product. The shopkeeper is an unrelated man, 
with whom women should avoid personal contact in order to protect their honour.
Field studies of Arab women dealing with their economic activities have revealed 
that the development of the commercial market has created shifts in the boundaries 
between the various spheres of action for both men and women. This process works on 
subtle levels of cultural articulation. Commercial development provides women with 
opportunities to participate in work outside the home and earn income, or conversely 
confines them to activities which have economic value. For example, Altorki suggests 
that women in the Saudi Arabian city o f' Unayzan are given opportunities to acquire 
their own sources of income from employment and to retain autonomy in disposing of 
it. This can, however, breed feelings of insecurity in their husbands. The dependency 
of women on male responsibilities such as providing food, shelter, clothing and health 
care, and on resources controlled by men, are prominent features in traditional 
patriarchal gender relations between men and women (Altorki, 1992: 107-8). Women 
taking up work creates a fear amongst men that the traditional boundaries between men 
and women could be eroded and thus curtail male authority over women.
Abu-Lughod's study of an Egyptian rural community, Awlad 'Ali (1986), 
suggests that the development of the commercial market economy has generated change 
in gender roles in terms of productive activities. Both men and women used to 
contribute to the subsistence economy within the framework of the traditional division 
of labour: the men cared for the sheep, and were involved in cultivation and trade; the 
women were responsible for milking and milk processing, gathering wood for the 
cooking fire, and weaving tents and blankets. The shift from subsistence to market 
production has resulted in women's work becoming peripheralised. Their work is
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confined to an economically devalued domestic sphere. Women have become 
profoundly dependent on men as subsistence is now based on cash rather than on the 
exploitation of herds and fields. Mechanised transport on the other hand, has increased 
men's mobility and business contacts outside the camp. Meanwhile, the women have 
no such access, because the sexual codes require that women avoid male nonkin and 
strangers (ibid.: 72-4). Thus, the development of a market economy tends in fact to 
encourage the confinement of women's activity and constricts their freedom of 
movement.
Whether the development of the commercial market confines women's activities 
or gives them more opportunities to be engaged in economic activities, it brings 
changes to the relations between a husband and his wife and their relative status. 
Discussions both of Altorki and Abu-Lughod suggest problems which have arisen in 
the two societies as well as in Jazirah: people in these societies are caught in a dilemma 
as to how to cope with the different configurations created by a market economy whilst 
maintaining the traditional values and relations between men and women.
In this chapter I shall describe Jazirah village women's dairy production and its 
contribution to the household economy. In considering the impact of regional 
economic development upon the domestic sphere, I shall examine the way in which 
women identify their production and commerce as a part of their domestic chores. The 
codes of modesty and sexual segregation determine to a much greater extent what 
women do outside the home. They must be vigilant in keeping away from personal 
contact with unrelated men during their work. These female roles and behavioural 
norms contribute to the observance of traditional relations between men and women 
within the household^)-
6.2 Women's Dairy Production
Among the twenty-one households living in Dubana, nineteen are engaged in 
animal rearing: of sheep, goats, cows, chickens and ducks. They keep different 
animals for different purposes. Chickens and ducks are kept for their eggs which
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provide food. Most households expect their sheep and cows to provide for their needs 
in milk and fuel, made of dried dung kneaded with straw and water, for heating and 
cooking. Both are needed for the household's own consumption, while market 
demand for milk provides them with the opportunity of generating cash income. The 
milking season lasts nine months throughout winter, spring and summer, with ewes 
giving milk throughout the lambing season. For three months between August and 
October ewes produce little milk.
Table 1. Household composition
Type of Household Number % People %
a) Paternal Joint 
(parents), single children 
and one married son)
3 14 30 17
b) Affinal Joint 
(one married man, 
wife and her parent)
1 5 5 3
c) Simple (one married 
man, wife and children) 17 81 137 80
Total 21 100 172 100
The household (usra) forms an independent unit of production and 
consumption. There is no co-operative labour or exchange of labour between 
households. A common budget and sharing of living space are important elements in 
defining a household as an economic unit. The household is also a unit composed of
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parents and their children. In this sense, sons and daughters who are married still keep 
their membership in their natal household. One of the married sons with his wife and 
children live in the same compound as members of his natal household in order to care 
for his old parents. The son's conjugal household and that of his parents can be 
identified as a joint household in terms of common budget and sharing living space. 
However, the villagers sometimes separate the joint household into two conjugal 
households: the son's and his parents' households. Table 1 shows that eighty percent 
of the village households are composed of parents and their children, and twenty 
percent are joint households, which include an aged parent or single brothers and 
sisters of the household heads. The villagers describe a conjugal or a joint household 
as an economic unit in which the members take responsibilities for carrying out their 
respective roles: the male household head is a representative for conducting commercial 
ventures and controls productive resources; the women cooperate for processing the 
food and milk, both of which are extracted from resources owned by the household 
head. I have examined a household in the context of the domestic economy and 
therefore, I refer to a conjugal or a joint household as one social unit defined by a 
common budget, co-operation in production and consumption, and the sharing of living 
space.
Women in each household are responsible for most of the labour involved in 
animal rearing and milk production. Men take little part in this labour. In Dubana, 
where the economic situation of the village households is similar, there is a correlation 
between flock size and household size, between flock size and the size of the female 
labour force, as well as between flock size and the occupation of household head 
(Figure 6, Figure 7). New households which are usually composed of a young 
couple and their small children are smaller and own a few ewes and cows. These are 
expected to provide for their domestic needs in dairy products and fuel. In a new 
household, the wife is the only source of labour for rearing sheep and cows, and for 
processing the milk. Throughout the developing cycle of the household, grown-up 
daughters therefore become indispensable to the labour force. When daughters reach
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thirteen, they can manage almost all the tasks of animal rearing. The more grown-up 
daughters a household contains, the larger the flock it can keep.
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The labour involved in animal rearing and milk processing within a household is 
allocated to women in accordance with the hierarchical division of labour between
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them. Age, experience and status are important criteria for this allocation. Young giris 
who mow the grass used for grazing the animals are responsible for watering, and 
bringing back the flock after a day's pasturing by the shepherd. Senior girls feed the 
animals and help their mothers in milking. Milk processing, and the making of 
yoghurt, clarified butter and cheese are the jobs only of married women requiring 
special skills. According to seniority, a young bride cannot be engaged in this work if 
there is a senior woman such as the mother-in-law or widowed sister of her husband 
living in the joint household.
Significantly, the number of animals retained in a household is affected by the 
occupation of male household head and the size of the female labour force (Figure 7). 
Households whose heads are wage earners in government establishments, or the 
private sector — such as workers in foreign companies and taxi drivers — own a 
relatively smaller number of sheep and cows than households whose heads are engaged 
only in agriculture and livestock breeding. In households of wage earners, the size of 
the female labour force influences the flock size, because male heads are not able to 
engage intensively in controlling flock size, the numbers of ewes and rams and in 
selling livestock at the daily market
Tasks related to market business are regarded as the men's role. Women are not 
allowed to participate in negotiations about prices with livestock dealers, because the 
sexual codes require that women avoid these unrelated men (ghiaib). The animal 
market thus belongs totally to the male domain. Therefore, households of waged 
labourers are more interested in rearing small numbers of cows rather than larger 
number of ewes, because a higher milk productivity is expected from the small 
numbers of cows. This means that the engagement of male heads in livestock control 
and marketing is minimized. Since milk production is the main purpose of these 
households, their livestock business is largely dependent on women's labour. The 
greater the number of women in a household, the more animals they can rear.
In households whose heads are livestock traders, the number of animals kept 
fluctuates. These heads sometimes buy lambs and cows, and keep them until they can
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make a profit on their sale in the market. This aspect of business needs the participation 
of the female labour force in the household, in order to rear these animals. We can find 
a correlation between the number of animals and the size of the female labour force in 
these households, although their purpose is different to other households in which 
dairy production takes priority.
There are two exceptional households, each of which contain only one female 
worker, but own larger numbers of animals (Figure 7); one owns ten and the other 
owns twenty-six sheep and cows. In these households females, that is, the wives, are 
not engaged in animal rearing. Their husbands contract the rearing out to others. The 
rearers receive dairy produce and the owners gain a profit by acquiring new bom 
animals and increasing the flock size, or by selling them.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 do not include the household of the Tai paramount 
sheikh who owns considerable economic resources which are not comparable to other 
commoner village households. Moreover, his female household members do not make 
up the actual labour force for his animal rearing business. He hires men from a 
neighbouring village and from Qamishly for grazing and managing his flocks, and hires 
women from a neighbouring village for dairy production.
The male role in animal rearing is to hire a shepherd for pasturing the animals 
and to control the size of the flock. Most household heads, except for the sheikh and 
the other two villagers who leave their flock with others, cooperate to draw up a 
contract of grazing with a shepherd who receives £S 25 per a month for each animal, 
instead of village males participating in grazing by themselves. The strict division of 
tasks between men and women, is evident with grazing and related work regarded as 
men's tasks, carried out outside the home, leaving women responsible for all the animal 
care in the domestic sphere. These spheres of responsibility become clear when the 
animals are brought back from the pasture. Young girls go out to the pasture in 
groups, and bring back their animals. When they arrive home, the men can help the 
girls water the animals and take them to the shed. Once the animals are back in the 
shed, the women are responsible for all the remaining tasks pertaining to the animals.
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6.3 Women's Market Activities and Domestic Economy
Dairy products are brought to Qamishly market by middle-aged wives who set 
off in a pick-up truck in groups in the early morning, along with their loads. How 
often they go to the market depends on the amount of dairy produce they obtain from 
their animals and on their daily food shopping needs. Because of the respect for 
seniority, single women are not allowed to deal with the selling of dairy produce. 
Senior daughters go to the market instead of their mothers when the latter are sick, but 
younger daughters can never replace their senior sisters.
The women in Dubana sell milk and dairy products to one particular shop with 
which their household heads have reached an agreement. Women bring their produce to 
the shop and are paid for it. The shopkeeper is a Kurdish man who belongs to a 
different social category from the Shawaya villagers in Dubana. Thus, he is an 
unrelated man, gharib, to these women and is out of bounds to them without 
permission of their household head. Even though their household heads are not directly 
selling the product to the shop, male intervention in the contract confirms to both the 
men and women that the women's commercial activity is carried out with male consent. 
By authorising their women in this commercial deal, male household heads can keep 
control over products and their women's activity.
Women spend almost all their income from the sale of dairy produce on the 
provision of the household's daily diet. These is a range of foods which women 
purchase: vegetables, meat, bread, spaghetti, a few luxuries, such as fruit, sweets, 
tobacco and ice-cream, if they are able to afford it. Women buy food only for daily 
consumption. The basics of the diet, such as salt, sugar, flour, rice and tea, and other 
important necessities such as clothing, paraffin-oil, coal for the stove and propane gas 
for cooking facilities, are bought by household heads.
Household expenditure on food and domestic consumption of dairy produce are 
impossible to ascertain. The estimates I was given were unreliable because of the high 
value give to the appearance of conspicuous consumption in Qamishly society. I have 
thus presented my own estimates of what I believe to be the women's income from the
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sale of dairy products and income earned from other activities, based on my own 
observations as well as my informants' statements.
My examples are of the incomes of three households, including income from 
dairy products in April 1990 ( see Table 2). Spring is the season during which they 
can expect plentiful milk supplies. The type of cow largely affects the level of 
productivity, and therefore, the number of rearing cows in a household does not 
necessarily correlate to the volume of milk products. I show the contribution of dairy 
production to the household monthly income by presenting income from other sources.
Household A is composed of a couple and seven children; there are only two 
women, the wife and her daughter of thirteen, who has not gone to school and works 
for the household. The household head is an employee of a foreign road construction 
company. His monthly salary is £S2,500. They rear two cows and one male calf; one 
cow and the calf are owned by the household head and the other cow belongs to his 
wife, who was given it by her father. The wife sells milk and yoghurt to the market 
shop every three days and her monthly income is approximately £S 490. She 
has additional income from selling soft drinks and ice-cream to the villagers, mainly to 
small children. She makes a profit of £S 60 a month.
The head of household A has two married brothers, who make up independent 
households. These brothers divide the wheat crop equally from the land left to them 
by their deceased father who took it on lease from the government. Their crop was 125 
sacks. According to the villagers' accounts of the relation between agricultural land 
size and wheat seed needed for cultivation, one sack of wheat (100 -120 kilograms of 
wheat per a sack) is required for seeding ten dwanurn (single: dunorri). These brothers 
said that they needed eighteen sacks of wheat for their land. They harvested wheat 
seven times the amount of seed required for their land. The price of wheat per 
kilogram in 1990 was £S8.5. The income of these three brothers' households from the 
wheat crop was £S 116,875. After deducting the cost of seed, the actual income of 
household A was £S33,348.
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Table 2. Household income, composition and flock size in April 1990
i) Household Income
Household A B C
Dairy Produce 
(Value in Syrian 
Pound)
490 2,100 3,917
Agricultural Crop 38,958/year* 
=3,247/month
18,700/year 
= 1,558/month
Agricultural 
Seasonal Labour
9,000/year
=750/month
9,600/year 
=800/month
12,000/year 
=1,000/month
Animal Sales ---- 6,600/year 
= 550/month
Sale of Soft Drinks 
and Ice-cream
60 ----
Employment 2,500 2,500
Total 7,047 5,600 7,025
Income from Dairy 
Produce/
Household Income
(%)
7 38 56
ii) Household Composition
Father 1 1 1
Mother 1 1 1
Son (under 13 y.o.) 5(2) 4(1) 6(4)
Daughter 
(under 13)
2(1) 3(0) 4(0)
Total 9(3) 9(1) 12(4)
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iii) Flock Size
Sheep 5 17
Cattle 3 5 3
Goat - - 15
Total 3 10 35
* All the income from agriculture was spent on the marriage of a brother of the head of household A. 
The bride price (£S100,000) and cost of the wedding reception were paid for by the crop income of A 
and A's brothers (£S 116,875).
Agricultural seasonal labour is another source of income. The wife in household 
A worked as a supervisor of female labourers for the cotton harvest. Her three sons 
worked as recorders, writing down the amount of cotton gathered by each labourer. 
Their total income was £S9,000. The income generated by women's dairy produce in 
this month makes up around seven percent of the total household income.
Household B is composed of nine people: a couple and seven children. Their 
three daughters are over thirteen. Four women are engaged in the rearing of five cows 
and five ewes. Their income from the sale of dairy produce was approximately £S 
2,100 a month. This income covers the cost of most daily food for the household. The 
income represents thirty-eight percent of the monthly cash income of Household B.
The household head is a worker at a petrol station and his salary is £S2,500 per a 
month. He has agricultural land equivalent to three sacks for seeding. Because of the 
shortage of rainfall in winter they had a small barley crop in 1990. They harvested only 
three sacks, which is the same amount of barley which they consumed for seeding. 
They stored this for feeding the animals the following winter. I do not therefore 
include this crop in the household income.
Income of Household B from agricultural seasonal labour is earned mainly by the 
two younger daughters working in the cotton harvest and weeding the wheat field (the 
eldest daughter has a bad leg and cannot work in the fields). The cotton harvest takes
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around thirty-five days from the middle of September to the middle of October. Work 
is often disturbed by rainfall which usually starts from the beginning of October. 
Wages are paid according to the amount of cotton which each person gathers. A 
woman gathers between eighty to a hundred kilograms of cotton a day. The wage is 
£S1.5 per a kilogram. A woman's income from the cotton harvest is approximately 
£S3,500. Girls work at weeding the wheat fields for ten days from the end of May to 
the beginning of June. Their wage is £S50 per a day. The two daughters of 
Household B together earn a total of £S8,000 as agricultural seasonal labourers. 
Household B's two sons were engaged in work controlling the flow of water to the 
cotton irrigation canal in June and in supervising female labourers weeding the wheat 
fields. Their total income was £S 1,600.
Household C is composed of twelve persons. With one son conscripted into the 
army, the actual number of persons in the household in 1990 was eleven. The 
household head was engaged in agricultural and livestock breeding. Household C's 
income was derived from the thirty-five acre wheat fields, and the sale of sheep and 
dairy products.
Household C's wheat crop in 1990 was small. Their land requires fourteen 
sacks of seed, and they harvested only forty sacks of wheat and paid half of the crop to 
their sharecropper who had provided the seeds and cultivated the land. Household C's 
income from agriculture was £S18,700. Household C's three daughters worked as 
seasonal labourers harvesting cotton, and earned £S12,000.
Household C's flock was composed of seventeen sheep, fifteen goats and three 
cows, controlled by the household head. Most of the goats reared by this household are 
owned by others. This household only receives their dairy produce. During the two 
years of my research, the flock size did not grow. Animal mortality is quite low, and 
there was no killing of lambs for meat or sacrifice. Aged ewes are sold and replaced by 
ewes bom the year before. Only one male lamb is reserved as replacement for the 
mature ram. Household C sold six sheep in 1990. The price of sheep, which differs
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according to its age and sex, was between £S 1,000 and £S 1,200. Their income from 
sheep sales was approximately £S6,600.
Consumption of dairy products, such as cheese and clarified butter, was affected 
by household size and its economic situation. As I observed, members of Household 
C ate more dairy products in comparison to the other households. Since Household C 
did not have a regular cash income from a salary and depended on income from 
agriculture and animal breeding, their household economy was more precarious 
compared to that of households whose heads earned cash income from sources other 
than agriculture and livestock. Because Household C owned nine ewes and three cows, 
and reared fourteen nanny-goats and three cows, their monthly income from dairy 
products was approximately £S3,917.
These three households are representative of the other animal rearing households 
in Dubana. The heads of both Household A and B are salaried workers and have an 
income other than from agricultural or animal breeding. Among twenty-one household 
heads in Dubana, seventeen are either employed or self-employed. Most of them have 
lease-hold agricultural land, which was allocated to them by the government, or which 
they inherited from their fathers. The size of these fields does not exceed fifty acres. 
The size of land is not always correlated to the amount of crop. These villagers cannot 
afford to invest money in irrigation, and therefore the crop is highly influenced by 
levels of precipitation. Their income from agriculture fluctuates annually, depending on 
the weather.
The economic situation of Household A and B is similar. They earn the same 
amount of salary. Household B had a poor crop of barley in 1990 because of the lack 
of precipitation. They farm a plot of 7.5 acres, which is smaller than the field held by 
Household A, which retains one third of 45 acres. Household B, however, rears more 
animals than Household A. As shown in Figure 3, a correlation is found between 
numbers of animals and the size of the female labour force in these examples. 
Household A contains only two females and so owns only two cows. Household B
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contains four females and is able to rear ten livestock. Household B is therefore more 
dependant on income from dairy products than Household A.
For Household C, whose head has no income other than from agriculture and 
animal breeding, dairy production is its most important source of income. There are 
only three household heads in Dubana among commoner villagers who are fully 
engaged in agriculture and livestock breeding. Household C is one such example. The 
amount of income from dairy products represents Fifty-six percent of the household's 
monthly income. As the household head only arranges agricultural and commercial 
contracts and controls flock size, household C is largely dependant on female labour 
and the income generated by it
Even though the social ideal of men as bread winners for their household is 
dominant in society, the women's contribution to the household economy has become 
greater in accordance with the size of the female labour force and the degree of the 
household's dependence on animal breeding. The villagers' daily diet, whose 
ingredients the women buy in the market, costs £S80 per a day for an average 
household size of nine persons. Income from the sale of dairy products covers most of 
the expense of daily food in Households B and C.
Going to the market regularly to sell their dairy products in order to buy 
provisions with the money earned seems to provide women with relative freedom. 
They can get satisfaction from providing the food for their household, and even sweets 
and small gifts for their children, when they can afford to. They are able to move freely 
in the market, in order to make their purchases, in the company of other women. The 
atmosphere on these excursions is relaxed; they are not reprimanded for having contact 
with individual men and women in carrying out their tasks in the market. (4) It is still 
vital to avoid encountering strange men, but the women are not shy when dealing with 
shopkeepers and their husbands' friends.
Retaining this limited control over dairy production, enjoying the relative 
freedom to decide what is bought daily, and participating in activities alongside 
unrelated men, are all carried out by the women without threatening their sexual
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honour. This is not to say that on their outings women can be independently involved 
in trade. Nor can their participation in this trade be admitted by the traditional value 
system. The sexual code that requires women to avoid unrelated men, prevents these 
women from being independent traders. This code restricts women's commercial 
contacts and even prevents them from making contracts with the shopkeeper to whom 
they sell the dairy produce. Trade requires personal agreement and confidence between 
business partners and the sexual code does not allow women to be involved in such 
personal relations with unrelated men. Women can however sell their produce only at a 
particular shop with which their husbands have made contracts. Women can buy 
expensive items, such as meat, on credit, but only at particular shops. Such trade 
between the shopkeepers and their customers, the village women, is based on personal 
confidence between the merchants and these women's husbands.
Male support proves that women's contact with unrelated men in the course of 
trading does not relate to any sexual desire (raghba). If asked whether women consider 
it shameful Caib) to speak to a shepherd or market trader, the women immediately 
reply, “it is my father/husband who has allowed me to participate in this activity”. 
Women clearly have no power to protect themselves from others' base judgement of 
their contacts with unrelated men. They cannot acquire self-respect in their contacts 
with unrelated men even for purely commercial purposes, without the permission of 
male household heads. Men's involvement in commercial contracts is a political 
manoeuvre aimed at maintaining male authority over their women through controlling 
their commercial activities outside the home. Women show obedience to male authority 
and acquire men's consent to their activities. Obedience to male authority means 
women's public display of their sexual virtue and modesty.
Women, as animal rearers, milkers, milk processors and milk sellers, turn most 
of the animal products into valuable sustenance. Men prepare a means to convert this 
sustenance into commercial products. Women's dairy produce is largely reliant on the 
market, due to the high price their products now fetch, and is extracted from productive 
resources which are owned by household heads. Most of the sheep and cows acquired
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in the market or through personal commercial contracts are owned or controlled by 
fathers, brothers or husbands. Women do not make contracts with the owners of 
livestock to rear their animals, nor do they inherit livestock, except as occasional 
presents from their fathers. In Dubana, only two women had received such presents; 
each had received a cow from her father. Yet, even these women do not seem to 
derive any benefit from their ownership of livestock other than as insurance for the 
future. Their animals are treated in the same way as those which belong to their 
household heads. Income from their animal is consumed in the same way as that from 
animals owned by the household head. This male control over resources allows them to 
control women's productive activities (Meillassoux, 1984: 44-8). Men are owners of 
livestock and the produce extracted. Women have no right to any commercial gain 
extracted from the produce, even though it is the fruits of their labour. Women do not 
insist that income from dairy produce is their own. It is yielded by both men's and 
women's complementary skills contributing to the household economy.
Women's acceptance of male control over activities creates the illusion that their 
economic activity is under the full control of male authority. The villagers, both men 
and women, understand that women control their special tasks in animal production. 
They are responsible for all the tasks in which they are involved, and do not submit to 
men in activities in their sphere. They are responsible for the work of production and 
consumption in the household and therefore women's animal rearing and its produce 
processing activities are regarded by both men and women as part of the activities of the 
domestic domain. Women's role here is to participate in activities constituting the 
household as a unit providing sustenance.
Women's activities in the market place are also regarded as a part of this process. 
Thus, income generated by the sale of dairy products must only be spent on daily food. 
Women's activities in the public arena are transformed into domestic tasks, regardless 
of their economic contribution to the household. Their economic activities become an 
extension of their female role within the relationship between men and women in the 
household, insofar as they are evaluated in terms of whether or not they carry out
200
female roles (Stroller, 1968: 10). They assess their own economic contribution by 
saying that “livestock business has brought 'us' improvement in 'our' life”. They use 
communal 'us' or 'our' which imply that their work is conducted within a male-female 
interdependent relationship within the household for the sake of benefit to all its 
members.
Since sustaining the household economically underpins men's prestige, the 
women should be respectful to this male role as bread winners (Ortner & Whitehead, 
1981:19). The cognition of their activities as domestic and the acceptance of male 
control over productive resources and their products, display women's respect to men 
and their respective roles. Women's involvement in a market economy does not 
undermine this male role. Women also pay respect to male authority to arrange 
contracts with unrelated men in the course of their production and trading, and admit 
control over the products. Women's acceptance of male authority brings them a good 
social reputation and self-esteem: they carry out the female role well within the 
household; showing their obedience to male authority proves respect for sexual 
modesty, even though they work in the market. In these respects, it may be said that 
women need to act in collusion with men to reproduce their own subordinate position in 
the relations between men and women within the household (Kandiyoti, 1991: 34). 
Women themselves do not think that they are submitting to men, even though they 
acknowledge restrictions imposed on them in the course of their animal production and 
trading. They think that different roles are allocated to both men and women.
I have heard no accounts of women who went against male control over animals 
and their products. A woman who is engaged in animal rearing, daily production or 
purchase of daily necessities thinks that she takes responsibility of all her work and has 
a free hand in it. No one, even her household head, can intrude on her business. 
Women in Dubana say; “the only role which my husband/father takes in the livestock 
business is to bring income to our household”. Women acknowledge the male role of 
converting animal produce into cash, because they respect the fact that this role is
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allocated to men in their household alongside their own work which contributes to 
welfare of their household members.
Income from livestock products is obtained by male-female cooperation within a 
household. Women assess their contribution as an improvement in their life achieved 
through the business. Improvement of their life signifies the welfare of their household 
members in terms of the economic condition of the household and the richer provisions 
which women can directly provide to their household members. Moreover, male-female 
cooperation in livestock business provides one of the economic bases with which these 
commoner tribal members can claim their economic independence of the tribal sheikhs.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
Different approaches are often taken by ethnographers to the issue of social 
restrictions and obligations imposed on women, and their reactions towards these 
constraints (e.g. Abu-Lughod, 1985, 1990; Azari, 1983;, 1977; Olsen, 1985). 
Although the premise of these approaches is that social obligations lead to women's 
individuality being subordinated, women are also caught in a dilemma between 
fulfilment of these obligations and accomplishment of their personal wishes. Women's 
struggle with the dual objectives of ensuring their own and their family's honour and 
position in society have seldom been systematically investigated. The approach taken 
in this thesis is firstly, to investigate how women label themselves as members of 
particular groups. When they label themselves according to an ethnic or sectarian 
identity, they insist on their shared group characteristics in order to distinguish 
themselves from other group members. Members of each ethnic or sectarian group 
share ideas as to how members of other groups hold particular characteristics which are 
different from their own.
Among the Tai, the commoner tribal members label themselves as those who 
used to be slave followers ( 'abld) of the tribal sheikhs. Most commoners wish to 
liberate themselves from this subordinate position to the sheikhs. Commoners in 
Dubana try to describe social exchanges between themselves and the paramount sheikh 
as those between equals. They apply the principle of 'brotherhood' relations between 
tribes to their relations to the sheikhs, obliging the sheikh to accept their voluntary 
respect in return for his political influence.
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Individuals are obliged to carry out particular roles and social obligations in order 
to identify themselves as members of particular groups. As discussed throughout this 
thesis, women are obliged to follow restrictions based on the relation between men and 
women in order to establish their social position. The second aspect of my approach to 
Jazirah women is that a woman must present herself as honourable (sharifa): sexually 
modest and obedient to male authority over her. Women are often in a dilemma 
between being sharifa and accomplishing individual wishes to be free from restrictions 
implied by being an honourable woman'. Expressions of emotion and comprehension 
of this social duty and obligation through narratives and actual behaviour tell us how 
women struggle with the dual objectives of ensuring their own and their family's 
honour and expressing themselves as individuals. The Syrian scholar, Na'Im al-Yafi, 
suggests that problems related to Muslim women's social position are created not by 
Islamic thought, but by their relations with men, where women bind themselves to the 
men's oppressive hold over women and sacrifice their freedom by acting in collusion 
with men (al-Yafi, 1985: 6,36,72, 83). In Jazirah, I have argued that women often 
criticise the social restrictions being imposed on them. Despite their reluctance to 
consent to these restrictions, women try to show obedience to male authority and to 
their own chastity, by which they protect both their own honour and that of male family 
members. Social acknowledgement for women who possess honourable characteristics 
is the route to acquiring self-respect and also to defining women's role in their relation 
to men.
The approach taken in this thesis is thirdly, to find out how personal 
characteristics and problems affect the honour of one's relatives or group members. 
The data presented here show that the different groups in Jazirah, despite clearly 
distinguishing between themselves in terms of ethnic, religious or class relations, share 
common ideas of honour linked to female sexual virtue. Loss of sexual honour, 
especially for single women, brings great shame not only to herself, but also to the 
woman's family. Evaluations of a woman's sexual actions by others in society have the 
moral force to attribute to her the possession of a strong sexual appetite (raghha) and
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also to dishonour to male members in her family who do not have the ability to control 
her behaviour. Such social evaluation of women's sexual actions can ruin the honour 
and self-respect of all family members for generations. Sexual misconduct damages the 
social reputation of a woman's female family members, because they are regarded by 
others in society as possessors of the same characteristics. The male family members 
are obliged to inflict punishment on her lover or his family in order to prove themselves 
as men who respect male honour.
The ideas of women's sexual honour prevent women from extra-marital 
relationships and marriage between men and women from different religious groups. 
The ideas of honour are repeated in widely known stories of prohibited relationships. 
These stories tell that unrelated men are potential threats to women's sexual virtue. This 
understanding is shared in common by all the groups in society. The Christians regard 
Kurdish men as potential threats to Christian women, because the Christians regard the 
Kurds as inclined to assault Christian women's sexual virtue as a means of venting 
their political hostility towards the Christians. The Christians construct this discourse 
with reference to historical precedents, namely when Christian women were sexually 
assaulted by Kurds during the political conflicts between them at the beginning of this 
century in Turkish Anatolia. The Christians apply their history to contemporary 
concerns that they may be regarded by the Kurds as a political opponents, and are 
hence at risk of Kurdish attack. The Christians also depict the Shawaya and Kurdish 
character as violent, avenging a male lover who has dishonoured their women's sexual 
virtue. The Christians regard such violent characteristics as evidence of Shawaya and 
Kurdish dispositions ( tabai) of backwardness (mutakhallij) and inhumanity. These 
group dispositions are regarded as shared characteristics among the Kurds and 
Shawaya. The Christians apply these group dispositions to individual Kurds and 
Shawaya when judging their behaviour.
This view, however, is emerging at a time when the Christians are losing their 
superior economic and political identity as the advanced urban middle class. This is 
because the increased economic and educational opportunities are enabling rural
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Shawaya and Kurds to acquire a similar status to the Christians in the urban sphere. 
The Christians' efforts at reconstituting their status by using criteria differentiating 
themselves from the others, lead them to attribute inferior characteristics to the Shawaya 
and Kurds. The Shawaya and Kurds in turn reinforce their traditional premises that 
vengeance is an admirable way of showing respect to their personal, family and group 
honour. For Kurds and Shawaya, Christians are a weak minority who are not able to 
take vengeance, because of their fear of counterattack by Kurds and Shawaya. Such 
labelling of group characteristics creates hostility between these groups. The hostility 
reinforces fear of sexual assault by men from other groups. This view confines 
women's activities outside the home and reinforces norms of gender segregation.
Others in society evaluate women's behaviour with reference to the ideas of 
honour related to female sexual virtue and what roles women play in their relations to 
men in their family. Women cannot avoid encounter with unrelated men in everyday 
life, especially when they work and visit their kin and friends. There are frequent 
possibilities for women to be judged by others as having sought sexual contact with 
men. If it is judged that a woman's behaviour is such that she is seeking to satisfy her 
sexual appetite, what she fears is that she might be regarded as a woman who is 
unaware of what constitutes an honourable woman. Since this is regarded as her 
personal characteristics (tabi'a), she loses both the social and self-respect that is 
acquired by social acknowledgement of her behaviour.
Women sometimes criticise this social view, because it becomes a social force 
which confines their activities enormously. They understand however that it is not only 
men, but also women themselves who bolster this view of the behavioural norms of an 
honourable woman (sharifa). Women slander other women's behaviour which does not 
satisfy the norms of sharifa, with the intention of contrasting their own rationality and 
good character. In this competition between women, women fear that other women 
may interpret their behaviour as suggestive of sexual action.
Matters relating to married women's sexual virtue are regarded as personal 
problems between a husband and his wife. Others, both men and women, do not give
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advice to either the husband or wife, because the autonomy of the couple must be 
respected. Even in cases of single women who are gossiped about as having had 
contact with men, only the women's family members are regarded as being responsible 
for these women's misconduct. Women other than their family members rarely 
comment on these women's actions, nor do men interfere, because such interference 
would undermine the authority of the woman's male kin. To understand how men 
should behave in order to keep their authority over their women, or how honourable 
women behave, is the responsibility of each individual. To respect one's own honour is 
at the same time to be responsible for one's family honour.
Since the respect of another's autonomy does not allow others' intervention into 
personal or family matters, it leads to the isolation of individuals. Each individual 
experiences increased anxiety about what others might say about him/her. In order to 
acquire a good social reputation and affirmation of one's own behaviour, women often 
force themselves to accomplish their social duties (wajibat) and to accept social 
obligations (ijbai). Whether they do this willingly, or by force, finds expression in 
their everyday language. For example, mulzim, lazim, and ijbar are all used to express 
duty to obey the social order. While ijbar expresses submission to social regulations 
and evaluations, regardless of one's own will, mnlzim expresses a willingness to 
support the order more than lazim. Women thus experience great difficulty in trying to 
free themselves from the norms of sharifa and the relations between men and women 
within a family, if they wish to survive in social competition and protect their own and 
their family's social reputation.
Because of women's need to establish an honourable identity, they bind 
themselves to the presentation of themselves as chaste and obedient to male authority in 
their family. Women's personal vulnerability, which is caused by the dilemma between 
obedience to the decisions of their family and their wishes to go against such decisions, 
frequently emerges in their conversations over the choice of spouse, and the prohibition 
of sexual encounter outside marriage, or regarding marriage between different religious
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communities. These stories illustrate the narrator's dissatisfaction and that of the 
audience with women's obligatory submission to family decisions.
The dilemma of facing a social reality which deprives women of the right to 
decide their own lives drives women to seek romance. This is because love between a 
man and a woman based on mutual respect and mutual understanding is regarded as the 
ideal (cf. Abu-Lughod, 1993; 229-31; Davis and Davis, 1989: 118). For women, the 
dilemma between constructing an honourable self and liberating oneself from its 
obligations is, to some extent, resolved by fantasies of romance. Married women often 
talk in private about their own marriage as if it were based on love, even if their 
marriage was in fact arranged by their family by taking account of marriage regulations, 
economic and social equality between the bride and bride-groom's families, and 
personal characteristics of the principals. Single women secretly express to their 
intimate friends their fantasies of romance for, or covert meetings with, unrelated men. 
Women, however, do not try to subvert the dominant ideology of respect for family 
decisions about their marriage. They try to justify fantasies of romance as the means for 
resolving their dilemma, that is expression of their individual wishes and their 
adherence to the norms of an honourable woman's behaviour. Furthermore, they 
maintain that meeting with men does not threaten their honour as long as it is not 
exposed. Actual contact with men, however, frightens women, because the possibility 
of exposure in public becomes a threat to their own and their family's reputation.
One of the most important problems in Jazirah society is class differences 
between tribal sheikhs and commoner tribal members. Tribal sheikhs had risen to 
positions of power when they began to seek commercial gain in agricultural business 
by cultivating wheat and cotton, and so monopolised former tribal territory as their own 
land. They integrated their economic means, and increased their political power as 
leaders involved in the region's ethnic or sectarian conflicts until the 1950s. Commoner 
tribal members understand that the sheikhly status has been constituted in Jazirah 
history, and that the sheikhs' monopolisation of economic and political means was the 
foundation for the enslavement of commoner tribal members. The Syrian land reform
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and regional economic development, which brought relative economic independence to 
commoner tribal members from the sheikhs, enabled the former to seek liberation from 
the status of slavery followers ( 'abid). 'Brotherhood' relations in tribal structure also 
invigorates egalitarian relations between the sheikhs and commoner tribal members.
TheTai is a tribal confederation in which alliance between tribes (a&han) among 
the Tai is described as 'brotherhood' relations, which are those between equals. The 
alliance of the tribes to the 'Asaf tribe, within which the position of the Tai paramount 
sheikh is passed down, constitutes the commoners' association with the paramount 
sheikh. Tribal members respect the political ability of the 'Asaf, who took on the role of 
political leaders in Jazirah history. This political authority becomes a disposition 
(tabl'a) of the 'Asaf, which is passed down from their ancestors. Tribal members also 
insist that the 'Asaf is one of the tribes among the fiai with reference to 'brotherhood' 
relations between the tribes. In this respect, relations between the 'Asaf and other 
tribes can be regarded as those between equals.
Members of each tribe believe that they share patrilineal genealogy and therefore 
their relations are defined as those between patrilineal kin. This definition indicates that 
these kin share membership of a group in the system of tribal segmentation. Their 
kinship relations are referred to by using kinship categories, such as qaraib, ibn 'anun 
and ukhuwa. Each category indicates genealogical distance between people who are 
involved in the relations. These group categories have meaning in opposition to their 
complementary groups. For example, when relationships between members are 
classified as ibn 'amm, they set another ibn 'amm group on the same level of 
segmentary opposition. These kin are able to keep close relations by carrying out social 
obligations of 'mutual support'. Meanwhile relations between tribes among theTai are 
not defined by kinship relations. Social exchanges between people from different tribes 
are understood as obligations between allied tribes, based on either egalitarian 
'brotherhood' relations, or patronage, shown in the relation between commoner tribal 
members and the sheikhs from the 'Asaf tribe.
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In the light of the transformation of relations between commoners and the 
paramount sheikh, religious ceremonies contribute to the enhancement of the 
commoners' egalitarian attitude. Women take the important roles in giving Islamic 
meaning to mourning ceremonies as domestic rituals. The women acknowledge the 
suffering of living people caused by the death as a trial of God. They direct themselves 
to the religious aspect of the ritual which can make for the redemption of the deceased 
and the bringing of God's blessing (khair) to him/her soul. Women's performance 
shows the process of their understanding that the fate of the soul of the deceased is 
determined by God. It becomes apparent through women's ceremonial performance 
that petition for God's favour for domestic benefit leads the community to the fulfilment 
of their Islamic devotion to God. Mourning rituals are intertwined with acts offering 
dedication to God as a means of showing devotion to God.
All household heads in Dubana can host mourning ceremonies and fulfil their 
religious duty through the dedication of animals to God and the sharing of the 
ceremonial meat dish with their guests, thereby showing devotion to God. These 
religious symbols used in mourning ceremonies are the same as those used in formal 
rituals in Islamic feasts held by the sheikh. In this framework, the commoners can 
achieve their duty as Muslims.
As a social action, relations between the host and guests are those of unequals 
during the ceremony. The guests put themselves in a position where they can receive 
their host's hospitality (diyafa), through which the guests obtain the right to receive 
both religious khair and food. Guests confirm the host's political ability to offer the 
prestigious meat dish. In domestic rituals, neighbouring households invite each other, 
and today's host will be tomorrow's guest in another ceremony held by his/her 
neighbouring household. Since this exchange is reciprocal, status relations between 
neighbours, even the sheikh and the commoner villagers, are those of equals.
On Islamic feasts, the sheikh can show his wealth and affluence by offering food 
and meat to his village neighbours. His affluence designates religious blessing {khair) 
and welfare brought to him by God. The sheikh gives beneficence to his poor
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neighbours by offering food and meat, and this act will be blessed by God. From the 
view point of the commoners, their respect for the sheikh is derived from admitting the 
sheikh's access to religious khair, to which they can also gain access through their 
hospitality as hosts in domestic rituals. The commoners' religious and political ability 
reduces status difference between themselves and the sheikh. The commoners accept 
the sheikh's economic, political and religious ability through identifying the act as the 
sheikh's hospitality (diyafa) which calls for the commoners' voluntary 
acknowledgement of his political power on the basis of their alliance to the sheikh in the 
structure of the Tai confederation. The sheikh acquires respect and honour, which is 
men's ideal quality for holding political power admired in the Tai tribal members, and 
these personal dispositions reinforce his political influence.
As the relations between the paramount sheikh and the commoner tribal members 
are reconstituted in the discourse on religious ceremonies, so the meaning of 
agricultural labour in the sheikh's fields has also transformed their relations. 
Commoner women working in the sheikh's fields do not consider themselves as 
entering into a position of slave labourers ( 'abld) of the sheikh, even though their 
labour is used to symbolise their inferior status to the sheikh. Families of these female 
labourers, especially the household heads, who have responsibility for their women's 
activities but cannot directly control them while they work, respect the political 
authority of the sheikh and commit their women to him. The women's sexual honour 
is not spoiled by their engagement in work with unrelated men outside the home, 
because any offence to their sexual virtue would dishonour the sheikh and suggest a 
political challenge to him. In this discourse, the female workers and their families can 
protect their honour related to women's sexual virtue, without putting themselves in the 
position of enslavement to the sheikh. Women acquire opportunities to engage in 
work, but accept the authority of their household heads. They constitute an alliance 
with the sheikh based on the structure of the Tai confederation. The sheikh acquires 
respect and honour in return, which enhance his personal dispositions ( tabai). These 
dispositions in turn enhance his political authority.
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Showing sexual modesty and respect for male authority within the family is 
necessary for women to be engaged in work outside the home. Women's economic 
activity must be conducted on the condition that it does not threaten their sexual virtue 
and men's role as bread winners. Income from animal rearing and dairy products 
generated with enormous labour contribution by women, is consumed to provide 
sustenance to all the household members. Ownership of livestock and the income 
generated from it, symbolise economic independence from the sheikh. Women insist 
on the importance of these economic resources for their liberation from the 'abid 
status. Women do not recognise their work, for which they receive acknowledgement 
as their economic contribution to the households. All female tasks involving the rearing 
of animals, the processing of dairy products, their sale in the market, and the buying of 
foodstuffs with the income from the dairy products, are part of the process of providing 
food to the household. It is men who are the owners of animals and the produce 
extracted from them, while women only contribute to the processing. Women conceive 
of their activities as domestic, accept male control over the property and products, 
thereby involving themselves in economic activities based on respect for the male role 
as breadwinners for his household members.
Women respect the authority of their household head in arranging their trade with 
unrelated market traders. Through this arrangement, these household heads can retain 
their control over these women's trading activities. Acceptance of male authority, 
which means to show obedience and chastity to male family members, gives a woman 
the self-confidence to act without fearing that she may be judged as behaving with 
sexual intent. Male members in their family can preserve their honour through these 
women's sexual modesty. These women's trading therefore do not threaten their own 
or their family's honour.
Strategies used for differentiating their own ethnic or religious group from 
others, and for overcoming class differences among the tribes, give rise to local 
discourses over constituting social positions which respect their own and their group 
honour in terms of female sexual virtue and gender roles. Such social obligations
should be carried out in order to constitute their position in society as members of 
groups. As far as women want to keep their position in society, the behavioural norms 
of an honourable woman (sharifa) oblige them to confine their activities. Sharifa is a 
disposition attributed to individual women, which influences both the honour of her 
family and even that of the ethnic or sectarian group. Since autonomy and 
independence of each individual is respected, no one intrudes on others' private 
matters, even though they are gossiped about behind their back. The codes of sharifa 
confine each woman's social and economic activities and define her role in the relation 
between men and women, because a woman owes responsibility to her family's 
honour.
Among the Tai, both men and women take interdependent roles to reduce tension 
in relations with the tribal sheikhs. Ritual ceremonies in Dubana oblige the paramount 
sheikh to accept voluntary respect for his religious and political position from the male 
commoners. The role of women in giving domestic rituals the meaning of Islamic 
devotion to God, makes it possible for commoners insist on their fulfilment of Muslim 
duty in the similar ways to the sheikh.
Agricultural work and animal business give women opportunities to be involved 
in economic activities. Women's participation in such work makes much of the 
interdependence of the men's and women's spheres. Men and women cooperate for 
the welfare of their household, and politically acquire the means whereby they can 
establish their independence from the sheikh. However, the right conferred on men to 
control women's activities, in order to protect their sexual virtue, allows them to 
intervene in women's decision making as to their activities and confines women's 
autonomy.
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Notes
Chapter one
1. Spiro suggests that anthropology needs to develop a cross-cultural theory. He 
warns contemporary cultural relativism that "the processes that characterise the working 
of human mind are the same everywhere - even though human cultures are different 
• • • there are certain psychological criteria by which such judgements can be made" 
(Spiro, 1984: 327). This discussion is interesting. However, to discuss whether or 
not the minds of people in different Middle Eastern societies work in accordance with 
the same principle, despite the structural differences in their cultures, is beyond the 
topic of my present discussion and my ability.
2. The name Shawaya is used to refer to Muslim rural peasants by the Christians and 
Kurds in order to differentiate Christians from themselves in terms of religion, and 
from Kurds in terms of ethnicity. Shawaya refer to themselves as Arab peasants. See 
chapter 2.
3. D1 Andrade suggests that a cognitive schema is not just a recognition device. It 
permits a range of possibilities to constitute various interpretations and consists of 
various elements which are activated for someone by producing interpretations. "Not 
all parts of the total schema could be likely to produce conscious interpretations at any 
one time, but all would have the potential of doing so under the right conditions 
(D'Andrade, 1992: 52-3).
4. There are small numbers of Jews living in the town of Qamishly. According to 
Friedman these are estimated at between 120 to 300 (Friedman, 1989: 95) and their 
numbers are decreasing because of emigration abroad. Even though their population is 
small, local Jews are still recognised as a group when Qamishly inhabitants divide 
themselves into ethnic or religious groups. I however, do not include Jews as a unit of 
my study. The main reason for this is political sensitivity and prevalent views that have 
been constructed by Qamishly populations other than the Jews in evaluating position of 
local Jews in society. Any contact with the Jewish inhabitants would have made it 
difficult for me to carry out my research among the Christians, Shawaya and Kurds. 
The political utility of hostile feelings to Israel in the context of national politics invokes 
emphasising the role of a Syrian nation and allegiance of non-Jewish Syrian citizens 
(Pipes, 1990: 186-7). There are moments of official demonstration, such as the march 
in memory of the 1973 War, including school children and employees of the 
government sectors, when this official ideology makes sense for Qamishly inhabitants 
to demand consideration for their social role against Israel. In the local context, local 
Jews become a target for other inhabitants to project their hostility to Israel (e.g. 
Friedman, 1989: 95-100). Qamishly inhabitants other than the Jews create antagonism 
towards Jewishness by their understandings of local Jews as Israeli supporters. For 
example, in October 1989, there was a widely spread story that a Syrian Jew working 
as an Israeli spy in Syria, had stolen a Syrian military plan and fled to Israel with secret 
information. All his family members who remained in Syria were arrested and 
sentenced to death. This kind of story encourages Qamishly inhabitants to identify 
local Jews as Israeli supporters. According to the press, the pilot was a major of the 
Syrian Air Force and was not a Jew. Israeli officials said the pilot had defected, but 
Syrian officials insisted that he had been forced to make an emergency landing (Times.
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12 October 1989; Diehl, 12 October 1989). In Qamishly however, bias against local 
Jews created the distorted story.
Chapter Two
1. One Syrian dunom is equivalent to 0.25 acres, which is approximately 1,000 
square meters (Warriner, 1957: 91).
2. The Syrian Central Bank uses both Lira in Arabic, and Syrian pound in English, as 
the currency unit. I use £S as an abbreviation of Syrian pound, following Warriner 
(1957) and Perthes (1992). The Syrian pound's official exchange rate of £S11 to one 
Us dollar on 31 December 1987 and commercial rate of £S22 to one US dollar taken in 
1989, were abolished in 1991. The rate of £S42 to one US dollar has been spread over 
a broader variety of imports. I use $ as an abbreviation of US dollar.
3. I use the term peasant(s), fallah (plural: fallahun), as one who gets part of his/her 
living by cultivating land that he/she does not own, and who identifies him/herself as a 
cultivator. I categorise peasants, whether or not they grow their own food, or sell a 
surplus or some inedible crop for which there is a market (see Mair, 1984: 21-20).
4. Wives use birth control, whereas husbands usually do not use contraceptive devices 
themselves, even though they agree to birth control. Men usually do not adopt devices 
which may undermine male sexual ability and thus their manliness.
5. Perthes mentions that the inflation rate in Syria at the end of 1980s was at least 40 
percent (1992: 43-4).
6. Price of food stuffs was rapidly increasing in the black market. For example, the 
price of sugar rose to £S50 per kilogram at the end of July 1989, from £S25 the 
previous month. Sale of vegetables is free from State control and their price fluctuates 
according to supply and demand. The price of garlic, which is a necessity for 
preserving winter food rose rapidly form £S35 per kilogram in its harvest season to 
£S65 that summer.
7. The Syrian government, in which Alawis, one of the Syrian minorities, had power, 
promotes pan-Arabism and pan-Syrianism as an ideological option to get support from 
the Sunni majority and other minorities in order to stabilise their power and inspire 
nationalism (Seale, 1988: 186-7). The Qamishly Christians feel supported by this 
campaign, regard themselves as Syrian citizens and Arabs in the broader political 
context, and by doing so try to secure a position in Syrian society.
Chapter Three
1. Kurdish anti-government uprisings in Iraq did not win support from the Western 
coalition. From early March 1991 die United States asserted that it did not intend to 
become involved in the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq. President Bush summarised the 
coalition's position on 23 March, and stated that 'it would be better if everybody 
stayed out and let the Iraqi people decide what they want to do'. By the end of March, 
Saddam had repressed the insurgence and regained effective control of most of the 
Kurdish territories (Dannreuther, 1991/2,60-1).
2. Military challenge by Turkish nationalists to the Ottoman government began in areas 
Kurdish nationalists claimed as a part of their homeland. Moreover the Turkish 
nationalists were locked in struggle with the Greeks and Armenians. The Turkish 
nationalists needed the support of the Kurds to claim the land and properties of the 
Armenians. After the defeat of the Greeks and Armenians in 1922, and recognition of 
Turkey at the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, it became easy for the Turkish government, 
collaborating with the British, to depict the Kurdish demands for independence or 
autonomy as treason. The largest rebellion was the rebellion of sheikh Said in 1925, a 
religious sheikh who led the rebellion as a challenge to secularism and who was also 
one of the most outspoken nationalists. The Turks sent troops to put down the
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rebellion and burned houses and entire villages. Kurdish people were deported, 
persecuted and harassed by Turkish officers, soldiers, and gendarmes (see Olson, 
1989: 36-7, 85, 101, 119-20, 126).
3. Throughout this thesis the following conventional abbreviations will be used to 
indicate kin relations: F = father; M = mother; B = brother; Z = sister; S= son; D = 
daughter.
4. Considering their income levels, the size of brideprice is not very big. In 1990, one 
month's salary of a government employee was between £S2,000 ($50) and £S2,500 ( 
$63). I, however, was told by Shawaya and Kurdish men who were eligible to marry, 
that even though they had steady sources of income, they still could not marry. Their 
difficulty is derived from the following reasons. Although a young single man who 
works independently and does not use household resources to earn income is allowed 
to keep part of his income for his own use, part of his earning must accrue to his 
household members. Inflation and increase of living expenditure make it more difficult 
for the household to pool money for paying brideprices. Young men cannot save 
enough money for brideprice and a wedding reception by themselves. Moreover, 
agnates who will help with brideprice payment are only usra members of the 
bridegroom, that is, his father and brothers. His household head has responsibility for 
arranging marriages of its members. The household head receives brideprices for his 
daughters and is expected to use them for paying brideprice for his sons, even though 
the brideprices he received become his property. His young son is obliged to ask the 
permission of his household head and for financial support to pay brideprice. Without 
the permission and financial support from his usra members, he cannot marry.
5. Where a man has children by different wives, children borne by different wives are 
siblings, but are not the members of the same usra. The man is a head of separate usra 
-s composed of each wife and her children.
6. The Christian wedding ceremony seems to have western influences. I could not 
trace new elements introduced to the Christian wedding ceremony, and therefore I did 
not refer to the meaning of women's transition in Christian ceremonies. In the 
wedding ceremony of Suriyan Christians, for example, a brother of the bride (not her 
father) takes her to the entrance of the church, where the bridegroom takes her hand, 
and they enter the church together. Both the bride's and the bridegroom's kin attend 
the wedding ceremony.
Chapter Four
1. According to my information about Nabfla, I found no evidence of her involvement 
in any relationship or in prostitution.
Chapter Five
1. The use of henna refers to symbolic blood. Women apply henna during religious 
celebrations to their hair, hands and feet, suggesting an implicit identification of their 
devotion to God through their association with ritual sacrificing of victims for 
dedication to God.
2. 'Rivers in Genna' are mentioned many times in the Quran (The Koran, 1990: 46, 
70, 81, 90, 187, 189, 261, 316, 409, 531, 594, 638, 653: The House of Imran, 13, 
193, 197; Women, 60, 121; Repentance, 73, 90; The Bee, 33; Ta Ha, 77; The Spider, 
58; Victory, 5; The Forbidding, 8; The Constellations, 11; The Clear Sign, 7): God 
will admit the believers, who do deeds of righteousness, and turn to God in sincere 
repentance, into gardens underneath which rivers flow, therein dwelling for ever even, 
God's promise in truth.
3. One of the examples of the government incorporation policy can be seen in the 1990 
parliamentary elections. The government's innovation in this election was to reserve a
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large number of seats for independent deputies. The election of these deputies 
encouraged ethnic and sectarian groups in Qamishly to testify to political rights given to 
them by the government. This policy incorporated them in an advising function rather 
them giving them a slice of power (see Perthes, 1993: 26).
4. YazidI is a Kurdish tribal group who live in the district of Mosul, Jabal Sinjar, 
Diyarbakr, Aleppo and Armenia. Their religion perpetuates with the admixture of 
Manichaeism, Syriac Christianity and Islam (Menzel, 1987:1163-65). There were three 
families working as agricultural labourers for the sheikh in Dubana. They took refuge 
in Syria in 1983, because they were afraid of persecution by the Iraqi government. 
According to them, five hundred Yazidi families took refuge from Jabal Sinjar in 
Syrian Jazirah where they settled in several places, such as Reis al-'ain, Hassaka, Hawl, 
Qahtanlya and Malkiya. They find work as seasonal agricultural labourers in various 
villages in Jazirah.
Chapter Six
1. The standard wage for female labourers in the field in 1990 was 150 Lira per day. 
A comparison between the wages and price of tea, which is one of the daily necessities, 
is helpful in assessing their economic situation. According to informants, the price of 
tea before the land reform was five Lira per kilogram, and 250 Lira in 1990.
2. Friedl suggests a theoretical direction for analysing the shift in gender roles which 
includes contradictory phenomena to gender norms (1991): although neither norms of 
gender roles nor definition of public and private have shifted, boundaries of various 
action spheres between men and women have. This inconsistency reveals a 
contradiction to these generalised norms. Concepts of gender role and public versus 
private continue to be of limited use in the context of tracing shifts in women's 
participation in productive activities. Friedel also suggests that these concepts are 
elusive and imprecise tools in analysing social processes that seem to proceed in 
different directions simultaneously (195-214). I think that regardless of this 
inconsistency, as long as people in society use these concepts to define the boundaries 
in the course of daily routines, it is important to analyse how these concepts are applied 
and manipulated for their understanding of these productive activities.
3. I focus on attributed difference of gender roles in animal production, and male- 
female relations constructed by imposition of gender division. In the native discourse 
of Jazirah women on animal production, there is no demand for equal opportunities for 
controlling production resources and income as men have. The management of labour, 
income and resources is something which is bound up with household organisation and 
the gender division of labour (Moore, 1988: 56). This division of gender labour is 
created with reference to gender attributes in processes of constructing different 
identities between men and women.
4. From the other point of view, relative freedom of these women is their control over 
their daughters' labour which is important for animal rearing. Compare Schildkrout's 
study of secluded Hausa women's economic activity (1982: 55-81).
Glossary^)
ar 
'aila 
'abd
(pi. abld)
'aib
akh
(pi. ikhwan) 
aimani 
'cisha' 
ashfiri 
'ashra 
(pi. 'ashMr) 
'ciza'
bait 
bint 
badail 
baraka 
bint'atmn
great shame 
family
slave, servant
shameful 
brother, fellowman
iS**j  Armenian
dinner
A
Nestorian Christian
V* A
tribe, lineage, tribal
»I A confederation
period of consolation or
mourning
house, residential space
girl, unmarried woman 
^  ^ ^  direct exchange marriage
blessing, religious merit 
cousin, father's brother's
daughter
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dat
(pi. dawat) 
dahiya
diyafa
dimya
du
(pi. dawu) 
dunom 
(pi. dwan um) 
fallah
(pi. fallahfm) 
fakhd
(pi. afkhad)
gemia
gharib
(pi. gharaib)
haq
hara
haw fa
halal
haram
hubb
hunna
person, personality, nature, 
essence, possessor,
female characteristics 
an act offering a victim to
God in great Islamic feast,
victim 
hospitality
this world
&.9L 0
L b
possessor
J J Z
a square measure, ldunom
0.25 acres
peasant
branch of family or tribe, 
thigh
paradise
unrelated person, outsider, 
stranger
right, full possession 
quarter
the first seven days after 
wedding
permitted, legitimate, 
forbidden, inviolable, sin 
ltx^  love, affection
woman
J 1*

ibn 'amn 
Id al-adha
'Id al-fipr
ijbar 
ihtiram 
inti fa'
'ishq
M
(pi .jiran) 
ktmtm
khair
khyar
kiif
kuldani
lazim
mafv
malik
maswuliya
cousin, father's brother's
y d s A l l  yxc
son
* I great Islamic feast, literally
"the Feast of Sacrifice of 
Abraham"
religious feast at the end of 
Ramadan
obligation, compulsion 
respect, veneration 
 ^ utilising agricultural land
vested in the state
*. A
love, ardour of love, passion 
j  ^  neighbour
( O 1^ )
** daughter-in-law, a woman
protected by a family 
religious power, blessing,
personal benefit 
j  precedent marriage right of
male patrilateral parallel 
cousin
a male guardian of a boy's
circumcision 
Chaldean Christian
necessary, imperative,
obligatory 
bride-price
d d L owner, propnetor 
responsibility
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mawlid >J
mulzim 
mulla 
musa 'ada 
musahama
mutaakhir
mutakhallif
mutaqaddim
nas
nisba
nugul
qalb
qais
qarib
(pi. qaraib) 
raghba 
(pi. raghbat) 
Ramadan 
ruh
sharaf
sharif
sharifa
Shorn (male)/ 
Shawiya (female)
j,ej L
i .
0 Lalo 
6 - oA Ljxo
u r L
0  JLo OJ
V i /
’doc^
(O I^ v )
•  A1—9yOJ
* Ai__3bjj>»
„ * •  A
b-SUJ j * i
c r J 1- '  
0-j^ Lj
religious ceremony for
redemption, or prophet's 
birthday
binding, compulsory 
religious specialist 
help, support, contribution 
contribution, participation,
sharing 
backward, late
staying behind
advanced, preceding
people, others
attribution, relationship
a gift dish composed of rice
and clarified butter and its 
exchange between women 
heart, mind 
polite, good 
patrilineal kin, relative
wish, desire, object of desire,
sexual appetite
lunar month of fasting
soul, spirit
honour
honourable, honourable man 
virtuous woman 
rural Arab inhabitants
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(pi. Shawaya)  ^L)
sheikh
AJ^LuJ
suriyan
tabi'a
(pi. tabai')
ukhuwa
iisra C> j**i\
wajib t—trvl j
(pi. wajibat)
tribal or religious leader 
Syriac Christian 
disposition, characteristics
brotherhood
household
duty
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Note
1. The words which are presented here are used in ordinary conversations as spoken 
language in Jazirah region and therefore some of them take different forms from 
standard Arabic.
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